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INTRODUCTION 
  
 
 Corruption and Tolerance 
The day of September 14th, 2000, can be considered a turning point in 
Peruvian politics, one of those dramatic moments whose impact is still very much 
present throughout the years, affecting the whole political experience of an entire 
generation. That day, passed 6pm, congressmen Fernando Olivera, Luis Iberico, and 
Susana Higuchi from the political party Frente Independiente Moralizador (FIM), 
were in the middle of a press conference in the Bolívar Hotel, a few blocks away from 
the National Parliament 1 . Both Olivera and the FIM had by then earned for 
themselves a name between the few references in Peruvian politics regarding active 
efforts to fight corruption in the higher levels of government, a pursue that had been 
ongoing since the decade of the 80’s, during the first administration of Alan García. 
Having been particularly active over the previous years, when the Fujimori regime 
was starting to show some serious signs of wearing, and scandals involving corruption 
of its highest ranks had started to surface, the role of the FIM and other political 
actors that may be considered of opposition was being put to the test, in a year that 
was already tainted by massive public perception of electoral fraud and State capture 
ending with Alberto Fujimori as constitutional president for a third consecutive term. 
 
 The first cassette of what would be later dubbed the vladivideos, in reference 
to the President’s main advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, was exhibited for the attentive 
eyes of all the press corps and the Nation at large, in a show that could easily be 
described as abominable: Montesinos himself was seen in a small office of the 
National Intelligence System, of which he was considered to be a powerful figure (if 
not the head), sitting down with turncoat congressman Alberto Kouri, negotiating in 
monetary terms the latter’s departure from Perú Posible (PP) and his recruitment in 
the ranks of the government’s party. In short, the video was showing the effective 
bribing of a congressman to change his political allegiance, conducted by the person 
who had been publicly acknowledged throughout the past decade to be Fujimori’s 
right hand. Although such kind of activities had always been something of a 																																																								
1 Caretas, No 1637, “El Procurador en su Laberinto”, September 22nd, 2000. 
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possibility, considering the country’s long history of high-level corruption and the 
collapse of the party system, such public display of privatization of a public office, as 
Rasma Karklins (2005) would probably call, had never occurred in Peruvian history, 
let alone presented in such a climate of political instability and media coverage. 
 
 This first vladivideo, as time would show, proved to be just the proverbial ‘tip 
of the iceberg’, as in the months to follow hundreds of videos showing Fujimori’s 
advisor bribing and discussing corrupt (and other illegal) affairs involving members 
of the highest structures of the country would be brought to light, displayed by the 
newly-found independent media, which included almost every stakeholder in national 
politics: From journalist, media owners, congressmen, military officials, and judges, 
to showmen, soccer players, and private entrepreneurs. The public moneys seemed to 
be endless and for the taking, until eventually the list of convicted figures included 
president Alberto Fujimori himself, who had to be extradited from Chile after 
spending some years running from Peruvian justice in Japan. This overarching and 
far-reaching situation was not to be downplayed. In the words of Catherine M. 
Conaghan (2005, p. 243), “[n]ever in the history of Latin America had the hypocrisy 
and venality of a ruling elite been so thoroughly documented, and completely exposed 
on prime-time television.”  
 
In an interview published on April 2001, the appointed Minister of Justice of 
the transition government, Diego García-Sayan, referred to the state of corruption in 
the country in the following terms: 
 
[Referring to Montesino’s mafia]“How did this huge corruption machine appear in Peru? Without a 
doubt, the mafia took over Peruvian institutions with the tolerance and interference of a big part of 
Peruvian society… What to do so it doesn't happen again? It’s about, then, identifying the objective 
conditions that existed in our institutionalization and the citizens’ behavior that tolerated this situation 
to get produced and progress2. There are ethical and institutional matters that need to be identified to 
be able to face them and successfully fight the corruption phenomenon.”3 
 
																																																								
2 Italics are ours. 
3 Translated from the Spanish. CARETAS, No 1666, “Anticorrupción, Operación Tenaza,” April 19th, 
2001. 
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 But what does that supposedly tolerance of corruption means, and why is it 
important? First, let’s address the issue of corruption, and its impact on the different 
subsystems of a national polity.  
 
Corruption is a common blight that all countries of the international 
community suffer, albeit in different levels. Its distorting consequences are felt 
throughout all the subsystems of a country, with particularly corrosive consequences 
to economic, political, and social relations. Corruption erodes democracy by breaking 
the rule of law (Seligson, 2002, p. 410; Bratton, 2007, p. 106), hindering the effective 
exercise of civic and political rights (Bailey, 2006), and damaging any process of 
inclusion of the most vulnerable sectors of the population (McCann and Redlawsk, 
2006, p. 797; Warren, 2004); it damages the economy by reducing the total amount of 
foreign direct investment (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002), diverting resources from 
productive to rent-seeking activities (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 577; 
Morris, 2004, p. 4; Goudie and Stasavage, 1998, p. 113), increasing transaction costs 
(Seligson, 2002, p. 409), and limiting the availability of information required to 
conduct regular business operations; and probably in the most pernicious dimension, 
corruption reallocates public resources away from areas such as education and health 
(Mauro, 1995, 1997), and, overall, it reduces the level of generalized trust that society 
requires to develop social capital (Uslaner, 2008; Rothstein, 2005, p. 131) , which in 
time has a direct effect on both democracy and economic growth. These consequences 
are felt even more deeply in developing countries, where the resource diversion has a 
direct impact on the poor by limiting the amount and quality of social programs, and 
where political clientelism affects political choices and participation (for a 
comprehensive review of issues related to corruption see Heidenheimer and Johnston, 
2002). 
 
Despite the amount of corruption studies currently available, it wasn’t until the 
mid-90s that they became an important feature of social sciences. This ‘new interest’ 
in the causes and consequences of the phenomenon was a response to two different 
circumstances: First, the end of the Cold War shifted the priorities of the international 
public agenda, and corruption became not anymore a problem that could be easily 
overlooked by the primacy of other geostrategic interests in the ‘fight against 
communism’, but a heavy burden for the economic growth of the industrialized 
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countries and a source of inefficiency for the global market. The drive was naturally 
spearheaded by the United States, where anti-corruption reforms had been in its 
international policy agenda for the past three decades, since it enacted the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) (Weiss, 2009). And second, the newly 
developed research tools made possible the objective measure of different corruption 
indicators that fostered an increasing number of papers empirically testing long-
overdue theoretic approaches. 
 
These new circumstances have given place to the emergence of a scientific 
trend that could be succinctly defined as the “new economics of corruption” (as 
dubbed by Ades and Di Tella, 1997) and the new politics of corruption. These two 
approaches depart from the practices of previous decades, and try to apply empirical 
evidence in their assessments. Moreover, in the case of the political approach, finally 
a controversial debate has been settled: corruption is no longer seen with the 
capability of functioning as the ‘grease in the gears’ (Huntington, 1968), but is now 
widely considered to be pernicious for the political system. Most importantly, as we 
have mentioned, corruption is treated by the new empirical research as a threat for 
political legitimacy, and therefore, democracy in general. This problem is suspected 
to have especially important ramifications for countries where democracy hasn’t been 
totally consolidated, like in the region of Latin America.  
 
While some research has focused on the impact of democracy over corruption, 
there have been some attempts to invert this causal direction, particularly in the area 
of political support for democratic regimes. These studies have treated political 
support mainly as regime legitimacy, using victimization survey data to address the 
dangers of corruption on the citizen opinion (Seligson, 2002); but there are also new 
attempts to go further, and to add the ‘punishment’ dimension as negative political 
support, developing for this purpose the idea of individuals’ tolerance of corrupt 
activities within a society (Cameron et al., 2009). The importance of this new 
construct has been succinctly summed in the following way: “Apart from influencing 
evaluations of government’s performance, a variation in corruption tolerance or one 
may even say corruption acceptance, may impact regime support in general, political 
trust, and political behavior” (Tverdova, 2007, p. 9).  
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Going back to the specific Peruvian context, if we understand in similar terms 
the tolerance to corruption that García-Sayan was referring to as the citizens’ 
permissiveness in front of acts of corruption, then we may easily say that the situation 
hasn’t much improved since then. Regarding tolerance towards high-level corruption, 
in 2006 the ex-president Alan García Pérez, whose first government had continuously 
been denounced as highly corrupt, and who himself had to flee the country under the 
same charges in 1992, managed to end in second place of the presidential runoff of 
2001 and was surprisingly elected for a second government in 2006. In 2011, Keiko 
Fujimori, daughter (and interim First Lady) of the imprisoned ex-president Alberto 
Fujimori, ran for presidency with a success level that positioned her in a close second 
place behind current president Ollanta Humala Tasso.  
 
Such popular support of large sectors of the population for corrupt politicians 
says a lot about the role that corruption plays in Peru. The Peruvian ad hoc attorney 
general for cases of corruption, Antonio Maldonado, made in 2005 the following 
dramatic comparison: 
 
“4[W]hen the Nuremberg trial took place the 22nd defendant was the German society, because Hitler 
cannot be explained if not for the German society that promotes or tolerates him. In the Peruvian case 
such social self-criticism hasn't occurred. It suffices to see the polls. There are important sectors whose 
heart is with [Alberto] Fujimori.5”  
 
From his words we can evidence that the citizens’ involvement in the 
sustenance and reproduction of corruption is a real and acknowledged fact in both the 
academic6 and political circles. On the other hand, the citizens’ participation in low-
level corruption such as bureaucratic bribery also continues to run high: Transparency 
International’s (TI) Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) reports an average of 17.8% 
for the period 2005-2010 of surveyed people declaring to have paid a bribe in the 
previous twelve months7.  
 
																																																								
4 Translated from Spanish. 
5 Caretas, No 1885, “El Procurador en su Laberinto”, August 4th, 2005. 
6 Similar words as Antonio Maldonado’s are expressed by Eduardo Dargent (2005, p. 383). 
7 Statistics performed by us.  
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Nevertheless, and probably as a result of the highly differentiated levels of 
technical capabilities that have marked the guidelines and agendas of the pre and post 
‘measurement revolution’, much of the new research strongly focuses on 
sophisticated models of econometric measurement without taking the same degree of 
attention over the theoretical backbone of each specific study. Whereas corruption 
studies have addressed in a profuse way the determinants and characteristics of 
bureaucratic corruption, on one side, and those of the private economic agents (either 
national or international) on the other, the impact and determinants of the citizen’s 
participation in a corrupt transaction have been approached in relation to political 
definitions such as trust, legitimacy, and support, while his/her impact on the 
reproduction of corruption itself has been mostly ignored (or modestly suggested). 
With few exceptions, the citizen is understood so far as being in the periphery and just 
having a passive role in corruption8.  
 
 
 Plan for the present study  
If citizens’ tolerance towards corruption is as damaging as Peruvian officials 
and international scholars have suggested, then, what forms does it take, and what are 
its determinants in the case of Peru? The main objective of the present study will be to 
answer these two main questions and thus to correct the current scholarly trend by 
filling up the void regarding the relation between the citizenry and corruption. This 
effort implies four concatenated aims: First, a clear definition of the construct needs 
to be developed, accounting for the different forms that it may take; second, the 
analysis of corruption tolerance will require the identification and employment of a 
theoretically grounded indicator, based on the preceding definition; third, a theoretical 
model for the potential determinants of corruption tolerance will be constructed; and 																																																								8	Karklins (2005, p. 155), however, orderly expresses her discomfort with such situation: 
“[T]here are three types of actors who need to be considered in any anti-corruption strategy: the 
corrupter, the corruptee, and the third actor. Although the main goal is to deter people from initiating 
corrupt acts to begin with, a narrow focus on the first actor can limit results. Corrupters rely on the 
passive or active collaboration of second actors, and in many situations it is easier to deter corruption 
by focusing on this second link in the process of ‘misuse of public power.’ If potential victims and 
other third actors become galvanized to work to prevent corruption, it is possible to limit or even 
reverse the spiral of corruption.” (Italics are ours)  
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fourth, we will use all these instruments in the analysis of the phenomenon as 
experienced by the Peruvian citizenry. This last step will be accomplished by the 
employment of the Latin American Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) 
AmericasBarometer dataset of 2006 for the country case of Peru, developed by the 
Vanderbilt University. Therefore, this study can be said to be twofold: A theoretical 
model of citizens’ corruption tolerance will be built upon the literature suggestions 
and requirements, and with it will be possible to explain why Peruvians behave as 
usually depicted by national officials such as Diego García-Sayan and Antonio 
Maldonado. The results will show that individuals in that country tend to support 
corrupt politicians when they have more information, political knowledge, partisan 
attitudes, economic satisfaction, democratic and community-oriented values, and 
positive attitudes toward the corruption phenomenon; and they punish them when 
they perceive high-level corruption to be generalized, and they are more politically 
efficacious. With regards to low-level (or petty) corruption, Peruvians will be shown 
to collude when they also have tendencies to economically support their communities, 
and when they feel politically dissatisfied; on the other hand, they will stand for their 
own rights and reject to be extorted by public officials when perceiving that others are 
also standing for themselves, and when effective complaint mechanisms are available. 
 
 The study is divided in two parts. Part One consists of the first five chapters, 
in which the complete theoretical model for the study of corruption tolerance is 
developed: Chapter 1 starts by disaggregating the possible interactions of the citizen 
with corruption in three parts –high-level, low-level collusion, and low-level 
extortion; then, it reviews existent literature on the term ‘corruption tolerance’ in 
order to identify common and differentiated usage, finding in general a preference to 
associate the citizen’s tolerance with his/her attitudes towards malfeasance, and a 
small but important tradition on implicit tolerance as electoral behavior, nonetheless; 
it finishes by addressing the importance of corruption tolerance for the overall level of 
corruption in a society. Chapter 2 applies the tripartite corruption scheme found in the 
previous chapter, an builds the theoretical models for high-level and low-level 
corruption tolerance; for the former, a model of vertical accountability is adopted, 
which envisages the manifestation of corruption tolerance as the last stage in a 
process that starts with available information, and finishes with the punishment of 
corrupt political actors; for the latter, the Theory of Planned Behavior is called to 
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represent tolerance as an action determined by attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioral control; throughout the chapter, an argument is made for the 
superiority of a behavioral approach to the tolerance indicator in front of the 
traditional attitudinal perspective. Chapters 3 and 4 undertake the test of our 
behavioral (or action-based) indicators, further confirming our previous assumptions 
regarding the non-equivalence of attitudes to behavior. In the case of high-level 
corruption (Chapter 3), two indicators are especially constructed for this task 
reflecting the politician’s history and electoral offer, which will allow us the recreate 
the citizen’s vote as a degree of support or punishment for corruption; after this, 
ordered logistic regression is employed to test the relation between our behavioral 
indicator of high-level corruption tolerance and a classic attitudinal one, resulting in a 
statistically significant, but small, coefficient. In the case of low-level corruption 
(Chapter 4), a theory-driven selection of indicators will allow the disaggregation of 
data between collusion and extortion, a difference not originally contemplated in the 
data set; and the employment of a similar statistical technique as the one used in the 
previous chapter will show that, for the most part, attitudes and behavior regarding 
low-level corruption tolerance, in its deviant or compliant form, are statistically 
unrelated.  Finally, in Chapter 5, we identify all potential determinants of corruption 
tolerance based on the models developed earlier and the theoretical and empirical 
progress of past literature. 
 
 Part Two consists of the last five chapters, where the study turns to the 
empirical analysis and interpretation of the specific determinants behind the levels of 
corruption tolerance in Peru, drawing from the models and indicators developed in the 
previous section. In Chapters 6 and 7 we analyze the statistical impact of the multiple 
factors identified over the behavioral indicators of Peruvians’ corruption tolerance. 
For high-level corruption tolerance, a combination of principal-components factoring 
analysis and more simple aggregation techniques is employed to create a composite 
indicator for each variable, using survey questions of the LAPOP’s dataset of 2006; 
then, a Structural Equation Model is built, partially mirroring the dynamic of the 
vertical accountability process. For the analysis of low-level corruption, the same 
strategy for the creation of composite indicators is adopted, and Spearman’s rank 
correlation is applied to test the two sets of variables pertaining to cases of collusion 
and extortion. Chapters 8 and 9 elaborate on the findings of the previous two chapters, 
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by taking statistical results into perspective and drawing explanations completely 
embedded in Peruvian reality; the result is a holistic approach (involving historical, 
political, sociological, economic, and anthropological information on Peru) that 
interprets seemingly enigmatic relations, evidencing and clarifying the complex state 
of corruption tolerance in the country. Finally, Chapter 10 concludes with a review of 
the outcomes of this study, warning about some shortcomings that warrant caution in 
the straight adoption and implementation of the empirical results, and suggesting 
some future venues for research and policy consideration.  
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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
THE IMPORTANCE AND USAGE OF CORRUPTION TOLERANCE 
 
 
1.1. THE POSITION OF THE CITIZEN IN A CORRUPTION SCHEME 
 
Corruption is by itself a complex phenomenon. Its usual illegality (if not 
unethicality) prompts all actors engaged in its performance to stay in the ‘shadows’, 
to act away from the scrutiny of the public eye in their exchange of financial and 
other desired assets for public power. Contrary to other criminal forms, corruption is 
believed to be particularly damaging, for it doesn’t exploit individual victims, but 
instead feeds over the entirety of the polity, thus stressing the social bounds that link 
all of its members. The most common definition of this phenomenon, which will be 
used in the present study, states that corruption is the misuse of public office for 
private gains (Balán, 2011, p. 4; McCann and redlawsk, 2006, p. 798; UNODC, 2004, 
p. 11; Anderson and Tverdova, 2003, p. 92; Seligson, 2002, p. 408; Kunicová and 
Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 577; Treisman, 2000, p. 399) that “occurs at the interface of 
public and private sectors” (Rose-Ackerman, 1997, p. 31). This seemingly innocuous 
definition involves, hence, such activities as pork barreling, electoral fraud, 
embezzlement, nepotism, cronyism, State capture, racketeering, bribery, etc.  
 
A main element to keep in mind in any analysis of corruption is that, in some 
direct or indirect way, there will always be a form of tax over the citizenry at large as 
a consequence. That is what gives corruption its uniqueness. Such externality can take 
the form of economic, political, or social costs, as briefly reviewed in the 
introduction. Because of that externality, then, some authors have suggested to think 
of corruption as a dynamic model consisting of three actors: A benefactor (usually in 
the form of a private person), a beneficiary (usually in the form of a public official), 
and a third, disadvantaged actor (society) (Spengler, 2010, p. 8; Karklins, 2005, p. 
155). Although this model can best describe any type of corrupt exchange that 
includes a bribe, with some leniency its potential could be stretched to include 
scenarios such as graft or racketeering; regardless of its non-mutually exclusive 
	 17	
categories, it supplies us with a basic scheme to position our societal actors and 
simulate their possible interactions. 
 
When placing the citizen in such tripartite scheme, it comes as obvious that 
he/she may occupy the same positions as the roles that drive his/her political 
interactions in society: A passive player in the process of political decisions (as most 
of the population is in representative democracies, most of the time), and reactive in 
the stage of policy implementation. As a passive player, the citizen can mainly be 
described as part of the unorganized civil society, and therefore understood for the 
purposes of this study as the third, disadvantaged actor in a corrupt exchange; this is 
the reason why corruption (in all of its forms) is hidden from the public, as it 
victimizes all others that are excluded (Uslaner, 2008, p. 9). On the other hand, 
citizens also have an opportunity to engage in corruption themselves in every 
opportunity when they encounter the public sphere. Bribery of low-ranking public 
officials is a very common phenomenon in most developing countries, and it is 
performed by men and women acting as private citizens (although there is nothing 
private in illegally paying their way through official interactions with agents of the 
State). In such cases, the person adopts the role of the benefactor, the ‘corruptor’ as it 
is commonly referred to. 
 
If we subscribe to this description of the possible roles of the citizen in a 
tripartite corruption scheme, we can conclude, then, that he/she has a part in both 
categories of high-level and low-level corruption9 (Uslaner, 2008, p. 132). We may 
think of this distinction as the two-fold nature of the individual: A political and an 
economic animal. Our argument shouldn’t be interpreted as the identification of 
mutually exclusive roles of the citizen, but rather of the two possible scenarios that 																																																								
9  We prefer to use these terms instead of the also commonly employed grand/petty or 
political/bureaucratic corruption. The distinction between grand and petty corruption has been said to 
be monetary, highlighting the importance of the ‘profitability’ of the act (UNDP, 2008, p. 8; Uslaner, 
2008, p. 10-11). On the other hand, although usually used as synonyms of the previous terms, the 
distinction between political and bureaucratic corruption informs the nature of the actors involved, 
where political (or administrative) corruption “involves political decision-makers” (Amundsen, 1999, 
p. 3) as opposed to ‘street-level’ officials (Khan, 2003, p. 4; Andvig et al., 2000, p. 13). Both 
distinctions have their deficiencies: A focus on the size of the bribe or the financial assets exchanged 
completely avoids considerations regarding the actors involved (although different authors tend to 
equalize the amounts of money to the ranks of the official actor, which is not always the case in real 
life), and therefore the possible reaction of the citizenry; while an exclusive focus on the official’s rank 
is a somehow unclear criteria to discriminate cases, due to the heterogeneity of selection processes and 
extension of duties of public offices (Liiv, 2004, p. 11). 
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may confront him/her as an average member of the unorganized civil society10. High-
level corruption (HLC) is understood as any corrupt activity involving high officials 
of the administrative and political system, on one hand, and economic agents 
engaging in a sizable activity outside of the scope of individual patterns, on the other. 
In this scenario, as explained by Morris (2008, p. 392; see also Németh et al., 2011, p. 
61; Uslaner, 2008, p. 14; and Tverdova, 2007, p. 3), would be futile to look for 
corrupt interactions involving the citizen as a direct actor (for example, in cases 
involving procurement or State capture). Low-level corruption (LLC), conversely, 
involves the interaction between lower-ranks government officials and regular 
citizens driven (for the most part) by economic incentives. 
 
 Moving beyond the tripartite model, a commonly added complexity to 
corruption studies is the disaggregation of LLC between collusive and extortive 
bribery (Uslaner, 2008, p. 37; Khan, 2003, p. 5), which describe the nature of the two 
possible relations between corruptor and corruptee. Collusive corruption is a situation 
where both directly implicated actors engage in a corrupt transaction in order to 
obtain some benefit which they are not entitled to. Extortive corruption, on the other 
hand, “means that the government official has the discretionary power to refuse or 
delay a service… in order to extract a rent from the private agent in the form of a 
bribe” (Brunetti and Weder, 2003, p. 1804). In this way, it is possible to appreciate 
that the incentives to engage in one form or the other of LLC corruption are quite 
different11.  
 
 Looking into it from a different, but supportive, perspective, we can also see 
the relevance of these two ways of categorizing the citizen’s relation to corruption by 
addressing some intuitive considerations regarding the individuals’ potential 
evaluation of HLC and LLC. To do this, we borrow from past studies to elicit some 
questions whose answers will prove to reflect in more familiar and practical terms the 
same kind of theoretical conclusions that we have derived above.  																																																								
10 The ‘average’ citizens of whom we will talk throughout this study should not be confused which 
citizens occupying public posts, elected leaders, or even members of civic groups. 11	Probably the most transparent description of collusive and extortive scenarios can be found in Bauhr 
and Nasiritousi (2011). In their description, the authors refer to collusion as a situation where a bribe is 
given to gain advantages not entitled to, whereas extortion occurs when services that citizens are 
legally entitled to are conditioned upon a bribe (p. 3).	
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- How is the citizen involved in corruption? As the distance between 
individuals and the State seems to have acquired complex ways, due to the 
varying degree of the latter’s intervention in daily life and the subsequent size 
of its apparatus, the limits between public and private spheres are not always 
clear, and in many instances they are permeated by the presence of corruption. 
The points of contact between them are usually as mundane as paying bills, 
filing taxes, receiving traffic tickets, and the like, whereas every certain 
number of years citizens are called upon to cast their vote in support of new or 
old representatives. That is the general sum of the public’s involvement in the 
political subsystem. In the same way, their relation with corruption mirrors 
their relation with the State: Citizens can engage themselves in LLC in any of 
those points of contact mentioned above, but are usually restricted in their 
interaction with HLC to those reactive moments of electoral participation, 
when they have the opportunity to punish a corrupt politician, or to reward a 
honest one. For this reasons, his/her involvement in corruption clearly 
differentiates between LLC and HLC. 
  
- How does it affect him/her? In the words of Rasma Karklins (2005, p. 68), 
“corruption is bad if it occurs at the highest level of government, because that 
endangers the interest of the entire state, whereas individual corruption is seen 
to involve the interests of only a few people.” Her words can be interpreted as 
concerning the individual’s self-image over the outcomes of corruption: When 
it happens in the highest levels of the government, all members of the polity 
feel tricked and lied to, their moneys robbed and their trust betrayed; however, 
corruption of the kind of petty payments to low wage officials may seem as 
almost a private matter, something that only affects the ones involved, and 
maybe one or two individuals that may be neglected as a consequence. For 
this reason, the difference between ending up losing, or potentially winning, 
from corruption, mirrors again the difference between HLC and LLC12. 
However, there is a detail that Karklins’ account does not consider at that 
moment, but which is picked up in another point of her study (2005, pp. 20, 
150): Every corrupt interaction which the citizen engages in does not 																																																								12	Uslaner (2008, p. 9) also describes the “excluded party” of political corruption (HLC) as “almost 
always the loser in the corrupt transaction”.	
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necessarily work in his favor, not just regarding the possible legal 
ramifications, but because he/she may be forced to pay for something that was 
already his/her right to obtain in the first place. Obviously, we are talking 
about cases of extortion. Therefore, an extra possible effect on his/her 
wellbeing might be a detrimental one, positioning him as a winner of the 
corrupt transaction only in cases of collusive LLC, whereas the opposite will 
be true in cases of HLC and extortive LLC. 
    
- What are the general consequences of such event? Inequality. Either 
through the big amounts of money involved in cases of grand corruption, or 
the small, petty payments to local bureaucrats, corruption always pushes in the 
direction of economic and social inequality. Uslaner (2008) partially proposes 
and tests this assumption: “Grand corruption is all about inequality –officials 
and entrepreneurs getting rich illegitimately. Petty corruption doesn’t create a 
big income gap” (p. 44). However, petty corruption of the one designated here 
as extortive LLC can also have sizable effects, as van Vuuren (2004, p. 16) 
finds in the case of South Africa: The poor’s “inability to access basic services 
due to the demand for bribes will further deepen socio-economic cleavages 
and contribute to their alienation from the democratic process”. Hence, once 
more, we identify two separate ‘cuts’ having detrimental consequences for the 
individual’s wellbeing. Contrary to Uslaner’s warning that only high-level 
corruption is perceived as increasing a society’s inequality (2008, p. 137), we 
posit that another necessary analytical cut for the effect of corruption must be 
performed between extortive and collusive LLC, where the former must be 
considered harmful, and only the latter relatively innocuous. 
  
- Who gets benefitted? Although the answer to this question directly draws 
from the arguments presented in the previous three, there is an obvious but 
important factor that makes this question important for the definition of a 
citizens stand on the matter of corruption: If the individual gets harmed by it, 
then, who benefits? Members of his/her kinship? Fellow partisans? Other 
citizens of his/her socio-economic group? The answer to this question is 
important to understand how might the individual possibly feel and react when 
confronted with a corrupt scenario. In societies where trust is not widespread, 
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and people identify and rely more (or exclusively) on familiar ties, “they will 
feel less guilty about acting dishonestly to people who are not part of their 
moral community” (Uslaner, 2008, p. 49). In other words, collusive LLC 
would not necessarily be judged as pernicious to the individual, as he/she is 
directly benefitted by it, or at least gives him/her the means to do so. However, 
when others in the higher spheres of the government are seen acting in a 
similar way, the public reaction drastically shifts to one of disapproval and 
rejection13. Similarly, addressing the circumstances where regular citizens are 
seen their money stolen not by distant political leaders, but by venal street-
level public officials, the classic corruption-scholar Robert Klitgaard (1988, p. 
191) considered that “[e]xtortion seems a particularly nasty form of 
corruption. It leads not only to inefficiencies but the alienation of citizens from 
their government.” Although there always exist the possibility that individuals 
might feel more lenient towards surrendering a small bribe to a extorting 
bureaucrat than they may feel towards politicians treating the State as their 
private fiefdom, we consider Klitgaard to be intuitively correct and expect 
citizens to also resent the predatory behavior of officials that, after all, are paid 
with public moneys. Therefore, and once again, a simple distinction between 
LLC and HLC would be insufficient to account for the public reaction towards 
all kinds of corruption, as extortion will probably be perceived too as 
benefitting others in a power position, whereas collusion at least provides the 
citizen with a benefit (even if only potentially).   
 
To sum up the above discussion, any attempt to analyze the role of civil 
society regarding corruption invariably requires us to consider splitting the corruption 
variable into three distinct dimensions: High-level corruption (HLC), low-level 
collusive corruption, and low-level extortive corruption14.  																																																								13	Uslaner (2008, p. 92), posits that “grand corruption makes people… more envious of those who 
have become wealthy by dishonest means, while petty corruption has little effect on people’s 
attitudes”, implying that the idea of the other, the rich and powerful members of society being the ones 
getting benefited from corruption while the rest see their own situation worsen, makes all the difference 
regarding public attitudes about corruption.	
14 The only situation where the division of the citizen’s position in a corruption scheme between three 
different dimensions may appear to be insufficient is that of clientelism or patronage. Such scenario, 
involving the selling of votes or other forms of political rights in exchange for material benefits (either 
individual or communal), could theoretically be described as high-level extortion or collusion 
(depending on the sense of entitlement to the benefits that may pervade that particular polity). 
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1.2. CORRUPTION TOLERANCE: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
As mentioned earlier, the interaction between citizens and corruption has been 
determinant in studies related to trust, legitimacy, and others; but in recent years there 
has appeared a new interest in the role of the citizen as a determinant him/herself of 
the preservation and perpetuation of corruption, especially in underdeveloped 
countries: Studies addressing the corruption tolerance among citizens. In itself, this 
new venue of research appears to be trying to fill a void in previous corruption-related 
studies, but being a recently developed perspective, it still struggles with some basic 
elements and characteristics of what ‘corruption tolerance’ as a specific concept 
should cover. This fact is made explicit by Blake (2009, p. 96) when he states that 
“despite interest in public attitudes toward corruption, to date there has been almost 
no systematic, cross-national research into the determinants of citizens’ tolerance of 
corruption”.  
 
A point in case can be made by quickly reviewing some of the studies that has 
addressed the concept of ‘corruption tolerance’ either by directly constructing it as 
dependent or independent variable, or by referring to it in a rather natural, every-day 
meaning.  
 
The literature on citizen’s corruption tolerance can be divided in two main 
groups: a) tolerance as citizen’s support for corrupt politicians; and, b) tolerance as 
citizen’s willingness to engage in corruption. The first group can be further divided in 
overt and covert support, depending on the research focus in reelection rates and/or 
voting behavior15, or mere attitudes towards politicians or political institutions, 
respectively. An example of corruption tolerance as overt support can be found in 
Chang and Kerr (2009), where they link corruption tolerance with the citizens’ 
behavior to “throw the rascals out” (p. 5). Other studies treating tolerance as overt 
support have a stronger emphasis on the link between corruption scandals and 																																																																																																																																																														
However, due to the decision to focus our analysis on average citizens not pertaining to any specific 
political division inside the country, and considering the fact that clientelism by definition involves the 
segregation of citizens between insiders and outsiders, we maintain HLC as a single construct and 
reserve the case of clientelism for its inclusion in the study of the determinants of high-level corruption 
tolerance in Chapter 5.  15	For a quick review of the literature on corruption scandals and their electoral consequences, see 
Barberá et al. (2012, pp. 5-6). 
	 23	
reelection rates, and while they use the concept of tolerance in a barely explicit (and 
even entirely implicit) way, they have a longer history of existence and much work 
have been done around them. Such is the case of the work from Peters and Welch 
(1980) and Hibbing and Welch (1997), where they assess the effect of corruption 
charges in congressional elections. This early approach have been followed more 
recently by Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2012, p. 13), who ask if Brazilian voters are 
more “tolerant of corruption when politicians provide public goods”; and by McCann 
and Redlawsk (2006) and Chang and Golden (2004), showing that partisanship has an 
important impact on the judgment of corrupt scenarios, and that voters in Italy are as 
tolerant as American voters, respectively.   
 
On the other hand, studies including the specific concept ‘corruption 
tolerance’ treated as covert support are found in Tverdova (2007, p. 9), where she 
succinctly comments that “tolerance… of corruption… may impact regime support in 
general”; Seligson (2002, p. 427), where he designates a respondent as “tolerant of 
corruption” when he/she lacks recognition of bribery of a deputy as a corrupt act; and, 
Gillespie and Okruhlik (1991, p. 87), when referring to tolerance of corruption as the 
level of social pressure over incumbents for the eradication of malfeasance. A similar 
treatment of the construct is given in the words of Tanaka (2005, p. 365), who posits 
that the citizens’ tolerance of corruption is a function of the efficacy of the 
government in supplying tangible benefits to the population. However, the most 
important example of this line of research is given by Manzetti and Wilson (2009, p. 
89), who include in their empirical study of public support for corrupt governments a 
measure of corruption tolerance operationalized as the justifiability of bribe-taking. 
Finally, isolated mentions of corruption tolerance are present in Redlawsk and 
McCann (2005, p. 265) and Durand (2005, p. 287).   
 
Corruption tolerance has also taken the form of, or been operationalized as, 
the citizens’ willingness to offer and/or justify a bribe and the ability to recognize 
such behavior as corrupt. Although not all authors would subscribe to this description 
of citizens’ low-level corruption tolerance (LCT) when referring in one way or the 
other to the concept, it does represent an inclusive approach that may be either 
explicit or implicit at different levels in this group of literature. Sautu (2002) develops 
a scale in order to classify middle-class citizens of Buenos Aires, Argentina, 
	 24	
according to their level of “tolerance-resignation” (p. 4), derived from answers to 
hypothetical cases of LLC such as bribing a policeman or getting a license through a 
‘middle-man’ (p. 6). This same description of the individual’s willingness to engage 
in bribery can be detected in the analysis presented by Del Castillo and Guerrero 
(2003), although in a more subtle and implicit way, as in Moyal et al. (2004), where 
even though tolerance is not explicitly mentioned, it can be understood from the 
context (determinants of citizens’ proclivity to offer a bribe). Regarding the 
justifiability of the corrupt act, Moreno’s (2002, p.6) “index of corruption 
permissiveness”, Gatti et al. (2003, p. 7), and Blake (2009, p. 102) use the same 
question regarding attitudes toward bribe taking: ‘Is someone “accepting a bribe in 
the course of their duties” justifiable?’ Their intention, as Moreno’s index clearly 
indicates, is to assess bribery’s legitimacy as a socio-political instrument, somehow 
close to the “routinization” of corruption that Salzman (2009, p. 5) postulates for petty 
corruption in Latin America. Finally, Del Castillo and Guerrero (2003, p. 26) report 
the results of a survey conducted by the Mexican chapter of Transparency 
International, which found that up to 18.7% of heads of household did not recognized 
a mordida (bribe) as a form of corruption. 
 
Aside from employing the basic description (and some future tenets) of what 
has been referred to as LCT, several studies have explicitly used the construct in 
varying degrees. Campos-Ortiz (2010, p. 22) categorizes tolerant and intolerant 
subjects based on their willingness and defense of corrupt behavior, as opposed to 
“previous experience”. In an analysis of perception of corruption among Estonian 
citizens, Uslaner (2008, p. 162) posits that “ordinary people are more tolerant, 
perhaps because they have experienced petty corruption more often”, while the Open 
Society Institute (2002) thoroughly employs this concept to describe some elements 
of the accession process of the new members of the European Union (Karklins, 2005, 
p. 67). But such worries are not a particularism of that region, but it is also a matter of 
worry in Latin America. With a behavioral intervention in Brazil in mind, Taylor 
(2009, p. 167) suggests that corruption tolerance may be reduced “through education 
and media awareness programs”; and Ortiz and Calderon (2005, p. 139), and Morón 
(2005, p. 147), call attention to the results of a national poll conducted in 2002 by 
NGO Pro-Ética showing the Peruvian citizens are highly tolerant to LLC.  
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Finally, only one study undertakes the task of measuring corruption tolerance 
as understood by both main groups reviewed above: Cameron et al (2009), following 
an experimental approach to the study of corrupt behavior among citizens in 
Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore, emphasizes the level and frequency of 
punishment behavior and that of engagement in corruption, understanding them as 
two sides of a citizen’s corruption-related activity. 
 
As we can see, the concept of corruption tolerance has indeed being around 
the scholarly production since the beginning of the new century, in both explicit and 
implicit ways, in an increasing rate. However, to the moment, only one study (Chang 
and Kerr, 2009, p. 4) has cared to define it as a first step for its scientific inclusion in 
properly constructed corruption studies, while the rest remain using it in vague and 
anecdotic terms. Such carefree approach has resulted, as it can be perceived above, in 
a heterogeneous operationalization of the construct, which can be either considered a 
set of perceptions, attitudes, or behavior, depending on the specific author and 
objective, with a seemingly higher preference for an attitudinal equation. There is, on 
the other hand, an important scholarly tradition that employs the basic idea behind 
corruption tolerance as a pattern of electoral conducts and actions, an approach that 
has been favored more in cases of high-level corruption tolerance (HCT). 
 
 Whereas the recent group of work suggest a diversity of technical and 
methodological strategies that enrich the discussion over the citizens’ involvement in 
their society’s level of corruption, their lack of homogeneity in the construction of the 
corruption tolerance concept prompts the need for some basic and common terms for 
the definition and operationalization of this multidimensional concept.  
 
 
1.3. THE IMPACT OF CITIZENS’ CORRUPTION TOLERANCE ON THE OVERALL 
LEVEL OF CORRUPTION 
 
The level of corruption in any particular society is said to depend to a large 
extent on the decisions that citizens take when confronted with corrupt scenarios. Not 
only this is implicit throughout the reviewed literature treating the concept of 
corruption tolerance, but it is masterly pointed by Manzetti (2000, p. 139) when 
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explaining that “high corruption takes place when: (1) many checks and balances 
among the three branches of government and the institutional mechanisms to combat 
corruption are weak or are not used; (2) there are no self-restraints in profiting from 
corruption as commissions reach extremely high levels; and (3) corruption is so 
widespread at any social level as to be accepted and tolerated.” This perspective takes 
for the topic of corruption what has already been pointed out in the literature dealing 
with tax evasion. In an enlightening analysis of the causes of different levels of tax 
evasion in Chile and Argentina, Marcelo Bergman (2009) revisits the concept of 
equilibrium to explain why the same basic system of tax collection proves to be 
effective in Chile but fails in the case of Argentina. His argument is that the 
interaction between voluntary compliance on the one hand, and the role of 
enforcement on the other, can develop in a stable environment of compliance or non-
compliance equilibrium, upon which the citizen makes rational decisions based on the 
expected choices of others. In its basic terms, Bergman presents a model where 
individual compliance is based on, and reproduced by, society itself, and the final 
aggregated result depends as much on this society-based consideration as on the level 
and strength of governmental enforcement. 
 
The same case seems to be the one raised by Manzetti in his list of three 
factors for an environment of high corruption. The first two, checks and balances and 
the level of self-restraint, are none other than the set of formal and informal 
“constraints that shape human interactions” (North, 1990, p. 3) on the governmental 
side of the political system. The third factor, which will be the center of our research 
efforts, refers to the citizen’s compliance to that corrupt set of formal and informal 
rules, his/her acceptance and coexistence with corruption in society. As advanced by 
the theory of tax compliance, we can then address the level of corruption in any 
country mostly by referring to the characteristics of the formal institutions 
(understood only as the legal governmental structures, and the bureaucratic and 
political culture of those who fill such structures) and the level of corruption tolerance 
among the citizens. By doing this, we will be able to see that the main theoretical 
contribution of the present study will be to develop an appropriate tool for the 
identification of the different determinants of corruption tolerance in a given 
community, and from there to empirically assert the conditions upon which efficiently 
employ the scarce public resources in the fight against corruption in Peru.    
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1.4. SUMMARY 
 
In this chapter we saw that the appropriate way of addressing corruption 
tolerance from the side of the citizen should undoubtedly start by identifying the 
different roles he/she may cast in a corruption scheme, which is a consequence of the 
multiple types of corruption that exists in society. Although many authors and 
International Organizations tend to approach it as a single and unified construct (a 
major example being Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index), 
scholarly production has been able to disaggregate it following two different 
divisions, which we adopt here in relation to the citizen’s potential direct or indirect 
involvement: High-level versus low-level corruption, and collusion versus extortion.  
 
Past literature mentioning or treating corruption tolerance has also followed 
the divergent lines of HLC and LLC, with the former describing it as the citizen’s 
support for corrupt politicians, and the latter as the citizen’s willingness to offer a 
bribe and his/her ability to recognize such behavior as corrupt. In cases of HLC, such 
support has been described in more overt or covert terms, depending on their focus on 
behavioral or attitudinal responses, respectively, while studies addressing corruption 
tolerance in cases of LLC have mainly operationalized it as an attitudinal response. 
Concerning the identified difference between collusive and extorted bribery, however, 
there is no work that could be found mentioning (or even assuming) tolerance towards 
instances of extortion, a problem resulting from the scarce academic production on 
that specific type of corruption. 
 
Finally, and before moving on to the concrete work on the tolerant construct, 
this chapter presented an argument about the importance of understanding its 
mechanisms, from the citizens’ perspective, for the evolution of corruption on a 
national level. The extent to which corruption is spread in society is said to be the 
result of the state of legal institutions, and the degree to which members of the polity 
accept and comply with practices of malfeasance in those formal structures. In this 
way, we can see that the level of corruption tolerance in the citizenry can potentially 
account for as much as half of the pervasiveness of graft and bribery in both high and 
low levels of the political-bureaucratic system. The reason is real and intuitive: 
Without individuals supporting corrupt leaders in government, and others who accept 
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to pay a bribe in order to gain access to lawful or unlawful services, corruption would 
promptly decay from lack of resources.  
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: 
BUILDING THE CONCEPT OF CORRUPTION TOLERANCE 
 
 
As we have seen, the concept of corruption tolerance, and as a consequence its 
operationalization, is not homogeneous in regard to the political dimensions it 
includes. Interestingly enough, only one author engages in the task of explicitly 
defining corruption tolerance: It denotes “citizens’ proclivity to condone a political 
actor’s engagement in corrupt transactions” (Chang and Kerr, 2009, p. 4). Whereas 
we don’t oppose this definition, we think it is unable to cover the whole range of the 
citizen’s relations with corruption that can impact a political system. This seems 
evident when we try to apply the concept to the framework developed earlier 
regarding the role of the citizen in a corrupt transaction. This role was decided as 
tripartite: a) the citizen as the disadvantaged party in a scenario of high-level 
corruption; b) the citizens as the willing benefactor in a scenario of collusion; and, c) 
the citizen as the forced, losing party in a scenario of extortion. When these roles are 
re-casted in reference to the level of tolerance towards the corrupt activity in case, we 
will see that each one of them bends the concept in a very specific way. 
 
In the first case, the citizen’s corruption tolerance can be addressed as his/her 
support for the corrupt politician(s), which has as a main consequence the impact on 
vertical accountability that is implied in any democratic system. In the second case, 
what has been addressed as corruption tolerance in a collusive transaction, implies a 
deviant behavior (in sociological terms) in favor of corrupt activities. This can be 
succinctly regarded as corrupt deviance. Finally, in the third case, although the 
citizen’s reaction towards a scenario of extortion hasn’t been contemplated so far in 
the literature regarding corruption tolerance, we believe it is important to include it in 
order to cover all the citizen’s roles, and in such effort we consider that any tolerance 
of extortion should be understood as corruption compliance. 
 
In this way, we can see that, although corruption tolerance invariably entails 
the citizen’s involvement in the perpetuation of corruption in society, the meaning it 
has for the individual, as well as the determinants and characteristics of such 
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behavior, varies greatly depending on the specific role casted16. Table 2-1 synthetizes 
the observations made. 
 
TABLE 2-1. DISAGGREGATED CITIZENS’ CORRUPTION TOLERANCE 
 High-level Corruption Low-level Corruption 
Collusive ---------------------- Corrupt Deviance 
Extortive Corruption Support Corruption Compliance 
  
 
Having reached a strong first point from where to construct a theory of 
corruption tolerance, and in order to be able to use the categorization developed 
above, it is necessary to operationalize each dimension of the concept by following 
step by step the process through which a citizen develops and expresses a particular 
level or amount of corruption tolerance. To this objective we turn now. 
 
 
2.1. HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE (HCT): THE ‘VERTICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY’ APPROACH 
  
When Canache and Allison (2003) studied the impact of corruption perception 
on political support, they seemed to be tapping into the main core of what HCT is all 
about: “A vital step in combating political corruption is for citizens to be able to hold 
leaders accountable when they engage in malfeasance” (p. 2). For this kind of 
accountability to exist, they explain, three requirements must be fulfilled. First, 
citizens must be able to accurately perceive corruption when it exists. This implies 
that the process through which citizens hold their leaders to some level of 
accountability starts with the ability to acknowledge the reality involving corruption 
around the acts of government17. The authors make explicit notice that this perception 
must be accurate in order to be of any help for the democratic system. Second, 
citizens need to adjust their opinions of the relevant actors according to the previously 																																																								
16 The first attempt to address the effects of citizen involvement regarding different levels of 
corruption can be found in Salzman (2009). 17	On the impact of corruption perceptions over electoral behavior, for the case of Poland, see 
Slomczynski and Shabad (2009, pp. 12-13). 
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perceived corruption. While corruption is currently unavoidably understood as 
pernicious for the political system, that does not entails an automatic reaction in the 
form of protest from the political subjects. For accountability to exist, the citizen must 
go through the internal process of calibrating his/her attitudes toward the political 
leaders in direct relation to the level of corruption perceived in the behavior of those 
leaders. And third, the citizen must punish in some way the corrupt actor. This is the 
final step where the internal attitudes translate into external behavior; or to put it in 
another way, the change in covert support emerges as a variation in the overt support. 
 
 To sum up, what Canache and Allison (2003) were proposing is that vertical 
accountability (O’Donnell, 1998) happens when the process presented in Figure 2-1 is 
satisfied: 
 
FIGURE 2-1. THE PROCESS OF VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
  
 
 In their study, Canache and Allison focused only on the presence of the 
requirements for punishment, leaving the actual punishment aside, and hence 
describing a still incomplete picture of corruption tolerance understood as the lack of 
vertical accountability. As we have seen in other authors, and the position that is 
going to be taken throughout this research, the main characteristic of corruption 
tolerance in a high-level corruption (HLC) scenario must be found in the absence of 
punishment for the corrupt party. If it’s particularly the lack of punishment what will 
describe the corruption tolerance in a society, the first three consecutive stages 
described in the chart above could be very much present in the same context as 
corruption tolerance. Graphic 2-2 reproduces the ‘vertical accountability’ process in a 
scenario of HCT. 
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FIGURE 2-2. HCT AS THE LACK OF VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 As we can see, in a scenario of HCT there are just two constant that we can 
identify. First, there must exist some kind of information about corrupt activities 
involving members of the government that is available to the citizens through the 
mass media18; and second, no punishment from the part of the citizen appears as a 
consequence of that information. Condensing it into a proper definition, we can say 
that HCT is the citizen’s behavioral adherence to condone the corrupt behavior of 
the political actor. Working backwards, we could define also (with the intention of 
managing proper indicators later) the attitude, perception, and information linkage. 
Following our punishment-centered definition of HCT, the corrected attitudes stage 
of the process will be defined as the citizen’s moral adherence to the political actor, 
whereas the perception stage will be defined as the degree to which a citizen believe 
that the political actor is involved in corrupt practices (which are condemned by 
definition). Finally, the information stage will be the availability of information to the 
public related to corrupt activities involving the political actor.  
 
 With the proper definitions laid down, the next logical step is to find a suitable 
indicator for measurement. We partly follow in this study the approach used by 
McCann and Redlawsk (2006) and focus in the voting behavior in congressional and 
presidential elections, understanding for corruption tolerance the action of voting for a 
candidate in spite of its corrupt character. This by no means imply that voting 
behavior is the only indicator with the potential to tap into HCT, but just that for the 
																																																								18	Karklins (2005, p. 112) has referred to the availability of information to punish corrupt politicians as 
“[a] fundamental precondition for accountability”. On its importance, see Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 
(2012), Barberá et al. (2012, p. 18), and Bagenholm (2009, p. 18); through its impact on perception, 
see Németh et al. (2011, p. 61). 
Information	about	corrupt	activity	 Accurate	perception	of	corruption	 Corrected	attitude	about	the	corrupt	actors	
Punishment	behavior	against	the	corrupt	actors	
	 33	
aims of this study it presents itself as the more feasible given the available sources of 
data and the trends already developing on the topic. Such strategy is also favored by 
Uslaner (2008), although for the analysis of anti-corruption19. Additionally, in Peru 
(the specific country case that will occupy us later), it can be clearly perceived that 
the elections are the main venue of vertical accountability (Sanchez, 2010, p. 6) and 
political participation (Masías and Segura, 2006, p. 106). Hence, we find suitable to 
equate the electoral act of voting to the punishment or support for specific levels of 
corruption. 
  
 Attitude-behavior congruency and HCT measurement  
 Having gone this far, we can now see some of the problems surrounding the 
recent efforts to tab in any way into the level and implications of corruption tolerance 
in cases of high-level corruption. First, the studies that show a bigger concern in 
focusing specifically on the tolerance construct are the ones that treat it as covert 
support (with the important exception of Chang and Kerr, 2009), hence not been able 
to explicitly cover the entire process as we have described it, specifically in relation to 
their lack of inclusion of the punishment stage, voting behavior. Second, the 
operationalization of covert support doesn’t follow the basic considerations for an 
improved accuracy in attitude-behavior (A-B) congruency20.  
 
 The decision of previous research to discard a study of corruption tolerance in 
attention to all four stages of the vertical accountability process described before, 
signifies the necessary preclusion of any determinant that may block the transition 
from attitudes to action, and hence account for a partial story. Beyond this self-
evident issue, however, it can be accepted that, if the intention to stop at the 
attitudinal level has to do with the possibility of using those measures as a proxy for 
actual punishment, they could still arrive to nearly conclusive results. Scholarly 
efforts since the 1970’s has been showing encouraging rates of success in the area of 
A-B congruency when concentrating in the prediction of voting behavior (Schuman 																																																								19	In his study of trust and corruption in United States, Uslaner 2008, p. 228) argues that “[since] the 
Progressive Party focused primarily on clean government and structural reform, support for it is a 
reasonable proxy for public support in a state for anti-corruption initiatives.”	
20 A-B congruency can be understood as the degree of correlation between attitudinal measures of a 
latent disposition, and “behaviors that are not elicited by formal measurement procedures” (Schuman 
and Johnson, 1976, p. 161). 
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and Johnson, 1976), meaning that even when a HCT study is not measuring the actual 
voting behavior of the citizens, it can still bring important results (although not 
complete) if measuring for the same citizens’ attitudes toward a particular candidate. 
Further development in A-B studies carried on by Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) showed 
that measuring the specific attitude towards a behavior, instead of the attitude towards 
a person or an object, increases the possibility of predicting actual behavior, implying 
for the sake of our research that a measure of a citizen’s willingness to punish a 
particular corrupt political actor could also predict his/her political behavior when 
punishment is an option (as in the case of electoral processes) and bring close results 
to uncovering his/her corruption tolerance level.  
 
 Nonetheless, most of the literature reviewed earlier regarding corruption 
tolerance miss these two possible alternative measurement approximations (meaning 
‘attitude towards a particular corrupt political actor’ and ‘attitude towards punishing a 
particular corrupt political actor’) and it decides in one way or another to measure the 
citizens’ attitude towards a corrupt act (‘how wrong would it be if the political 
actor…?’) without any further context. This treatment is most explicit when looking 
at the cases of Manzetti and Wilson (2009, p. 92) and Blake (2009, p. 102), where 
what is stated as an indictor for “tolerant of corruption” in the former, is called an 
indicator for “attitudes toward bribe taking” in the latter. As it will be explained in 
detail later, attitudes towards an action can be a powerful predictor when referring to 
one’s action, what we have called ‘attitudes toward the behavior’; but in the case of 
HCT, the classic measurement of attitudes can be actually described as a 
measurement towards corruption itself as an object21, and hence producing little A-B 
congruency22. 
 
  All this said, the selection of a casted vote as an indicator for HCT still 
deserves some additional comments before we can continue with its testing. 
 																																																								
21 It is important to clarify that A-B congruency can effectively use the attitudes toward the object as a 
powerful predictor for voting behavior given that the object measured is the one over which the voting 
behavior is expressed. In this way, the attitude towards a candidate could predict voting for him/her or 
not, while attitude towards corruption should theoretically be able to predict the voting behavior in a 
referendum for an anti-corruption piece of legislation. 
22 The problem of congruency will be explained in further detail when we talk about the principle of 
compatibility in the construction of the low-level corruption tolerance indicator. 
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 The indicator of HCT: A problem of degrees 
 In 1972, Howard Schuman reproduced the results of a series of survey 
questions that were trying to assess the racial attitudes of white Americans in 1969. 
When asked about a simple, hypothetical scenario where a case of discrimination in a 
job interview against an African American was committed, most respondents showed 
disagreement with the validity of such discriminating behavior. Nevertheless, when 
confronted with the same hypothetical case in a context where economic and 
democratic values were added into the scenario, the rate of responses showed an 
increasing tolerance towards discrimination against African Americans in the same 
job interview. The intention of Schuman (1972, p. 352) was to show that this 
technique to measure attitudes was a “[test] of adherence to a single principle under 
various degrees of practical difficulty or counter-pressure” and that, as such, it didn’t 
mean that respondents were showing some kind of incongruence between questions, 
but that reality could be better capture in a survey by means of recreating the various 
sources of stimuli that make an individual behave in one way or the other. 
 
 The exact same problem can be said to affect corruption tolerance and voting 
behavior. When asking a citizen about his/her attitude toward an imaginary corrupt 
politician, there is no surprise that the citizen may express his/her disagreement with 
that behavior and find it punishable. The reason for such an answer is that the corrupt 
actor was shown in a vacuum, a particular case that very rarely can be found in 
reality23. The most similar scenario could only be found by experimentally controlling 
every socio-economical and demographic variable that could determine the political 
support of a single citizen for a corrupt and a non-corrupt politician; the result will 
most likely, if not always, be the support for the non-corrupt politician24. In an 
electoral process, nevertheless, voters must weight different and sometimes 
contradictory values to decide in which direction to orient their political support. It is 
precisely in this case where we could see in action the degree to which a citizen can 																																																								23	Zaller (1992, p. 49) have expressed this same idea when arguing that “individuals answer survey 
questions by averaging across the considerations that are immediately salient or accessible to them”. 
(Italics are ours)	24	In the words of Barberá et al. (2012, p. 3), “it is almost trivial to argue that, among a number of 
candidates, citizens will prefer to choose one that is not involved in illicit activities, caeteris paribus.” 
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tolerate corruption, by placing such factor against other reasons for voting for a 
particular candidate25. In a scenario where different candidates hold a different record 
of corrupt activities (it doesn’t matter if this record is objective or created by the 
media), the decision of the voter can be interpreted as the minimum level of 
corruption tolerance as expressed by a higher emphasis in other features of the 
candidate. To say it shortly, the more corrupt the candidate for whom the citizen is 
voting, the more tolerant of high-level corruption that citizen is. 
 
 Hence, we complete the above construction by saying that the individual’s 
HCT level is based on the minimum tolerance of the citizen expressed by voting in 
spite of the ratio of information about the corrupt character and the position of fight 
against corruption (in an index of electoral offers) of the candidate. When addressing 
congressional instead of presidential elections, the focus on the candidate might be 
switched to that of the party because of the lack of individual congressmen 
information available in most surveys regarding voting behavior. 
 
 
 2.2. LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE (LCT): THE BEHAVIORAL 
APPROACH 
  
 As stated in Chapter 1, the category of low-level corruption (LLC) is better 
understood as an encompassing level that in deeper analysis involves two related but 
distinct sub-categories of corrupt behavior: collusive corruption, a transaction where 
the citizen acts as a benefactor in order to secure an advantage which he/she is not 
legally entitled to; and extortive corruption, a transaction where the citizen is put in 
the role of the disadvantage party as he/she tries to secure a service which he/she is 
legally entitled to but that is conditioned upon his/her engagement in the transaction. 
The implications of this dichotomic division are most relevant in an analysis of the 
citizen’s engagement in LLC because it allows us to focus on the basic motivations 
behind his/her decision to engage in it.  
 																																																								25	This phenomenon is what Rundquist et al. (1977, p. 957) dubbed “the trading theory of corruption 
voting”. McCann and Dominguez (1998, p. 495) find, indeed, empirical results showing that, in the 
case of Mexican citizens, “for the most part they vote on the basis of considerations other than their 
perceptions of electoral fraud and corruption.”  
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 The point is made explicit by Bauhr and Nasiritousi (2011, p. 3) when they 
propose the usage of the analogous greed/need corruption concepts, which declares 
the opposite motivational nature of both phenomena. In the first case, citizens 
engaging in the act are mainly identified by a general attitude of greediness, as they 
actively and willingly corrupt government officials in order to get an advantage or 
benefit that is normally refused to the rest of their fellow countrymen/women. The 
second case describes a rather different scenario, where citizens are forcibly and 
unwillingly put in a situation where they have to participate in a corrupt transaction 
(often in the way of bribing) in order to gain access to services that are legally 
available to him/her, but that are denied; in other words, the citizens in this case only 
act corruptly because they need to. 
 
 Whereas the greed/need conceptualization highlights the literature’s void 
regarding the specific reasons for a person’s corrupt behavior in markedly different 
scenarios, they do so by taking account of the two extremes in a continuum. While we 
do acknowledge the stereotypical description of the circumstance behind both kinds 
of corrupt citizens, we think it is more appropriate to engage their construction 
without including a priori the specific motivations that we want to discover behind 
them. For this reason, and refocusing in the task of understanding corruption 
tolerance, in the following sections we shall understand as collusive corruption the 
citizens’ deviant behavior in favor of a corrupt collusive transaction, and extortive 
corruption as the citizens’ compliant behavior with a corrupt extortive transaction. 
 
 Being these two behaviors of a different nature, although coexisting overall in 
the same level or dimension (LLC), we expect them also to represent two different 
sets of attitudes and motivations towards corruption. The model we will use in their 
analysis, and eventually in the assessment of the specific determinants behind each of 
them, however, will be one and the same. In the following lines we will present the 
basic elements of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), an action model developed 
by Icek Ajzen (1985) through which is possible to predict and understand human 
behavior, and we will develop a LCT scheme based on it.   
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 The Principle of Compatibility and the Theory of Planned Behavior.  
 The problem of attitude-behavior (A-B) congruency was for a long time 
regarded as the biggest impediment to accept any theory based on attitudes and 
personal traits as determinants of human behavior, due to its long and consistent lack 
of statistically significant validation through empirical data. Any number of studies 
trying to predict and explain specific behaviors during the decades between 1950 and 
1970 were able to find only small to moderate correlations of the A-B nature 
(Schuman and Johnson, 1976). A meta-analysis of 109 investigations during those 
years reviewed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1977) found nonsignificant results for 25 of 
them, while the remainder rarely showed correlations in excess of 0.40. The problem, 
as this same authors elaborated on, was that the bulk of A-B research was trying to 
link general attitudes to rather specific actions. An example of that trend would be the 
efforts to correlate a white person’s general attitude towards African Americans, to 
some specific act like engaging an African American in conversation or signing a 
petition toward extended civic rights towards that group. Although attitudes were 
assumed to predispose human behavior, research was so far unable to predict people’s 
specific behavior toward attitudinal objects. 
 
 To understand better the relation between attitudes and behaviors, Ajzen 
(2005) explains, we have to discard the belief that verbal responses (as the ones 
assessed in a standard questionnaire, for example) reflect a person’s attitude whereas 
nonverbal actions are measures of behavior. In reality, both kinds of responses are 
equally valid behaviors to be used as indicators of a latent disposition, and for these 
indicators to be compatible at least their target and action elements (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1977) should be assessed at identical levels of generality or specificity. 
Hence, a principle of compatibility was proposed to finally deal with the major 
problems of A-B congruency. What it implied to A-B studies was that their 
measurement objective should go beyond the simple assessment of both attitudes and 
behaviors toward the same object, and assess specifically the attitudes toward the 
behavior of interest. As a result, the employment of surveys directed at these latter 
attitudinal measurements were found to increase the predictive power from only 0.13 
to a correlation of 0.54 (Kraus, 1995). 
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 The subsequent development of a complete model not just to predict human 
behavior, but to understand it as well, had to attend to the principle of compatibility in 
the inclusion of other elements directing human action. The Theory of Planned 
Behavior (TPB), designed by Icek Ajzen (1985), postulates that the intention to 
perform (or not to perform) a behavior is the most important immediate determinant 
of that action, and that, further on, this intention is a function of three basic 
determinants: The attitudes toward the behavior, the subjective norm surrounding it, 
and the perceived behavioral control behind engaging in it. Finally, each one of these 
dimensions is constructed upon a set of beliefs; hence, these are regarded as the basic 
informational foundation of intentions and behavior. Figure 2-3 graphically shows the 
elements of the TPB. 
 
FIGURE 2-3. THE THEORY OF PLANNED BEHAVIOR (TPB) 
 
 
 
To interpret correctly the process supported by this model, we need to 
understand the meaning behind each construct, even if succinctly. “Intentions are 
assumed to capture the motivational factors that influence a behavior; they are 
indications of how hard people are willing to try, of how much of an effort they are 
planning to exert, in order to perform the behavior” (Ajzen, 1991, p. 181). The 
attitude towards the behavior, unlike general attitudes toward institutions, people or 
objects, is the individual’s positive or negative evaluation of performing the behavior; 
behind this evaluation are beliefs regarding the likely outcomes or consequences of 
performing it. The subjective norm, on the other hand, is the individual’s perception 
of social pressure to perform or not perform the behavior; this pressure is based on 
beliefs about important referents approving or disapproving the behavior, or even the 
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same referents themselves engaging or not engaging in it. The third determinant of the 
intention will be the perceived behavioral control (PBC), or the sense of ability that 
the individual has about performing the behavior of interest; this ability is based on 
the individual’s beliefs about both his/her self-efficacy and control over the behavior 
(Ajzen, 2002).   
 
 The TPB represents a theoretically sound and empirically potential model to 
understand the individual’s decision to pay a bribe, either acting in a deviant or a 
compliant way. While the model adopted for the analysis of HCT draws heavily on 
political theory and models of democratic accountability due to the main political role 
envisaged upon the citizen in the behavioral manifestation of tolerance towards HLC, 
a more psychologically strategic approach is necessary to gain an insight on activities 
that a big part of the citizenry would probably consider ‘private’, albeit illegal. If it’s 
true, as we have argued earlier, that LLC elicit a fundamentally distinct set of 
emotions and rationale, it would be indeed advisable to get a step closer to the mind 
of our study subjects, an get the support of a vast tradition of political thinking 
produced by social psychology.  
 
 Although Ajzen’s TPB is obviously not the only potential model that may be 
applicable to the specific context of the present study, it is by far the most widely 
accepted and empirically tested model in existence, with both the simplicity to bridge 
the distance between the scientific requirements of a political scientist and the 
behavioral insights of social psychology, and the complexity to include the most 
important determinants of the individual’s engagement in corruption, as it will be 
shown in Chapter 5. Since its introduction in the mid-1980s, the TPB has been 
applied to more than 600 studies26 on an increasing variety of research fields 
expanding from health behaviors to environmental actions. Several meta-analyses of 
this empirical literature provide a sizable support for the postulates of the TPB: For a 
wide range of different behaviors, attitudes, subjective norm and PBC were found to 
correlate with intentions in average up to 0.60, 0.42 and 0.46, respectively. What is 
more, the multiple correlations for the prediction of intentions were found to range 
from 0.63 to 0.71. Finally, intentions have been found to predict behavior with 																																																								
26 As of January 2012, from a quick search on the official Icek Ajzen’s TPB bibliography website: 
http://people.umass.edu/aizen/tpbrefs.html 
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considerable accuracy, with meta-analyses reporting an overall correlation of 0.53, 
while PBC explains approximately an additional 2 percent of the variance in behavior 
(Ajzen, 2005). This last result, although showing only a small increase in the model’s 
predictive power, should be expected to rise as the level of volitional control of the 
specific behavior under investigation decreases. Thus, in total, the TPB can be said to 
represent a paramount model for the prediction and further understanding of human 
behavior in a wide range of activities.   
 
 Before we can proceed with our argument, however, there are three final 
points about Ajzen’s model shown above that we need to explain. First, the theory 
assumes that the relative importance of attitudes, subjective norm and PBC depends 
on the intention under investigation. In other words, for some behaviors the most 
important determinant will be the attitudes toward it, while for others will be the 
subjective norm or the PBC. The clearest case of their relative weights can be found 
between the intention to perform a routine behavior that can be said to be highly 
under volitional control, compared to a behavior that depends on other people or upon 
which we may or may not have all the knowledge required. In this case, PBC would 
be expected to have an important impact on the prediction of the latter intention, but 
not on the prediction of the former. In the same way, for some intentions to emerge, 
the subjective norm will be expected to be more important than for others. The 
specific theoretical reasons for the relative weights of the components, however, are 
not contemplated by the theory, and it leaves any explanation ex-post facto in an 
empirical analysis (Bagozzi, 1992, p. 183).  
  
 Second, it should be noticed that the model suggests the possibility of an 
interaction between attitudes, subjective norm and PBC. This point, also, has to be 
empirically discovered and explained regarding the specific intention of interest.  
 
 And third, the model proposes that PBC, together with intentions, can be used 
also to predict actual behavior. A dotted arrow graphically represents this point in the 
above figure. Two rationales support the link. First, PBC is expected to help a person 
persevere in his/her intention to successfully engage in the behavior; even holding 
intentions constant, a higher PBC should increase the probabilities of performing the 
intended behavior. Second, the theory proposes that PBC can be used as a proxy for 
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the measurement of actual behavioral control. As the theory proposes, intentions may 
only be expressed in actions as long as the individual has the real capability to do so; 
otherwise, the intention will not be able to evolve into action. In addition, the TPB 
proposes that, to the extent that an individual’s PBC is realistic, it can be used to 
predict the probability of a successful behavioral attempt, and thus serve as a proxy 
for actual behavioral control (Ajzen, 1991). However, reserves have to be made about 
the accuracy of that approach regarding actual control. As Armitage and Conner 
(2001, p. 474) express, “given the extant literature on ‘illusions of control’… it seems 
likely that PBC will rarely reflect actual control in a very accurate way”.             
 
 Previous implementation of the TPB for the study of corruption 
 Having Ajzen’s theory produced such a vast amount of literature on a 
diversity of scientific topics, it comes as a surprise to find that only three studies have 
attempted to incorporate it, in one way or the other, to the study of bribery. Samart 
Powpaka (2002) uses the TPB to assess the different determinants behind the act of 
collusive bribery, using a sample of Thai managers to that objective. His model 
represents a first effort to understand the briber’s motivations to engage in corruption 
completely under a framework of TPB 27  directed at organizational corruption. 
However vague the policy recommendations sprouted from the results of his study 
may be, it shows the possibilities of using the model to deepen our understanding of 
why people engage in bribery based on a sound theoretical framework, without falling 
into simplistic empirical results highlighting the individual’s characteristics as either 
homo economicus or homo politicus (Nyborg, 2000). 
 
 Later on, and recognizing Powpaka’s lead in the use of behavioral models for 
the study of bribery, Rabl and Kühlmann (2008) proposes initially a Model of 
Effortful Decision Making and Enactment (Bagozzi et. al., 2003) to discover the 
personal-based determinants of corrupt behavior in interaction with the business 
context. The model, which can be described as extremely complex and sophisticated 
for empirical analysis, was found to be unfeasible for the purposes of the study, and 
many of its elements had to be discarded as a consequence. When a revised model 
																																																								
27 In fact, Powpaka does introduce a minor modification to expand the construct of PBC. This will be 
described later in detail. 
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was presented for new analysis, its remaining structure was graphically presented as 
Figure 2-4 shows. 
 
FIGURE 2-4. RABL AND KÜHLMANN’S REVISED MODEL OF CORRUPT ACTION 
 
 
          
 
 This “Model of Corrupt Action” (Rabl and Kühlmann, 2008, p. 479) was used 
again later for the study of the impact of situational influences (specifically the size of 
the bribe, time pressure, and the degree of abstractness of the business code) on the 
decision to bribe (Rabl, 2011). The intention was to analyze the influence that the 
situational factors exert over the subjective decision making process, i.e. over the 
determinants contemplated in the model. Without needing to refer to Bagozzi’s Model 
of Effortful Decision Making and Enactment (MEDME), we can see that Rabl and 
Kühlmann’s revised model is basically a derivation of Ajzen’s TPB28 with the 
inclusion of desire as an element that influences intention (Bagozzi, 1992) and that 
mediates most of the effects of attitudes and subjective norm. As a last modification 
to the TPB, Rabl keeps the PBC as a determinant of intention but not of desire, in 
																																																								
28 The complete description made by Rabl (2011, p. 4) explains that “the model [of corrupt action] is 
based on the Model of Effortful Decision Making and Enactment (Bagozzi et al., 2003) and represents 
a modified extension of Ajzen's (1991) Theory of Planned Behavior that also integrates the distinction 
between desire and intention, that is motivation and volition, as elements drawn from the Rubicon 
Model of Action Phases”. We believe this description overestimates the revised model as it is. 
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direct allusion to Bagozzi’s MEDME29. The final result, as we may appreciate, is that 
Rabl and Kühlmann’s model preserves the basic idea behind the TPB’s model. 
 
 However we decide to analyze the process through which the individuals 
decide to engage in corruption, we can see that an action model based on the elements 
described by the TPB has much to offer in our path to unravel the motivations behind 
bribery. In the next lines we will address some modifications of our own in order to 
make the TPB more suitable for the study of LCT, which, even though will preserve 
almost entirely the structure suggested by Ajzen, needs to be commented in order to 
interpret correctly any results derived from it.    
 
 Some modifications to the TPB: Unfolding the LCT indicator 
 As stated earlier, we will use the TPB’s model to construct a proper indicator 
for LCT. If the theory allows us to predict and understand human behavior, first we 
need to correctly identify which is the specific behavior that we are interested on. 
Having the possibility to be either of a collusive or extortive nature, as we saw before, 
the main element common to both types of LLC from a citizen’s standpoint will be 
the transfer of goods in order to acquire the legitimate or illegitimate services. For 
ease and convenience, we will refer to these transacted goods as bribe. However, 
before the bribe can occur, it has to be explicit or implicitly offered or surrendered, 
depending on which type of LLC we are focusing on. What we are implying here, in 
other words, is that the deviant and compliant behaviors cannot be seen as unitary 
behaviors, but rather as processes that include a behavioral attempt and a subsequent 
behavioral goal. This separation implies, quite correctly, that as bribery is not a 
behavior entirely under volitional control, it is better to distinguish between both 
elements. 
 
 The division of the overall behavior between behavioral attempt and goal was 
included originally in the first model of the TPB (Ajzen, 1985), but was later dropped, 
as Ajzen himself explains, because of the high correlations found by early work on 
																																																								
29 The theoretical reasons for this decision escape our grasp. Bagozzi himself goes from including PBC 
as a determinant of desire (Perugini and Bagozzi, 2001), to reallocate it as a determinant of 
implementation intention (Bagozzi et. al., 2003), to finally describe it in relation to desire again 
(Perugini and Bagozzi, 2004). 
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the model between ‘trying to perform a behavior’ and the ‘actual performance’30 
(1991, p. 182). Bagozzi and Warshaw (1990), however, picked up on the importance 
of distinguishing between the two concepts and included it in their Theory of Goal 
Pursuit (TGP), proposing that “to encompass goals [in a model of human behavior] is 
to replace behavior with trying31 as the dependent criterion” (p. 129). Following then 
the principle of compatibility to reformulate the TPB’s determinants of behavior, the 
result will describe a model where trying to achieve a goal is determined by the 
intention to try, which in turn is determined by the attitudes and subjective norm 
toward trying32.  
 
 The division between attempting or trying to achieve a goal (by performing 
one or more specific actions), and the goal itself, can be shown to be of particular 
importance for the construction of a LCT indicator by posing a simple example. The 
actual occurrence of a corrupt transaction, in other words a bribe, depends in a self-
evident interaction between choices taken by both the citizen and the public official. 
If at least one of those two actors completely refuses to engage in bribery, then the 
result will be a scenario where corruption was avoided. However, from this scarce 
information, it is impossible so far to say anything else about the corruption tolerance 
of either one of the actors; simply put, the absence of bribery does not tell us anything 
about how inclined was the citizen or the public official to bribe or to be bribed, 
respectively. The absence of bribery can be very well a product of a low level of LCT 
among public officials, or the lack of a purely economical necessity for the individual 
to actively pursue it, without caring about the level of LCT among citizens. By the 
same token, a scenario where bribery did in fact take place, although we do not know 
which side initiated the transaction, we can be sure that them both demonstrated a 
corruption tolerance behavior. What this mean, simply put, is that an indicator of the 
occurrence of bribery only impacts the level of LCT when bribery actually took 																																																								30	The model that continued being used later, although it acknowledged the difference between 
behavior and goal, presumed that the incorporation of PBC was enough to allow for an accurate 
prediction of behavioral goals over which people have only limited volitional control, and therefore 
stayed with the unitary construct of behavior.	
31 Italics are ours. 32	Regarding PBC, however, Bagozzi and Warshaw (1990) say nothing and do not even include it in 
their original model. For this reason, and following Ajzen’s main intention of using PBC under 
scenarios of incomplete volitional control, we consider that is necessary to continue treating it in 
relation to the behavioral goal (which is, after all, the stage under consideration when thinking about 
behaviors under limited control), and not in relation to the behavioral attempt.	
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place, but tells us nothing about the level of LCT otherwise. As we analogously 
elaborated for the case of the HCT indicator, a measurement of the incidence of 
bribery in a given population should be read as the minimum level of corruption 
tolerance in that given population as expressed by the actual engagement in 
bribery. This strategy is particularly useful in cases where no data regarding the 
details of LLC transactions is available but only for its occurrence, and when the 
formal and informal institutions of bureaucracy are reportedly highly permeable to 
corruption, putting bribery under the individual’s complete volitional control.   
 
 A perfectly constructed indicator for LCT, however, should be able to measure 
the behavioral attempt to engage in corruption, be it of a collusive or extortive nature. 
Although this approach is theoretically correct, it is necessary to notice that while the 
distinction between indicators measuring the attempt to bribe and those measuring the 
actual bribing is of particular relevance for the case of LCT as deviant behavior 
(collusive corruption), the distinction between both measurements loses theoretical 
significance when approaching LCT as compliant behavior (extortive corruption). 
Even when we can imagine a situation where a citizen, for ignorance of his/her rights 
regarding the request and usage of public services, may try (out of his/her free will) to 
bribe a public official in order to gain access to a desired service that he/she is 
actually entitled to, we find it highly improbable. Being a scenario of extortive 
corruption characterized by the public official denying access to a rightly service in 
order to force the citizen into a corrupt exchange, what we expect to find in reality is 
that either result of a measurement of the incidence of bribery, meaning the 
occurrence or not occurrence of bribery, will tell us with high accuracy the level of 
LCT of a citizen regarding his/her compliance behavior, as it will be assumed that the 
citizen’s attempt to bribe in this scenario will always accomplish the goal. To put it in 
other words, to talk about a citizen’s behavioral attempt to bribe in a case of extortion 
against that same citizen seems empirically unreasonable, as he/she is being forced 
into a behavior he/she wouldn't engage in out of self-motivation, therefore not being 
relevant to consider the dimension of behavioral attempt in this case.  
 
 A graphical example of the elements involved in each case is shown in Figure 
2-5 and Figure 2-6. 
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FIGURE 2-5. LCT-DEVIANT IN A MODEL OF TPB 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2-6. LCT-COMPLIANT IN A MODEL OF TPB 
 
 
 
 To sum it up, a perfectly theoretically-grounded measurement of LCT as 
deviant behavior will imply the behavioral attempt to bribe a public official in 
order to gain some unlawful benefit, while the measurement of LCT as compliant 
behavior will imply the behavioral goal achievement of bribing a public official in 
order to gain access to a lawful service. 
 
 It appears clear now, therefore, the substantive difference between a 
measurement of LCT following the guidelines of the TPB, and the usual measurement 
of LCT as reviewed earlier. While the latter clearly represents an indicator of attitude 
toward bribery, and in this way only one of the determinants (although possibly the 
most important, as meta-analyzes has found for a majority of different behaviors) that 
affect intention, the former involves the combined effects of attitude, subjective norm 
INDICATOR	Collusive	bribery	attempt	Intention	to	try	to	bribe		
Attitude	towards	trying	to	bribe	
Subjective	norm	towards	trying	to	bribe	
Perceived	behavioral	control	over	bribing	
Collusive	bribery	
INDICATOR	Extortion-compliant	bribery	Intention	to	bribe	an	extortionist	
Attitude	towards	bribing	an	extortionist	
Subjective	norm	towards	bribing	an	extortionist	
Perceived	behavioral	control	over	bribing	an	extortionist	
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and PBC, and thus representing a more eclectic view of the motivations behind 
bribery. 
 
 A final comment regarding the function of PBC 
 Some issues have to be clarified before we can start working on the 
foundational determinants of LCT of each type. Whilst the theory describes PBC as 
the confidence in one’s ability to perform the behavior of interest, encompassing both 
self-efficacy and control, we think it is necessary to expand the latter meaning of 
control in order to take a proper account of the multiple elements that may impact a 
person’s decision to engage in bribery. Although it is not stated in a explicit manner, 
we see reasonable to expand Ajzen’s (2002, p. 680) description of “controllability 
(the extent to which performance is up to the actor)”, to include the approach taken by 
Powpaka (2002) for the study of managerial corruption, who based on a focus group 
interview determined that it was more relevant to include a perceived choice variable 
(i.e. the power or chance of choosing to give or not give a bribe) instead of the classic 
PBC. The perceived choice can be understood in this context as control over not 
performing the behavior. The main distinction between both constructs resides in the 
inclusion of the ability to refuse the behavior in question, while the usual measure of 
PBC was just interested in the positive impact of control over intention and behavior.  
 
 Following Ajzen’s (1991) double rationale for directly linking PBC to 
behavior, we can assume that, holding intentions constant, both perceived choice and 
the classic measure of PBC should have an additional (although opposite) impact on 
behavioral goal based on the idea of perseverance and actual control.    
 
 The stronger defense for adopting Powpaka’s position in our research comes 
from the fact that, in order to include any set of beliefs related to the measure of 
perceived choice (if that is in fact the requirement of the research), we would need 
just to invert the direction of the behavior of interest, and we would find that the 
beliefs related to perceived choice fall perfectly under the classic measures of PBC. 
To give an example, in Powpaka’s study the perceived choice comes in the form of 
options (or lack of options) to secure an important business contract without resorting 
to bribery. As we can see, while the lack of options other than bribery cannot be 
interpreted as a regular issue of PBC, or ability to perform the behavior, it can be 
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appropriately used under the construct of perceived choice. However, if we would 
choose only to revert the behavior, meaning to select ‘refuse bribery’ instead of 
‘engage in bribery’ as the dependent behavior, the lack of options to secure an 
important business contract without resorting to bribery would clearly be able to be 
considered as a regular part of PBC. In this way, we consider that the inclusion of 
perceived choice in the overall definition of PBC is in order for the appropriate study 
of a bribery behavior.  
 
 By the same token, if we accept the previous postulate as theoretically correct, 
we would re-interpret the meaning of behavioral intention and say that it represents 
how much effort a person is planning to exert to perform or not to perform an action. 
  
  
 2.3. SUMMARY 
 
 Translating the role of the citizen in the three different types of corruption 
identified in Chapter 1, to the construct of corruption tolerance as was reviewed from 
past literature, we were able to conceptualize them in the following terms: 
 
- High-level corruption tolerance (HCT): The citizen’s behavioral adherence to 
condone the corrupt behavior of the political actor (corruption support).  
- Low-level corruption tolerance – collusion (LCT-deviant): The behavioral 
attempt to bribe a public official in order to gain some unlawful benefit 
(corrupt deviance). 
- Low-level corruption tolerance – extortion (LCT-compliant): The behavioral 
goal achievement of bribing a public official in order to gain access to a lawful 
service (corruption compliance). 
 
 Such definitions were reached, first, through a commitment with a citizen-
centered theory that is reflected in the adoption of the terms support, deviance, and 
compliance, all of which are grounded in the individual’s tolerant reaction to the three 
corrupt scenarios. And second, through the adoption of theoretical models that were 
found with the potential to best suit our analytical requirements, and which favor the 
equation of corruption tolerance with actual behavioral manifestations.  
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 In the case of HCT, a scenario that mainly involves the relationship of the 
citizen with the higher skeleton of the polity, the concept of ‘vertical accountability’ 
(O’Donnell, 1998) was employed to describe the process by which individuals 
develop a political response to scandals of high-level corruption, running through four 
consecutive stages: Information, perception, attitudinal change, and punishment. 
Since the actual punishment of the corrupt political actor was found to be the 
necessary last step for the manifestation of corruption intolerance, we decided that a 
behavioral approach best suited the selection of a proper indicator, and suggested that 
the act of voting should provide the most promising possibilities (for empirical and 
technical reasons). Therefore, the future indicator of HCT is worded as voting for a 
candidate despite its corrupt character, which will reflect the minimum level of HCT 
as expressed by a higher emphasis in other features of the candidate. Finally, it is 
proposed that the so-called ‘corrupt character’ might be operationalized by reference 
to his/her past official conduct, and his/her electoral offer for the future. 
 
 LCT, on the other hand, required a radically different approach that found in 
the terrains of social psychology a good fit for the analysis of the individual’s 
subjective mechanisms for engaging in deviant and compliant corrupt behaviors. 
Adopting the model described by the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), deviance 
and compliance were described as the behaviors of interest that may be explained and 
predicted by reference to the individual’s attitudes towards the action, the subjective 
norm surrounding its performance, and the perceived behavioral control and/or choice 
over it. From this perspective, an indicator was proposed that could measure the 
‘minimum’ level of corruption tolerance of a citizen by addressing his/her actual 
engagement in bribery, a strategy that, besides respecting the logic of the model, 
allows us to take advantage of the available information contained in the LAPOP data 
set.     
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CHAPTER 3 
ATTITUDES VS. ACTIONS:  
DEVELOPMENT AND EMPIRICAL TEST OF A  
HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE BEHAVIORAL INDICATOR 
(FOR THE CASE OF PERU) 
 
 
 In the previous chapter we have seen that, following a vertical accountability 
approach, the tolerance towards corruption as manifested by citizens is only clear in 
the last stage of the process, meaning when an actual punishment is sought against the 
corrupt politician. From this realization, an argument followed providing reasons for 
differentiating between attitudes toward high-level corruption (HLC), and the 
behavioral punishment embodied by the citizens’ act.  
 
 If in Peru, as we have commented earlier, the electoral processes can be 
regarded as the main venues of accountability and political participation (Masías and 
Segura, 2006; Sánchez, 2010), it is still unclear the precise corrupt potential of the 
various candidates running for office in any given presidential or congressional 
election. Leaving aside potential partisan influences skewing some of the electoral 
information provided by the media, due to the delicate nature of the topic most public 
and private sources of political discourse tend to remain silent regarding the relative 
positive or negative influence of the most important leaders of the country over the 
state of HLC. Therefore, before attempting to solve the issue about the 
appropriateness of an attitudinal indicator as a proxy for behavior, we will need to 
develop our own indicator of behavioral high-level corruption tolerance (HCT) in 
clear and consistent terms to test our assumptions. 
 
 
 3.1. INTRODUCTORY INFORMATION ABOUT PERUVIAN NATIONAL ELECTIONS 
  
 Presidential elections: Peru, 2006 
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 Electoral processes in Peru have never been easy to analyze, partly because of 
the numerous and diverse issues that change in importance and saliency between one 
election and the other, and partly because of the characteristics of the constituency 
and the electoral system. Although many of these topics (however important) are not 
the main concern of the present study, some specific points need to be clarified if we 
are to address the relative corruption-potential among the candidates in 2006. 
 
 As García and Meléndez (2006) show through a quantitative review of the 
voting tendencies in this and previous presidential elections, the Peruvian electorate 
can be regarded as volatile: Not only do people’s vote migrate from one political tent 
to another between elections, but often the results of different polls addressing the 
voters’ intention up to one month before the process do not match the results in the 
ballot box. This certainly suggests a low level of partisanship in the Peruvian 
citizenry, but also the importance of the public stands adopted by candidates during, 
and even before, the electoral campaign.  
 
 A related issue, concerning the electoral system, is the provision about the 
electoral dates, inaugurated by the Constitution of 1979  (Canchari, 2011), which 
stipulates that both presidential and congressional elections must be held on the same 
day. Such circumstance creates a pressure towards a symbiotic perception of both 
types of vote, resulting often in what has been called voto de arrastre, or “coattail 
effect” (Lucinda, 2005, p. 426): The sympathies for a candidate influences the 
perception of the party, and creates a tendency for matching the ballots on both 
presidential and congress runs. This fact is clearly evidenced in the table built by 
Dietz and Myers (2007, p. 69), which we partially reproduce in Table 3-1.  
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TABLE 3-1. NATIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS IN PERU, 1980-2000 
Year Election Winner (Party) % Vote 
1980 Presidential AP 45.2 
1980 Senate AP 40.9 
1980 Deputies AP 38.9 
1985 Presidential APRA 53.1 
1985 Senate APRA 51.3 
1985 Deputies APRA 50.1 
1990 Presidential 1R33 FREDEMO 30.0 
1990 Senate FREDEMO 32.3 
1990 Deputies FREDEMO 30.1 
1995 Presidential C90-NM 64.4 
1995 Congress C90-NM 51.0 
2000 Presidential 1R C90-NM 49.9 
2000 Congress C90-NM 42.0 
2001 Presidential 1R PP 36.5 
2001 Congress PP 26.3 
 
       
 The information provided by the above table is important in the sense that it 
supports our comments about the existence of a coattail effect in Peru, which 
combined with a lack of party institutionalization (Tanaka, 1998) and acute 
personalization (the caudillo mentioned by Taylor, 2005; Romero, 2007; Masías and 
Segura, 2006), resulted in a popular equalization of the congressional vote to the 
presidential34. For this reason, any consideration regarding the citizens’ vote favoring 
or punishing a specific candidate would need to include both sets of political actors35.  
																																																								
33 1R refers to the first-round of the presidential elections. 34	Although the problem of party institutionalization and the appropriate differentiation between the 
dynamics of both legislative and executive branches are highly significant in themselves, and deserve 
scholarly attention from the perspective of democratic engineering, for our discussion of corruption 
tolerance and support they may be rather blunt. Simply put, the non-separation of opinions about 
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 Since 2001, as part of the restructuration of the electoral system, the single-
district arrangement introduced by the Constitution of 1993 for the congressional 
elections was changed for a multiple electoral district, equivalent to each one of the 
24 regions (departamentos) of Peru plus the constitutional province of Callao36. When 
including the fact that there is also the image of the double preferential vote, it 
follows that an attempt to focus on the personal history and electoral promises of each 
of the candidates to national congress would be a monumental task. For the 2006 
elections, there were 2,585 candidates for congress across 25 political parties. If we 
consider only the 6 parties which garnered most of the votes (Unión por el Perú – 
UPP, Partido Aprista Peruano – APRA, Unidad Nacional – UN, Alianza por el 
Futuro – AF, Frente de Centro – FC, and Perú Posible – PP), we would still be 
having 743 candidates to consider37.  
 
 A possible shortcut out of this electoral marsh could be to just focus on the 
political parties, instead of the individual candidates. However, as most of them are 
selected from the ranks of the party (or are invited to run) taking into account their 
notoriety in a particular district, and they may win a seat in congress either from the 
amount of votes obtained by the party, or directly by themselves through the 
preferential cast, their relationship with the political organization they represent is 
highly undetermined. It seems completely feasible that many citizens may vote for a 
particular candidate considering only his/her personal and professional attributes, 
without considering his/her party label; and, equally feasible (and common in the 
Peruvian congress), that once seated the congressman may choose to brake ranks with 
the party, become independent, join another party, or simply antagonize his/her fellow 
partisans by voting in a non-coordinated way in the process of legislative production. 
Therefore, the party label would tell us very little about the level of HCT among the 																																																																																																																																																														
presidential and congressional candidates should be taken as a given, a contextual variable that needs to 
be included in the formula, be it a correct or incorrect process of vertical accountability. 	35	Although its impact on potential interventions over the citizens’ level of HCT would deserve further 
study, at this time it’s impossible to accurately discriminate the importance (and even the meaning) of 
such symbiotic perceptions as the one discussed here. What it’s possible to suggest here, however, is 
that for the discussion of HCT, Peruvians may be correct in letting congressional corruption scandals 
affect their presidential preferences, as the nature of the candidate’s environment (political party) can 
have manifold implications for his/her eventual performance in office.	
36 In 2009 an additional electoral district was created by dividing the Lima Region between “Lima 
Provinces” and Lima. (http://www.congreso.gob.pe/ntley/Imagenes/Leyes/29403.pdf, accessed on 
November 25, 2012) 
37 http://portal.jne.gob.pe/informacionelectoral/estadisticaelectoral/1_1.pdf 
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citizens who chose a certain congressional candidate, leaving us with the only 
reasonable option to select the presidential candidates for a verifiable indicator of 
HCT, and to include (as was argued earlier) information from their political parties’ 
congress list. 
 
 A final comment regarding the real conditions for the development of a HCT 
indicator in line with the argument presented in the theoretical framework of Chapter 
2 has to do with the role of the party platforms in the electoral campaign. As can be 
remembered, it was postulated that such an indicator should include both the 
candidates’ history related to corruption scandals, and their anti-corruption promises. 
The former is naturally obtained from the media (first step in the vertical 
accountability process); the latter, can be obtained from the media, the party 
platforms, or both. Because the media coverage of the candidate’s stand on different 
corruption and anti-corruption issues may actually be included under the data 
gathering of his/her history, the present study will focus on the official documents 
released by the political parties containing their detailed government project38.  
 
 Presidential candidates of 2006 
 The most voted Peruvian presidential candidates in the first round of 2006, in 
descending order, were39: Ollanta Humala – UPP (30.6%), Alan García – APRA 
(24.3%), Lourdes Flores – UN (23.8%), Martha Chávez – AF (7.4%), Valentín 
Paniagua – FC (5.8%), Humberto Lay – Restauración Nacional (RN) (4.4%). In the 
following lines we present a very brief corruption-related résumé, which, although not 
being thorough, should provide an introductory image of their stance in the subject. 
 - Ollanta Humala (UPP): Major Humala jumped to fame in Octomber of 2000 
when he led a minor military uprising in the town of Locumba, with the 
support of army reservists of the south coast of Peru. The purpose of that 																																																								38	In support of this position, Masías and Segura (2006, p. 103) assert about the presidential campaign 
of 2006: “In previous processes, there was no doubt that a candidate’s personality and experience or his 
party affiliation, against the party platforms, were the determinant factors behind electoral preference. 
These patterns seem to have changed somehow, for there is evidence of a reasoning that incorporates, 
in the adoption of a decision course, the party platforms, but not the party or the political tendency. The 
intuition about this change is what seems to explain why the campaigns were centered in the exposition 
of such platforms.”	
39 http://www.web.onpe.gob.pe/modElecciones/elecciones/RESUMEN/GENERALES/14.pdf 
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‘heroic’ action, as was regarded by many Peruvians at that moment, was to 
condemn the illegitimate third government of president Alberto Fujimori and 
the corruption of the military, which was then being exposed in the 
vladivideos40 scandal. This first appearance in the public arena granted him an 
image of anti-corruption champion, particularly among inhabitants of rural 
and impoverished areas of the coast and the Andes, and was further reinforced 
(although in a more radical overtone) by Ollanta’s brother, Antauro, who 
continued working on a future political platform for the 2006 elections 
through the production and distribution of the nationalist tabloid Ollanta 
(Montoya, 2009). Although it’s necessary to discriminate between the 
activities of radical nationalist Antauro Humala, who is currently purging 
prison for a second uprising in December of 200441, and those of presidential 
candidate Ollanta Humala, there is a clear connection between some of the 
statements of the Humala family members regarding extreme anti-corruption 
measures (including a proposal for the imposition of the death penalty to 
corrupt officials) and Ollanta’s heavy reliance in popular disenchantment with 
what was being perceived as widespread corruption in the State. Nonetheless, 
with the proximity of election day other issues regarding the actual probity of 
Humala as a honest candidate started to surface, putting into question the 
original objective behind the Locumba uprising of 2000, the political group 
that was accompanying him in the presidential run, and his links to 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez (Schmidt, 2007; McClintock, 2006; 
Mäckelmann, 2006).  
 - Alan García (APRA): Many things have been said and analyzed over the years 
about the first government of ex-president García (1985-1990), particularly 
involving the level of corruption reached in Peru during his administration, 
and the criminal charges brought on him during the decade of 1990. In here 
we would like to refer to the words of Alfonso Quiroz (2008, pp. 346-347), 
who, making a brief review of the corruption scandals involving the image of 																																																								
40 Vladivideos is the popular name given to the about 700 videotapes left behind by Alberto Fujimori’s 
main advisor Vladimiro Montesinos, on which he recorded his meetings and conversations regarding 
all kinds of subjects, the most important ones being corrupt deals. 
41 Regarding the participation of Ollanta Humala in the Andahuaylazo conducted by his brother, there 
are contradictory positions at best. For a review of the facts and context, see Montoya, 2009. 
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García, recounted: “The principal charges against [him] in 1991 included 
illicit enrichment as a public official resulting from undeclared income of 
dubious origin, and probable illegal gains from direct involvement in the 
Mirage and BCCI cases. Later charges included demanding and receiving 
bribes from the Italian state agency that financed the construction of Lima’s 
electric train system. Former senior officials, including Mantilla, García’s last 
minister of the interior, faced charges.” More scandals still implicated APRA 
members in the years before the presidential elections of 2006, one case 
showed, as Regional Presidents belonging to the party were implicated in 
corrupt activities (McClintock, 2006). 
  - Lourdes Flores (UN): The center-right, social christian candidate from 
National Unity can be regarded as the closest representative of a middle point 
between the corruption-anticorruption continuum. If on one hand her honesty 
and sincerity (PUCP, 2006, p. 8) is perceived by 9.4% of Peruvians to be her 
most important attributes as a presidential candidate, on the other her position 
in front of governmental corruption has always been rather weak, with only 
sporadic activism which can be largely attributed to her longstanding situation 
as member of an opposition party. Schmidt (2007, p. 816), for example, 
comments that Flores “enjoyed a reputation for honesty and hard work” 
throughout the pre-electoral year 2005, but Mäckelmann (2006, p. 16) makes 
the precision that her communicational campaign has mainly been focused on 
the issues of “health, education, and the generation of employment.” Those are 
the circumstances under which we suggest that Flores should be seen as a case 
of corruption-neutrality, a characteristic that is also present in her political 
activity during the Fujimori regime. At the beginning of the 1990’s, she had an 
active and prominent role in the generalized effort to make ex-president Alan 
García face justice for charges of corruption, a fact that Quiroz (2008, p. 346) 
acknowledges by considering her part of the “new breed of anticorruption 
politician[s]”, together with Fernando Olivera and Pedro Cateriano; at the end 
of the decade, she would take again over the role of active opposition, engaged 
in the task of stopping the pro-Fujimori electoral fraud of 2000. This time, 
Flores is referred to as part of the “truth squad” (Conaghan, 2005, p. 206), 
who, along with later minister of Justice Diego García-Sayan and 
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congresswoman Anel Townsend, joined the Organization of American States 
(OAS) meeting in Windsor, Ontario, with the objective of garnering 
international pressure over the illegitimate re-reelection of Fujimori. However, 
from an objective perspective, both instances of anti-corruption stands taken 
by Flores can be regarded as politically-driven, not only due to her position as 
an opposition leader, but because both of them happened to occur in 
distinctively dramatic episodes of Peruvian politics, when the majority of the 
population were also severely frustrated with the increasing scandals of 
governmental corruption. Clearly, the designation of businessman Arturo 
Woodman (known for his dealings with the Fujimori-Montesinos duo during 
the 1990’s – Durand, 2005) as her first vice-president for the running formula 
didn’t help her position in the fight against corruption (McClintock, 2006, p. 
102), nor did her party’s behavior during the congressional period 2001-2006 
(in cases like the congressional report on corruption under Fujimori’s 
government, where UN largely lined with the remaining pro-Fujimori forces – 
Zapata, 2005), or even the inclusion of pro-Fujimori candidates in UN’s 
congressional list of 2001 (Taylor, 2005). 
 - Martha Chávez (AF): The openly pro-Fujimori candidate of 2006 had an 
enthusiastic record for bending the rules in order to provide political and legal 
back-up during ex-president Fujimori’s government. According to Ugarteche 
(2005), Chávez was part of a group of congressmen that regularly met with the 
President’s main advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, to develop legal strategies to 
derail any case of human abuses or corruption that may arrive to the 
congressional commissions of Intelligence, Investigation, and Economy, in 
exchange for bulky payments. Zapata (2005) recounts, in the same line, the 
legislative proposal defended by Chávez in 1995 to grant amnesty to the 
members of the paramilitary death-squad Colina, which were involved in 
“selective assassinations” (p. 263). This and other cases pointing to her active 
participation in the government’s strategy to seize and retain power 
throughout the 1990’s, and the aim to continue doing so for the period 2000-
2005, are described in detail by Catherine Conaghan (2005). What is of more 
interest for us now, is Chávez’s position regarding all these issues in the 
presidential campaign of 2006. We refer to the words of Schmidt (2007, p. 
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815) in order to start grasping the profound meaning that Martha Chavez’s 
candidacy represented for the continuation (or return) of Fujimori’s legacy in 
power: “Fujimori chose Congresswoman Martha Chávez to run on the ticket 
of Alianza por el Futuro (Alliance for the Future), comprising the two major 
pro-Fujimori organisations [sic] from the 1990s, Cambio 90 (Change 90) and 
Nueva Mayoría (New Majority). Not coincidentally, the alliance’s logo was 
‘AF’, Alberto Fujimori’s initials.” It’s important to remember that by the time 
of the 2006 campaign, Fujimori was impeded to obtain any public office, and 
was even being prosecuted for several charges, including corruption. 
However, Chávez’s intention to get a bloc in congress in order to help Alberto 
Fujimori’s case was rather obvious, not least of all for the inclusion of 
Fujimori’s own daughter, Keiko, running as the head of the congressional list 
(McClintock, 2006), but most evidently for the creation of a ‘catchy’ song for 
the campaign called el chino va a volver, or ‘the chinese man will come 
back’42 (Mäckelmann, 2006). 
 - Valentín Paniagua (FC): The case of the candidate of Frente de Centro, or 
Center Front, can be described as diagonally opposite to that of Martha 
Chávez. After ex-president Fujimori resigned to office in November of 2000, 
Paniagua swore as interim president to conform a Transitional Government 
that would call for new presidential and congressional elections in 2001, and 
would set in place (and in record time) the basic anti-corruption architecture to 
prosecute the corrupt members of the previous regime and recover the stolen 
assets (Peña-Mancillas, 2011; Jorge, 2008; Calderón, 2006). In general, his is 
a government remembered as successful, where his political support to the 
anti-corruption effort was considered decisive, and his personal attributes were 
since then linked to words such as honesty (McClintock, 2006, p. 100), 
transparency (Taylor, 2005, p. 572), ethics (Peña-Mancillas, 2011, p. 5), 
scrupulous (Franco, 2001, p. 16), and morality (Ford, 2003, p. 194). These are 
all of them descriptions of not only the government that Paniagua presided 
(2000-2001), but also of his individual political value that are repeated once 
																																																								
42 ‘Chinese man’ was Alberto Fujimori’s friendly nickname since the beginning of his political career, 
in the presidential campaign of 1990. 
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and again in virtually all scholarly and documentary reviews of his person and 
administration. 
 - Humberto Lay (RN): As a political newcomer, very little can be said of the 
Protestant minister Humberto Lay from the perspective of his corruption-
anticorruption potential. Before the presidential campaign of 2006, Lay had 
intended to participate in the 2001 elections, but early in the effort suspended 
the legal subscription of his political party National Restoration in order to 
participate in the Iniciativa Nacional Anticorruption (National Anticorruption 
Initiative) by request of President Valentín Paniagua (Transparencia, 2008). 
 
 
3.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDICATOR 
 
Ranking of corruption-related résumé 
 In order to objectively develop a HCT indicator based on the relative 
corruptibility of each of the main Peruvian presidential candidates of 2006 (in other 
words, a ranking of their corruption potential), a topic that may be seen as particularly 
problematic and controversial, this study conducted what Kimberly Neuendorf (2001) 
would describe as quantitative interpretative analysis, a method resembling that of 
content analysis but which constructs its categories in a progressive way, close to the 
idea of grounded theory, and ends up quantifying its results and reorganizing them in 
specific arrangements.  
 
 The data used as primary source for this ranking is provided by the Peruvian 
newsmagazine Caretas, which is considered the leading source of political and 
investigative journalism in the country, with more than 50 years of work. Although its 
level of impartiality hasn’t been scientifically addressed, in general terms its content 
covers most of the Peruvian political spectrum, and different perspectives and 
opinions are usually published in order to reflect the complexity of the subjects. 
Assuming the unbiased coverage (in both content and extension) of corruption-related 
stories involving different political tents, all the information published in the Careta’s 
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digital version43 was processed for the period between September 22, 2000 (first issue 
published after the burst of the vladivideos scandal), and April 7, 2006 (last issue 
published before the first round of presidential elections). This means 283 issues, in 
total.  
 
 The details of the information regarding corrupt (and anti-corrupt) activities of 
the six major candidates of 2006, and their political parties, are presented in Appendix 
1. The corruption-related categories developed in the process of analysis are as 
follows: 
 - Corruption (C): Cases where the party/candidate is directly or indirectly 
involved in the commission of a corrupt act. - Against anti-corruption (-AC)44: Cases where the party/candidate shows 
tolerance to corruption, either by action or omission, or attacks/ignores AC 
principles. - Not corruption (-C): Cases where a point is made against previous 
information involving the party/candidate in the commission of a corrupt act. - Anti-corruption (AC): Cases where the party/candidate actively 
pursues/supports the fight against corruption without having as a motive to 
earn equivalent political return. 
 
As it can be observed, the four corruption-related categories are presented in a 
continuum that, to use the vocabulary of HCT, extends from high tolerance to low 
tolerance of corruption. At least one of these categories can represent each one of the 
pieces of information regarding the corrupt potential of the 2006 candidates, with 
some cases involving two categories. Other categories included to analyze the data 
were: Party or candidate involvement (or both), and the title/body presentation45. To 																																																								
43 http://www.caretas.com.pe/Main.asp?T=3098 
44 About –AC, Karklins (2005, pp. 28, 33) states that, during privatization phases in post-Communist 
countries, the image of “all” politicians got tainted “since few among them made a visible effort not 
only to avoid personal involvement [in corrupt deals], but to look for effective countermeasures to 
constrain their colleagues. The lack of preventive work by more honest politicians is a significant part 
of the corruption experience… In addition to… active corruption of legislators, there also is passive 
corruption in the sense of omission and dereliction of duty” 
45 Such a differentiation allows us to consider the relative importance given to the information, 
depending on the position where the corruption-related reference is included (either in the title or the 
body of the press article). 
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account for the relative importance of party/candidate and title/body distinctions, the 
following formula was applied 
 
Ct + ( Cb / 2 ) + { [ Pt + ( Pb / 2 ) ] / 2} 
where Ct stands for candidate in title, Cb for candidate in body, Pt for party in title, 
and Pb for party in body. In other words, although each piece of information 
(disregarding the length) was given ‘1 point’, a body point was valued as half of a title 
point, and points given for information involving the candidate’s party, and not the 
candidate him/herself, were valued as half also46. The results, excluding cases where 
more than one category was adjudicated, are presented in the Figure 3-1. 
 
FIGURE 3-1. HLC-RELATED INFORMATION ACROSS CATEGORIES 
 
 
 Finally, points were added and aggregated across corruption-related categories 
in the following way: 
 
{ (C) + (-AC) - (-C) / [ (C) + (-AC) - (-C) ] + (AC) } x 100 																																																								46	The time lag between the news coverage and the presidential election of 2006 is not considered as a 
discriminatory element due to its expected irrelevance. Regarding the same strategy, in their study of 
corruption scandals in Spain, Barberá et al. (2012, p. 18) explain: “We also examined whether the 
‘timing’ of the corruption scandal had a significant effect. We expected corruption scandals that broke 
out shortly before the election to decrease incumbent’s vote share even further. This result would be 
consistent with existing theories about citizens’ use of heuristics when making their electoral 
decisions… However, we found null results: corruption scandals that emerged in 2007 and 2011 were 
as equally likely to be punished as those that broke out earlier in the electoral cycle.” 
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The product, presented in Figure 3-2, gives us the percentage of news 
regarding corruption (plus the ones against anti-corruption, and minus the ones 
denying corruption) from the total of corruption-related information, for each 
candidate/party.  
 
FIGURE 3-2. PERCENTAGE OF NEGATIVE HLC-RELATED INFORMATION 
 
  
 
 Therefore we conclude that, regarding the corruption-related history of the six 
most voted candidates in the first round of the presidential elections in Peru of 2006, 
the ranking is as follows, in order of their anti-corruption potential: 
 
1. Valentín Paniagua 
2. Humberto Lay 
3. Ollanta Humala 
4. Lourdes Flores 
5. Alan García 
6. Martha Chávez 
 
 Ranking of anti-corruption offer 
 In the previous section we have quantitatively resolved the question behind the 
presidential candidates’ probity to conduct public affairs. Now, we shall do the same 
for the candidates’ offers (included in the their party platforms) in order to analyze the 
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voters’ reaction to the potential benefits that each candidate may bring to office in the 
fight against corruption. With this objective, we employ quantitative content analysis 
(as described by Neuendorf, 2001) to assess the importance of the ‘corruption 
construct’ in the party platforms officially presented by each of the six most voted 
candidates for Peruvian national elections in 200647, with the exception of Martha 
Chávez’s Alianza por el Futuro, which didn’t present any. 
 
 The complete dictionary of corruption and anti-corruption-related terms is 
included in Appendix 2, along with the cases generated from the analysis. The 
categories considered were: Corruption/anti-corruption usage; implicit (the 
‘corruption construct’ is assumed from the reference to anticorruption-related terms) 
or explicit (the construct is mentioned in any variant); and the ‘structural 
independence’ of the construct, which is nothing more than the length of its 
reference48. However, only the second and third categories were considered for the 
final ranking, which was calculated based in the formula 
 
{ [ explicit (2) implicit (1) ]  x [ length - word (1) sentence (2) paragraph (3) subchapter (4) 
chapter (5) ] } / Total amount of words in the document   
 
where the numbers in parenthesis are the points given to each observation of the 
construct in order to calculate the weight of each party platform, and ‘total amount of 
words in the document’ refers to the entire content of the party platform. 
Consequently, the lower ratio of points/total will mean higher anti-corruption 
offer. The results are presented in Figure 3-3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
47 The documents can be downloaded from:   http://agenciaperu.com/especiales/elecciones/planes.html 
, last accessed on November 27, 2012. 48	The length can be considered to be a word (construct with or without attached adjective and 
standing with other concepts), a sentence (statement about the construct, standing alone or repeated), a 
paragraph (two or more sentences), a subchapter, or a chapter.	
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FIGURE 3-3. RATIO OF THE CORRUPTION CONSTRUCT IN PARTY PLATFORMS 
 
 
 From this table, we can conclude that the candidates of 2006 who made the 
fight against corruption a bigger issue of their party platforms, in relative terms, are:  
 
1. Humberto Lay 
2. Valentín Paniagua 
3. Alan García 
4. Ollanta Humala 
5. Lourdes Flores 
6. Martha Chávez49 
 
Composite ranking  
 After obtaining results pertaining to the relative importance of the presidential 
candidates in terms of their corruption-related history and electoral offer, we proceed 
to recombine both rankings by averaging the positions, an approach also employed by 
Transparency International in the construction of their annual Corruption Perception 
Index (Thompson and Shah, 2005). However, the present study will take into account 
the average level of media exposure and readership prevalent in Peru, and consider 
																																																								
49 Althoug Alianza por el Futuro did not, in fact, presented a party platform for the elections of 2006, 
we include Martha Chávez in the ranking for comparison purposes between this and the previous 
ranking regarding the candidates’ résumé. 
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the importance of party platforms as half of that of Careta’s coverage50; in other 
words, when averaging both rankings, the candidates’ positions as discovered by the 
content analysis of the platforms will take half its value. Table 3-2 presents the final, 
composite ranking of corruption-potential of the Peruvian presidential candidates of 
2006. 
  
TABLE 3-2. COMPOSITE RANKING OF CANDIDATES’ CORRUPT CHARACTER 
Presidential candidate Composite ranking 
Valentin Paniagua – FC 1 
Humberto Lay – RN 1.25 
Ollanta Humala – UPP 2.5 
Lourdes Flores – UN 3.25 
Alan García – APRA 3.25 
Martha Chávez – AF 4.5 
 
  
 As we can see, there is a tie between the candidates Lourdes Flores, from 
Unidad Nacional, and Alan García, from APRA. To decide their relative placement, 
we draw supportive data from an intention poll conducted in 2006 (PUCP, 2006) in 
Lima and other cities of the country, which included a question regarding the 
“principal reason for casting their vote in support of the candidate…” The resulting 
information about four of the six candidates included in the present study is presented 
in Tables 3-3 through 3-651. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								50	Even though party platforms have gained importance for issue-saliency, they are still to be 
considered as less accessible (and therefore less influential) to voters than other massive sources of 
political news and information such as the media. This approach is also argued by Bagenholm (2009, p. 
9) regarding the relative importance of party manifestoes and the media in Europe.  
51 All information in the tables is translated from Spanish. 
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TABLE 3-3. INTENTION POLL – OLLANTA HUMALA 
 
 
 
TABLE 3-4. INTENTION POLL – ALAN GARCÍA 
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TABLE 3-5. INTENTION POLL – LOURDES FLORES 
 
  
 
TABLE 3-6. INTENTION POLL – VALENTIN PANIAGUA 
 
  
 
 Adding the anticorruption-related information in the above tables in Table 3-7, 
we find that the resulting ranking is equivalent to the one presented in Table 3-2.  
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TABLE 3-7. INTENTION POLL – COMPOSITE 
  
 
 The order taken by the four candidates included in the PUCP poll, hence, 
mirrors the composite ranking developed from their history and electoral offer, and 
helps us untie the scores of Flores and García. Therefore, and following this partial 
support, we conclude that the candidate from APRA should be considered more 
potentially corrupt than his counterpart from Unidad Nacional. With this information, 
finally, the set is ready to test the relation between an attitudinal and an action-based 
(or behavioral) indicator of HCT. 
 
 
 3.3. TEST OF THE HCT INDICATOR 
  
 In order to apply the previously elaborated ranking to the LAPOP database of 
2006, the self-reported information regarding “for which candidate did you vote for 
President in the last presidential elections?” coded PERVB3 52  is recombined, 
becoming now a quantitative indicator of HCT, read as the ‘minimum tolerance of the 
citizen’ expressed by voting in spite of the ratio of information about the corrupt 
character and the position of fight against corruption (in an index of electoral offers) 
of the candidate. 																																																								
52 Appendix 3 presents a complete list of the variables, indicators, categories and codes regarding HCT 
included in this study. 
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 On the other hand, an attitudinal indicator of HCT is obtained from the 
question “an unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, 
and the politician uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. Do you think the 
politician is 1) corrupt and should be punished, 2) corrupt but justified, or 3) not 
corrupt?” coded DC1353, where the answers can be described as intolerant, tolerant, 
and highly tolerant of corruption, respectively, following the logic of the present 
study.  
 
 Employing ordered logistic regression analysis, the voting behavior is 
regressed on the attitudes toward HLC, and the results are presented in Table 3-8. 
 
TABLE 3-8. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 
 
VOTE COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
ATTITUDE 0.218* 0.108 2.02 
 
N = 1178 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
 
 
 Evidently, there is in fact a sizable and statically significant impact of attitudes 
over the citizens’ electoral behavior. Translating this result to probabilities, we find a 
more clear interpretation of the way that attitudes manage to affect the punishment 
capabilities of the electorate. As we can see in the Table 3-9, a change in attitudes 
from highly tolerant to intolerant of corruption positively impacts on the amount of 
support for the three more honest candidates, whereas an inverse trend would benefit 
the two more potentially corrupt candidates (Alan García and Martha Chávez); the 
importance of attitudes over behavior is somehow unclear, however, for the case of 
the support for Lourdes Flores, possibly evidencing her corruption-neutral stand as 
mentioned earlier in the brief about each candidate. 
 																																																								
53 The frequency of observations (n=1178) for each category is 914 (77.59%), 232 (19.69%), and 32 
(2.72%), respectively.	
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TABLE 3-9. PROBABILITIES OF VOTING FOR A CANDIDATE,  
BASED ON ATTITUDES TOWARD CORRUPTION 
	 Intolerant	
attitude	
Tolerant	
attitude	
Highly	tolerant	
attitude	
Valentín	Paniagua	 5.87%	 4.77%	 3.87%	
Humberto	Lay	 3.10%	 2.57%	 2.11%	
Ollanta	Humala	 36.72%	 33.00%	 29.23%	
Lourdes	Flores	 23.26%	 23.75%	 23.72%	
Alan	García	 28.09%	 32.25%	 36.56%	
Martha	Chávez	 2.96%	 3.66%	 4.51%	
Total	 100%	 100%	 100%	
 
  
 In a simpler fashion, we resort to the descriptive statistics regarding attitudes 
and behavior, tabulated in Table 3-10. As we can appreciate, more the 30% of 
surveyed people who stated that the corrupt behavior in question (nepotism) was 
indeed “corrupt and punishable”, still decided to cast their votes in support of the two 
most potentially dishonest presidential candidates of 2006, hence not actually living 
up to that punishment they thought would be appropriate for such politicians. How 
can A-B congruency address this problem? The only option left is to rely in the actual 
voting behavior of the citizenry, and to regard their attitudes exclusively as a potential 
determinant for that behavior. 
 
TABLE 3-10. PERCENTAGE OF ATTITUDES VERSUS BEHAVIOR REGARDING HCT 
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 3.4. SUMMARY 
  
 By resorting to the quantitative interpretative analysis of the main political 
magazine in Peru, Caretas, throughout the issues published during the five years and 
a half previous to the Peruvian presidential elections of 2006; and quantitative content 
analysis of the party platforms of five out of the six most voted presidential 
candidates in that election, we were able to construct two separate rankings in order to 
account for the relative position of the candidates of 2006 in corruption-related 
history and offers. After combining them in a single, composite ranking, the results 
showed that, from the most honest to the most corrupt character in terms of their 
political background and their promises for the future, Peruvian candidates of that 
year were presented in the following order: (1) Valentín Paniagua; (2) Humberto Lay; 
(3) Ollanta Humala; (4) Lourdes Flores; (5) Alan García; and, (6) Martha Chávez. 
This ranking, over which we were later able to develop the indicator of HCT, could 
also be partially assumed from the description of each one of the candidates that was 
conducted at the beginning of the chapter, drawing from the information provided by 
numerous academic sources; however, due to the sensitive nature of the topic, a 
scientific approach for data gathering was necessary to preserve and secure the 
required level of neutrality.  
 
 With the previously unavailable input now at hand, a ‘recombination’ of the 
information presented by LAPOP’s AmericasBarometer 2006 regarding the self-
reported voting behavior in the first round of presidential elections was applied in line 
with it. The result was the development of a behavioral indicator of HCT as proposed 
in Chapter 2, which read ‘voting for a candidate in spite of its corrupt character’, a 
requirement that we consider to have fulfilled. 
 
 Finally, an ordered logistic regression of our behavioral HCT indicator on an 
attitudinal indicator of the same dimension showed that they are, in fact, statistically 
related. However, the size of the effect wasn’t big enough (as evidenced by the actual 
probabilities of a behavioral change) to consider attitudes 
	 73	
behavioral HCT. If not for the argument developed earlier regarding the theoretical 
framework for the study of corruption tolerance, such result would posit the question 
of the appropriateness of both indicators equally (as it becomes necessary to choose 
one of them for the operationalization of HCT). However, our discussion in the 
previous chapter already assumed most of the statistical relations we found here, and 
hence, we have now the road clear for the usage of a properly behavioral indicator, 
and the subsequent inclusion of attitudes as a potential determinant, among others, for 
the analysis of HCT.  
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CHAPTER 4 
ATTITUDES VS. ACTIONS:  
EMPIRICAL TEST OF A  
LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE BEHAVIORAL INDICATOR 
(FOR THE CASE OF PERU) 
 
 
 The importance of any measurement of corruption tolerance, be it attitude-
based or action-based, consists in the degree of internal validity that we can hold it to. 
If the way we operationalize the phenomenon under consideration is in any way 
flawed, biased, of just fails to tap into the main components of interest, then it follows 
that any conclusion about the causes and consequences of the phenomenon will be 
biased as well. While it is common to find different problems of operationalization of 
concepts in the social sciences, we should always strife for the closest approximation 
to the actual concept we are tying to study.  
 
 As we have seen in Chapter 2, the study of corruption tolerance from the point 
of view of deviant and compliant behavior theoretically requires from us the 
assessment of the actual behavior (engagement in bribery54) instead of relying on the 
classic attitudinal measures that are found in the literature. In the identification of a 
proper indicator of low-level corruption tolerance (LCT), we have elaborated on this 
point by adopting Icek Ajzen’s Theory of Planned Behavior, which regards attitudinal 
measures as an incomplete account of the determinants of any specific behavior. 
Focusing on LCT, we will test this assertion by way of comparison. If, as expected, 
we find only a mild relation between attitudes towards bribery and the individual’s 																																																								54	As the LAPOP’s questionnaire does not include any item that would allow us to measure the 
specific behavioral attempt for cases of LCT-deviance, we will rely entirely on the actual occurrence 
of bribery, making the cautionary alert to treat this measure (for cases of collusion) as the minimum 
level of corruption tolerance in that given population. This strategy seems plausible, as offered in 
Chapter 2, based on the fact that Peruvian “formal and informal institutions of bureaucracy are 
reportedly highly permeable to corruption”. The Global Integrity Report 2007 developed by the NGO 
Global Integrity regarded Peruvian law enforcement (48/100) and whistle-blowing measures (21/100) 
as very weak. This suggests, in line with many accounts of low-level corruption in Latin America in 
general, that if a citizen attempts to bribe, he/she will most likely succeed.	
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actual decision to engage in this form of corruption, we will be one step closer to 
unravel the different elements that determine a citizen’s corruption tolerance level. 
 
 The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) AmericasBarometer – 
2006 provides us with survey data to tap on both attitudes and behavior towards LLC 
in the case of Peru. The variables and indicators included in the analysis, and their 
original codification, are presented as follows55: 
 - Action-based indicators:  
o EXC11: During the last year, to process any kind of document (like a 
license, for example), have you had to pay any money above that 
required by law?  
o EXC14: Have you had to give a bribe to the courts during the last 
year? 
o EXC15: In order to be attended to in a hospital or a clinic during the 
last year, have you had to give a bribe? 
 - Attitude-based indicators: 
o EXC18: Do you think that the way things are, sometimes giving a 
bribe is justified? 
o EXC19: Do you think that in our society giving bribes is justified 
because of the poor public services, or do you think it is not justified? 
 - Additional variables: 
o SGL2: How have they treated you or your neighbors when you have 
had dealings with the municipality? 
o EXC6: During the last year, has any public official asked you for a 
bribe?  
 
 
4.1.ANALYSIS AND RESULTS  
 																																																								
55 Additionally, Appendix 4 presents a complete list of the variables, indicators, categories and codes 
regarding LCT included in this study. 
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To test the relation between attitude-based and action-based indicators of 
LCT, we first create a composite ordinal variable from EXC11, EXC14 and EXC15 
(all the questions regarding actual bribery, considering only the data for those subjects 
that have indeed had interactions with public institutions in all three cases), and use 
ordered logistic regression analysis to regress it on the widest of the attitudinal 
questions, EXC18. This analysis will tell us if the attitudes toward bribery are a good 
predictor of the actual engagement in it. It should be noted, however, that this initial 
composite variable will not differentiate between deviant and compliant corruption. 
The results are shown in Table 4-1. As we can see here, the impact of attitudes over 
behavior gives a high coefficient of 0.95, while it reaches statistical significance at 
p<0.05. 
 
TABLE 4-1. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR (THREE CASES) 
 
BRIBE COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
ATTITUDE 0.959* 0.432 2.22 
 
N = 146 
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.043 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
 
 
Translating this result to predictive probabilities, it means that a change of 
attitudes from “non-justifiable” to “justifiable” derives in an increase of the 
probabilities of engaging in corrupt behavior from 11% to 22% for a ‘one-time’ 
bribery, from 4% to 9% for a two-times bribery, and from 0.9% to 2.5% for a three-
times bribery; conversely, a more tolerant attitude towards corruption reduces the 
predictive probabilities of avoiding it from 82% to 65%.  
 
To further test the relation between both variables, we dichotomize the values 
of the composite between ‘no incident’ (zero-times) and ‘incident’ (one or more 
times) of bribery over the same amount of time, and we include all the subjects that 
have had interactions with a public institution in at least one of the three cases. We 
use a simple chi-square test to check if there is any statistical relation, and the results 
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are presented in Table 4-2. This time, we find statistical non-significance in the 
relation between attitudes and behavior, which suggests that the importance of 
attitudes in shaping actual behavior depends on the frequency of interactions between 
the individual and the public sphere. To lend (or withdraw) support to this 
assumption, we repeat the analysis for individuals showing the minimum frequency of 
interactions (the opposite population from the one used in Table 1), which means 
using the data for subjects that had interactions with a public institution in only one of 
the three cases exposed by EXC11, EXC14 and EXC15. Results are presented in 
Table 4-3.   
 
TABLE 4-2. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – DICHOTOMIC (ALL SUBJECTS) 
 
 ATTITUDE  
BRIBE NO YES TOTAL 
NO 687 197 884 
YES 90 30 120 
TOTAL 777 227 1,004 
 
PEARSON CHI2(1) = 0.445; P = 0.505 
 
 
 
TABLE 4-3. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR (ONE CASE) 
 
BRIBE COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
ATTITUDE -0.276 0.404 -0.68 
 
N = 577 
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.002 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
 
   
As assumed, this time again the simple logistic regression shows statistical 
non-significance and even an inverted coefficient for the effect of attitudes over 
behavior, which lends support to the intervenient effect of the frequency rate of 
private/public spheres interactions. 
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Following the argument presented by the theoretical framework, however, it is 
required to get past the general level of corruption tolerance behavior, and to be able 
to differentiate between deviant and compliant corruption in the analysis of the 
relation between attitudes and behavior toward corruption. This task is accomplished 
by inserting in the analysis the survey question coded EXC6, which refers to the 
occurrence of being asked for a bribe by a public official. This question is treated as 
tapping directly on cases of extortive corruption (as suggested by Orces, 2009). To 
prove its feasibility as such, it would be expected for victimization (exc6) to have an 
important impact on the citizen’s attitudes toward the way the public servant has 
treated him/her (sgl2). To test it, we use ordered logistic regression analysis to regress 
SGL2 on EXC6. The results are shown in Table 4-4. As expected, the coefficient is 
both of important effect size (0.48) and statistically significant (p<0.01). 
 
TABLE 4-4. IMPACT OF VICTIMIZATION OVER ATTITUDES TOWARD PUBLIC SERVANT 
 
TREATMENT COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
VICTIMIZATION 0.487** 0.166 2.93 
 
N = 1,371 
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.007 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
 
 
TABLE 4-5. PAYMENT OF A BRIBE BY OWN INITIATIVE OR VICTIMIZATION (THREE CASES) 
 
 VICTIMIZATION  
BRIBE NO YES TOTAL 
NO 102 
89.47% 
14 
42.42% 
116 
78.91% 
1-TIME 10 
8.77% 
11 
33.33% 
21 
14.29% 
2-TIMES 1 
0.88% 
7 
21.21% 
8 
5.44% 
3-TIMES 1 
0.88% 
1 
3.03% 
2 
1.36% 
	 79	
TOTAL 114 
100% 
33 
100% 
147 
100% 
 
Now, it’s possible to disentangle the composite ordinal variable used in Table 
4-1 (subjects that interacted with public institutions in all three cases during the past 
year)56 by tabulating it with EXC6 (request for a bribe). Table 4-5 presents the 
number of cases that can give us a distinction between deviant and compliant 
corruption.  
 
As we can see, 58% of citizen’s that were confronted (victimized) with a 
request for a bribe decided to comply with it, showing what the literature has called a 
need behavior. On the other hand, only 10% of those who were NOT asked for a bribe 
ended up giving one, clearly suggesting the possibility of a situation of greed 
corruption. Although none of the survey questions employed here allow us to state 
beyond reasonable doubt that the specific occurrence of victimization corresponds to 
that of the payment/refusal of a bribe (due to the exclusion of any measure of the 
frequency of those situations), we may still derive strong arguments if it can be 
proven that in fact a bribe request (victimization) influences the decision to pay it, as 
it would intuitively be expected. Table 4-6 presents the ordered logistic regression of 
the chosen composite ordinal variable on the variable coded EXC6. 
 
TABLE 4-6. IMPACT OF VICTIMIZATION OVER BEHAVIOR (THREE CASES) 
 
BRIBE COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
VICTIMIZATION 2.488*** 0.459 5.42 
 
N = 147 
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.258 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
 
 																																																								
56 For ease of exposition we have chosen to limit the analysis presented here to only one of the three 
composite models used before, and with that objective we employ the one showing the most promising 
results for the impact of attitudes over behavior so far. When using the other two composite variables, 
the results for deviant and compliant corruption show that in every case the regression fails to reach 
statistical significance (and a counter-logic negative coefficient in three out of the four analyses). All 
four logistic regression analyses are included in Appendix 5.   
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As expected, there is an important influence (2.48, p<0.001) of 
“victimization” over the decision to bribe or not. Hence, even though it is impossible 
from the survey questions to match both measures to the same event, the results of the 
regression provides enough support to the assumption that they are, in fact, parts of 
the same incidents.  
 
To continue testing the relation between attitudes and behavior toward low-
level corruption, now more readily delimited by the differentiated cases of deviant 
and compliant corruption, we shall turn to the more specific question about attitudes 
toward bribery due to poor public services (exc19). The ordered logistic regression of 
the behavioral composite ordinal variable on this variable, for the subset of cases that 
were not asked for a bribe, should tell the collusive part of the story between attitudes 
and behavior. Table 4-7 presents the results. We can see that the relation between the 
two variables is statistically non-significant, although showing an otherwise 
interesting effect size (0.678). 
 
TABLE 4-7. IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPT DEVIANCE (THREE CASES) 
 
BRIBE COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
ATTITUDES 
(GREED) 
0.678 0.723 0.94 
 
N = 113 
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.013 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
 
 
Finally, the only test left to perform in this section is for the cases of clear 
extortion: The relation between corruption compliance and attitudes toward it. 
Unfortunately, there is no question in the LAPOP AmericasBarometer survey that 
allows for such analysis, as no question is asked regarding people’s opinion about 
being victimized by a public official. However, since the widest attitudinal question in 
the survey (exc18) allows for the inclusion of both deviant and compliant attitudes, it 
would be suspected that any important relation between compliant attitudes and 
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behavior should be able to be tapped into through a weak (at least) impact of general 
attitudes over specific extorted behavior. To test this possibility, we use again ordered 
logistic regression analysis to regress the composite ordinal variable (actual bribery) 
on EXC18, for the subset of cases that were asked for a bribe. The results are shown 
in Table 4-8. Once again the regression gives a statistically non-significant result, 
with a coefficient of 0.414. However, it is important to notice that the lack of 
significance may be a result of the exceptionally low number of cases included in this 
particular regression. Therefore, further data collection may be necessary in the 
future. 
 
TABLE 4-8.  IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE (THREE CASES) 
 
BRIBE COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
ATTITUDES 0.414 0.665 0.62 
 
N = 33 
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.013 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
  
 
 4.2. SUMMARY 
  
 The results presented in this chapter aimed at conclusively resolve the 
discussion regarding the appropriateness of an attitudinal measurement of the 
phenomenon of low-level corruption tolerance (LCT). As in the case of high-level 
corruption, the theoretical framework developed earlier in the present study made a 
strong argument for the usage of a behavioral approach to the analysis of corruption 
tolerance, with the intention of eventually unraveling its determinants and 
characteristics. 
 
 In the previous pages, it has been shown that an attitude-based indicator of 
LCT cannot be used as a proxy for actual deviant (or compliant) behavior regarding 
bribery. We reached this conclusion by focusing on the data for the Peruvian subjects 
that had the most encounters with public institutions, as provided by the LAPOP 
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AmericasBarometer 2006 database. Although these subjects reported to have behaved 
in a clearly consistent way with their attitudes regarding bribery, such consistency 
couldn’t be found when disaggregating the analysis between cases of collusion 
(deviant behavior) and extortion (compliant behavior). Furthermore, the capacity of 
attitudes to predict behavior completely disappeared when considering all subjects in 
the database, or only the ones that had the minimum frequency of interactions with 
public institutions over the previous year. This results evidence the same kind of 
problems that inspired social psychologist Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein to develop 
their principle of compatibility (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977), as described in Chapter 2. 
  
 Been this the case, we are compelled to follow the logic presented in the 
theoretical framework supporting the higher validity of a purely action-based model 
of LCT, and undertake the effort of finding and explaining the various individual 
determinants behind the decision to engage in corruption on these specific terms.  
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CHAPTER 5 
THE DETERMINANTS OF CORRUPTION TOLERANCE 
 
  
 5.1. THE DETERMINANTS OF HCT  
 
 From here, and following the HCT process showed in Chapter 2, we can set 
up a number of determinants that can cause the evolution from information to 
punishment to be broken and devolve in a scenario of high-level corruption tolerance. 
Figure 5-1 shows the major determinants associated with a HCT scenario. 
 
FIGURE 5-1. THE POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF HCT 
 
 
 
 
 The variables selected above come in big part from a profuse literature on 
corruption that, as mentioned in the introduction, has been developed from the mid-
20th century and more importantly from the decade of 1990. We will go into each one 
of them taking special care to explain the internal logic of their impact in the 
particular step of vertical accountability. 
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 The first stage of the process starts with the formation of citizen’s perception. 
All other elements and ‘noise’ being cast aside, this cognitive process should go 
without alterations as people perceive accurately what the original information is 
transmitting; however, we will find that this assumption is contested usually by 
reality, and in the particular case of corruption perception it can be affected by four 
different considerations: media exposure, political awareness, partisanship (or 
political allegiance), and bureaucratic culture. Media exposure refers to the classic 
measurement approach for political knowledge acquired from the news (“learning 
from news”), which involves assessing the level of exposition of the individual to the 
mass media (Rhee and Cappella, 1997). The importance of this first determinant is 
easily understood given that any information that a citizen may have about high-level 
corruption (HLC) can inevitably only come directly or indirectly from the media, as 
opposed to popular perceptions of low-level corruption (Morris, 2008). In order for 
the citizen to perceive any corrupt activity that may be affecting the government, 
he/she must first have some degree of exposure to the main sources of HLC 
information. As Chang and Kerr (2009) prove for the case of the African countries, 
media exposure has an important impact on the level of corruption perception among 
the citizens57. The same logic stands behind Uslaner’s (2008, p. 36) words, when he 
recounts that “[c]ountries with high newspaper readership and democracy have less 
corruption”, and also those of Karklins (2005, p. 6), who states that “people in a 
democracy tend to hear much more about corruption than in nondemocratic systems 
that censor the news.” In short, the media is widely accepted to be the main vehicle 
for the spread of corruption-related information, as we have commented earlier in this 
study, and the level of individual exposure to it is naturally a key element for the 
punishment of corrupt politicians. Therefore, we may propose the following 
hypothesis: 
 
 HCT-H1: Higher media exposure relates to lower HCT. 
 
 Nevertheless, and as recounted by Rhee and Cappella (1997), this basic logic 
of information absorption has increasingly being challenged over the past decades as 																																																								
57 Although they extend that impact to corruption tolerance, they don’t include in their model a linkage 
between perception and tolerance. For this reason, we believe that any impact that media exposure can 
have over corruption tolerance must logically come from its impact on corruption perception.  
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an insufficient concept to account for the entire individuals’ learning process, based 
on the intervening power that other related variables may have in the formation of 
political knowledge. The most important challenge in this sense has come from the 
scholarly attention to the multidimensional concept of political sophistication, or 
‘political awareness’ as Zaller (1992) calls it. In his own words, political awareness 
refers to “the extent to which an individual pays attention to politics and understands 
what he/she has encountered” (p. 21), and as such it denotes the cognitive engagement 
of the recipient as opposed to his/her affective engagement or the lack of engagement. 
To put it more clearly, it refers to the understanding of political communications58. In 
our model, political awareness represents a necessary addition in order to control for 
the possible intervening effect of the frequency of delivery of a specific piece of 
information by the news, being the logic that a low rate of transmission of information 
would only be mitigated by a high level of political awareness. Consequently, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
 
 HCT-H2: Higher political awareness relates to lower HCT. 
 
 Hence, together with media exposure, both variables are proposed to be the 
minimum necessary for a regular citizen to be able to absorb any available 
information about corrupt activities and interpret it as such; any decrease in media 
exposure and political awareness would, on the contrary, limit citizen’s ability to 
perceive corrupt activities in the government and hence increase his/her level of 
corruption tolerance.  
  
 The next constraint in the information-perception link is the citizen’s political 
allegiance, or partisanship. McCann and Redlawsk (2006) find that Republican and 
Democratic voters in United States express different opinions on what constitutes 
corrupt behavior in a context where such instances were connected to scandals 
involving the Republican Party; similarly, in another study both authors find at least 
partial support for the same link, if only when corruption is understood as 
“favoritism” as opposed to “lawbreaking” (Redlawsk and McCann, 2005, p. 270). 																																																								58	The impact of political awareness over the individual’s ability to process information is also noted 
by Blais et al. (2005, p. 8), who find that the most aware Canadians were almost four times more prone 
to perceive corruption under the government of Jean Chrétien.	
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Chang and Kerr (2009, p. 15) made the same line of observations when they found 
that partisans of the incumbent party in various African countries had systematically 
less perception of national government officials being involved in corrupt activities 
vis-à-vis non-partisans, and Anderson and Tverdova (2003) even extended these 
partisan consequences to the impact of attitudes toward the government59. In the 
words of Adam Brinegar (2009, p. 145), regarding attitudes about corruption in Chile, 
“[p]artisanship reflects an expected distrust among the opposition and an expected 
trust among the governing party about [anti-corruption] reform.” If partisanship is 
theoretically and empirically considered to have such a distorting effect on an 
individual’s perception and evaluation of corruption-related information, therefore, 
the following hypothesis may naturally be derived for the purposes of the present 
study: 
 
 HCT-H3: Higher partisanship relates to higher HCT. 
 
 Finally, the national ‘bureaucratic culture’ has been suggested to play a 
distorting or enhancing feature in the citizens’ perception of what constitutes a corrupt 
behavior. An eloquent piece of evidence of such obstacle, produced however from the 
perspective of petty corruption, is presented by del Castillo and Guerrero (2003, p. 
26), who report that in Mexico City up to 18.7% heads of household did not 
connected the image of a bribe to that of a corrupt behavior60; in other words, one 
fifth of Mexican subjects weren’t able to perceive their own bribing behavior as 
corrupt. From this perspective, we cannot help but wonder if these circumstances may 
be mirrored by the cases involving political figures, an the potential incapacity of 
many citizens to understand the corrupt nature of some ‘scandals’. Van Vuuren (2004, 
p. 12) states in his analysis of South Africa:  
 
“Media attention on cases of alleged grand corruption such as the arms deal has raised public 
awareness about what constitutes an act of corruption. This, combined with a greater awareness among 
citizens of their rights to fair administrative action may have resulted in respondents reporting corrupt 
behavior in 2003 that might have been regarded as ‘normal’ practice in 1998.”  																																																								59	Given the aggregate nature of the data used in their research, however, it is not possible to assert that 
the impact wasn’t actually on corruption perception, instead of directly on attitudes.	
60 Similarly, Karklins (2005, p. 68) reports that in Latvia “respondents struggled to distinguish ‘gifts’ 
from ‘bribes’ and ‘corruption’. 
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 Clearly, there is a connection between this idea of bureaucratic culture and 
political awareness; however, what differentiates both constructs is the change in 
focus from the individual’s lack of skills to appropriately process news, to the 
society’s popular tradition regarding public affairs61. From this distinction, then, the 
following hypothesis is presented: 
 
 HCT-H4: A more corruption-friendly bureaucratic culture relates to higher 
HCT. 
 
 The second stage in the process of vertical accountability implies the 
adjustment of attitudes toward the corrupt politician in line with the previously 
perceived information about his/her corrupt activities. Or to put it in fewer words, it 
implies the negative recasting of the political leader’s image. There are five factors 
identified by the corruption literature as being able to disrupt the formation of this 
appropriate attitudinal response to perceived corruption: economic satisfaction, 
clientelism, perceived generalized high-level corruption (HLC), democratic values, 
and attitudes toward HLC. Economic satisfaction refers to the way in which people 
evaluate a number of aspects of the government based primarily on their assessment 
of their own economic satisfaction, raising the possibility that they may accept certain 
levels of corruption if the actors involved offer and deliver a higher economic status 
compared to their cleaner political rivals. In this line of thinking, Manzetti and Wilson 
(2006, p. 138) find that, in the case of Argentina, “corruption only affects confidence 
(in government) when it is combined with economic dissatisfaction”. While this link 
is fairly obvious and intuitive, most of the literature has some issues regarding the 
exact dimension of satisfaction measured. Although common expectations suggest 
that people will support candidates or incumbents who better represent their economic 
interests despite issues involving corruption (“positive externality”, Barberá et al., 
2012, p. 16; Brinegar, 2009; “economic voting”, Lucinda, 2005, p. 418; McCann and 
Dominguez, 1998), there is also empirical evidence of an independent effect of the 
individual’s economic status and self-evaluation on both perception and attitudes 																																																								61	This position is expressed by Salzman (2009) when, talking about the case of Latin America, posits 
that the acceptance and rejection of certain types of corruption is “linked to societal norms of distinct 
political cultures” (p. 7), and by doing so gets close to an anthropological approach of corruption. 
Karklins (2005, p. 101) also suggests the social construction of acceptable public behaviors against 
private ones as a fundamental determinant to what we have called HCT.	
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toward high-level corruption (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2012; Chang and Kerr, 
2009, p. 17; Tverdova, 2007, p. 7; partially supported by Redlawsk and McCann, 
2005, pp. 270-271). Therefore, we would expect both dimensions of economic 
satisfaction in relation to HCT to be statistically significant, and the subsequent 
operationalization of this variable will have to account for them. In conclusion, the 
literature takes the lead for the inclusion of the following hypothesis in our study: 
 
 HCT-H5: Lower economic satisfaction relates to lower HCT. 
 
 Clientelism, very much like economic satisfaction, has also been argued to 
constrain the necessary process of accountability through the exchange of votes (and 
other modes of political support) for “whatever favors they can muster” (Manzetti and 
Wilson, 2009, p. 81). In their study, Manzetti and Wilson (2009p. 84) assert that 
“corrupt governments, in spite of their bad reputations, may survive because they are 
able to buy off voters (or at least enough voters) through clientelistic networks”. In 
that scenario, citizens would behave as clients and develop a positive view of the 
leader even if (and sometimes because) he/she engages in corrupt activities62 (Chang 
and Kerr, 2009). This relation between economic hardship, clientelism, and 
corruption tolerance is also acknowledged by Blake (2009, p. 100), who states that 
“poverty forces most citizens to focus on basic survival concerns that form a fertile 
breeding ground for clientelist [sic] politics and weaken the prospects of citizen 
activism to prevent corruption.” As economic considerations have already been 
discussed earlier, here we focus in the potential effect of clientelistic tendencies over 
the level of HCT: 
 
 HCT-H6: Higher clientelistic tendencies relate to higher HCT. 
 
 The third important factor to consider in this stage is the citizens’ perception 
of generalized high-level corruption pervading their society. As del Castillo and 
Guerrero (2003, p. 2) state, “corruption tolerance has a lot to do with the perception 
																																																								62	The same results are implied in an anthropological study of poor Bolivian citizens conducted by 
Sian Lazar (2005). She finds that people of El Alto, Bolivia, are willing to accept and condone some 
level of corruption from their leaders as long as they provide obras (basic infrastructure) for the 
community.	
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that the individual has of himself and of the society where he/she interacts”63. This is 
so because citizens assess different candidates in an electoral process based in relative 
and not absolute terms, meaning that the value of any political attribute is set based on 
the comparison between the different electoral options. If a citizen believes that all 
politician are unavoidably corrupt, then the threshold of corruption that any politician 
can be engaged in before the citizen changes his/her attitude towards him/her will be 
higher. Karklins (2005) adopts this position as a pivotal theme of her study, and, 
borrowing the words of Philip Pettit64, reproduces: 
 
“[One view is]65 that people in power are inevitably corrupt: that is, in republican terms, that such 
people inevitably make their decisions by reference not to considerations of the common good but 
rather to more sectional or private concerns. This attitude represents a general cynicism about people, 
in particular about those individuals who seek and get power. The other interpretation is that people in 
power are not inevitably corrupt but are inherently corruptible: while they may actually make their 
decisions on a proper, impartial basis, they cannot be relied upon to continue to do so if there are no 
blocks or checks on the abuse of their power. This attitude is not so much cynicism about those who 
happen to have power as a realism about what power can do to anyone who gets it.” (Karklins, 2005, p. 
98) 
 
 Hence, Pettit’s idea of cynic citizens implies a permissive and submissive 
reaction, if any, when confronted with information regarding corrupt deals in the 
highest spheres66. The solution, following his argument, would be the formation of a 
more realistic citizen, who, understanding the dangers of unaccountable leaders, 
became engaged in their scrutiny. We may say, in short, that if citizens believe that all 
politicians are corrupt, then no one is (for the effects of vertical accountability). This 
seems to be the case in Lazar’s research (2005) when she suggested that for the 
residents of El Alto there might exist degrees of corruption that may be acceptable 
given the reality of the circumstances: “Since most people felt all politicians to be 
equally corrupt, the issue of corruption did not enable electors to choose between the 
political parties. Ultimately, they assessed the value of a politician despite and beyond 																																																								
63 Translated from Spanish. 
64 Pettit, Phillip. 1997. Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 
65 Brackets from source. 
66 However, contrary to their own expectations (and ours), Blais et al. (2005, p. 12) found empirical 
evidence showing that cynic Canadians actually became “more angry” when confronted with 
information regarding high-level corruption.  
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their presumed corruption” (p. 222). Clearly, Lazar’s words fit perfectly our argument 
regarding HCT, in the sense that we would expect a higher perception of generalized 
corruption to make it more difficult for citizens to condemn the behavior of any 
particular corrupt politician. Phrasing it in an appropriate hypothesis: 
 
 HCT-H7: Perception of generalized HLC relates to higher HCT. 
 
 The next determinant of HCT to consider is the individual’s democratic 
values, which have been suggested to affect the level of permissiveness of some 
corrupt behaviors among citizens. Moreno (2002), for example, makes the argument 
that the justifiability among citizens of corrupt practices may be considered a cultural 
trait, exemplified by the fact that countries with a lower tradition of democratic 
institutions show higher rates of corruption “permissiveness” (p. 13). Although the 
author doesn't go into the details of his index67, and more importantly the indicator 
used taps only into petty corruption behavior, it is nonetheless an alluring position. 
Such argument drifts away from the previous discussion regarding bureaucratic 
culture (focused in the possibility of appropriate perception), and enters the more 
diffuse dimension of the individual’s democratic roots or commitment. From an 
elemental perspective, O’Donnell (1998, p. 121) posits that democratic expectations 
“have the consequence of demanding a high degree of transparency in political 
decision making, and transparency creates a climate in which corruption does not 
thrive.” Partially for this reason, but building on a vast literature in both democracy 
and corruption fields, the negative relation between both constructs has become 
almost axiomatic in current scholarly production, with the exception of empirical 
studies regarding ‘new democracies’ (Morris, 2004, p. 3; Anderson and Tverdova, 
2003, p. 105). These considerations, for example, inspire Karklins (2005, p. 99) to 
suggest that even from the popular construction of the State and its power, and the 
relation between the public and private spheres, we can appreciate a society’s 
tolerance towards HLC in rather consistent terms. However, as Karklins herself 
notices (2005, p. 7), democratic regimes also face much greater pressure to reduce 
their levels of corruption, mostly due to the inherent mechanisms of such system. If 																																																								
67 The author doesn’t try to unravel the meaning of the index used, undiscriminating between the 
possibility of the respondent not being able to interpret the behavior as corrupt, and the respondent 
interpreting it as such but still expressing its justifiability. 
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democracy is to fail in addressing this problem, there are always societal forces that 
will exert various degrees of pressure (with support from the citizenry) to undo the 
liberal reforms and go back to old authoritarian ways. To pick up O’Donnell’s terms 
once again, if corruption doesn’t thrive in a political climate of transparency, at least 
it becomes more evident, naturally bringing the perception of its occurrence to higher 
levels. Grounded or not, such perception may produce the image that corruption is 
more widespread under a democratic regime than it was before, therefore deterring 
support for such system. In those circumstances, we would expect a less corruption-
tolerant citizen to reject democratic institutions, as he/she would see them as 
facilitating malfeasance, in a completely opposite logic than the one expressed earlier 
in this paragraph.  It’s clear, then, that the relation between an individual’s democratic 
values and his/her level of HCT have a complex relation, whose direction cannot be 
clearly assumed a priori. The following hypothesis is worded in a way that accounts 
for such problem: 
 
 HCT-H8: Individual democratic values and HCT are statistically related.      
 
 The final determinant associated with the possibility of appropriately 
correcting one’s attitudes in line with perceived corruption-related information, are 
the individual’s attitudes toward HLC. Because such feature is self-evident in its 
impact over the citizens’ punishment behavior (as presented for the case of LCT in 
Chapter 2), we won’t stop to go into its details. It should suffice to explicitly lay down 
the logic behind it, even if such exercise would prove to be unnecessary: The 
importance of corruption scandals over the individual’s opinion of the political 
candidate is dependent on his/her opinion about the positive or negative nature of 
HLC; if the individual finds HLC to be ‘despicable’, he/she will also find any 
candidate involved in it unsuitable for office. Conversely, if the individual has no 
problem with the idea of HLC in his/her society, then, his/her opinion of the political 
candidate won’t change, and he/she will omit the corruption-related information from 
his/her electoral calculation. In few words, our hypothesis is as follows: 
 
 HCT-H9: Better attitudes toward HLC relate to higher HCT.    
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 Finally, the last stage of vertical accountability requires the attitudes to be 
converted in real punishment against the corrupt political leaders. Just one factor has 
been found with the potential to obstruct this natural manifestation: a citizen’s sense 
of self-efficacy. Self-efficacy, or political efficacy for the objective of the present 
study, refers to the individual’s self-perceived capabilities to attain specific goals, 
including the resolute respond to environmental demands (Madsen, 1987, p. 571). A 
citizen’s sense of self-efficacy is, in its most basic expression, the belief that he/she 
can exert some influence in political affairs, direct efforts toward successful political 
action, and be involved in overall political change (Gecas, 1989, p. 310). On the other 
hand, a citizen’s low level of political efficacy can be expected to hinder any effort 
towards a political goal, including the punishment of a corrupt politician by means of 
casting a vote for an electoral adversary. As an example of such relation, a common 
indicator of political efficacy68 is presented by Tanaka (2005, p. 371) to address the 
individual’s feeling that “through citizen action is possible to make [political] power 
accountable69”, as part of his effort to empirically argue for a reduction in the level of 
corruption tolerance among the Peruvian citizens. Following his lead, we choose to 
posit the validity of the following hypothesis, the last one for the model of HCT: 
 
 HCT-H10: Lower political efficacy relates to higher HCT. 
 
 
 5.2. THE DETERMINANTS OF LCT AS A DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 
 
 In Figure 5-2 we show the process through which behavioral and normative 
beliefs determine attitude and subjective norm towards a bribery attempt, 
respectively, and control and choice beliefs determine the perceived behavioral choice 
and control over bribery. The rest of the model reflects what we have already 
discussed earlier about the ways these beliefs ultimately decide behavior70.  																																																								
68 Citing data from a study conducted by Martín Tanaka and Patricia Zárate (“Valores democráticos y 
participación ciudadana en el Perú, 1998-2001”, Lima: IEP-USAID, 2002), the author uses the survey 
question “how much do you agree or disagree with the following phrase: “The politicians decide what 
they want and there’s nothing I can do to stop it’” (translated from Spanish) (Tanaka, 2005, p. 372).    
69 Translated from Spanish. 70	It needs to be noted that the selection of beliefs behind ‘attitude towards trying to bribe’, four in 
total, respond to Ajzen’s description of “[linking] the behavior to a certain outcome” (2005, p. 123), 
while at the same time integrates his more comprehensive model (Ajzen, 1985) that includes outcomes 
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FIGURE 5-2. THE POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF LCT – DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 
 
 
 
In this way, we can see beliefs (1) and (2) regard the outcomes of a successful 
attempt, belief (3) regards the outcome of a failed attempt, and belief (4) regards the 
outcome of the process. On the other hand, regarding the beliefs (5) and (6) behind 
the subjective norm, it can be noted that we decided to use Ajen’s (2005) comment 
over the referents’ engagement or not engagement in the behavior as the belief’s core. 
Lastly, belief (7) refers to the individual’s perceived control, while beliefs (8) and (9) 
refer to the individual’s perceived choice over engaging or not engaging in the 
behavior. 
 
When we talk about attitudinal beliefs, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) describe 
them as the result of a twofold process: First, there is the belief that a certain behavior 
will bring about a specific outcome; and second, there is the evaluation of the 
outcome. When addressing the issue of bribery, attitudinal beliefs will be formed 
based on the expected result of such a behavior, and the positive or negative opinions 
citizens may hold about them. The first of these beliefs, naturally, is the idea that 
bribery is bad for society. This is a rather obvious statement, empirically found 																																																																																																																																																														
of both successful and failed attempts, with Bagozzi and Warshaw’s (1990) attitude toward the process 
of striving to reach the goal.  	
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through a series of in-depth interviews commented by Karklins (2005, p. 68) where 
interviewees seem to differentiate between bribes and the idea of corruption, the latter 
being associated with a negative impact on others; furthermore, subjects regard 
bribery justifiable only as long as “it has no negative consequence for society”.  The 
same pattern is informed by Barr and Serra (2008, p. 24) who, by conducting 
experimental research, conclude that subjects are “less likely to offer bribes” when 
negative externalities were included. However, what is not entirely clear is the 
evaluation that people may hold regarding such negative outcome, as they would only 
refrain from causing harm to others to the same degree that they believe others 
deserve such considerations. If citizens don’t trust others in society, or they don’t feel 
they have a stake in others’ lives, the result will most likely be a better attitude 
towards bribery. Eric Uslaner (2008, p. 53) states, for example, that “[w]hen some 
groups in a society are considerably worse off than others, they may feel more reliant 
on corrupt behavior to get their ‘fair share’.” Not surprisingly, considering the levels 
of inequality and trust in Peru, López-Cálix et al. (2009, p. 128) find that most of the 
financial “leakage” in the Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk) Program corresponds to 
assets directly managed by beneficiaries or their representatives. Therefore, by 
considering the obviously negative outcome of bribery, the remaining question is how 
much do Peruvian citizens think that society is worth protecting, a question that 
includes their fellow countrymen as much as the State (Assies et al., 2002). From this 
argument, the following hypothesis can be developed: 
 
LCT-H1: Citizens will refrain from engaging in bribery if they have a better 
evaluation of their society.  
 
 The second determinant of LCT-deviant is the belief that paying a bribe is 
more economically convenient, understanding this in terms of any material or 
immaterial resource (time, money, effort, etc.). In the words of Campos-Ortiz (2010, 
p. 19), citizens are more inclined to engage in collusive bribery when such action is 
seen as “serving some purpose – eg., avoiding red tape or supplementing a low 
wage”, thus linking it to some convenient outcome. The same conclusion is reached 
by del Castillo and Guerrero (2003) after conducting interviews with focus groups in 
Mexico City, and in a rather suggestive way by Frank and Schulze (2000), who find 
that economic students are more prone to corrupt transactions. Similarly, Karklins 
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(2005) reports that the problem of red tape is a common justification among citizens 
for engaging in petty corruption. Due to the general acceptance of this obvious 
outcome of bribery, what is left to see is how important it is for citizens to be 
materially (or immaterially) benefitted. In other words, although in itself the 
economic gains of bribery might always be perceived as positive, there may be 
substantial differences between different individuals and the importance they assign 
to such outcome. Therefore, a second hypothesis is presented in those evaluative 
terms: 
 
LCT-H2: Citizens will engage in bribery if they hold its potential benefits in 
higher esteem. 
 
 Peruvian normativity clearly states, through the provisions included in Law No 
2835571, that the “active corruption” of a public official is punishable by 3-5 years of 
imprisonment, in cases where the official acted without stepping out of the limits of 
his/her function, and by 4-6 years if the official was corrupted to act in transgression 
of his/her duties. Thus, bribery can be legally harmful if actually detected and 
convicted, and such possibility must necessarily be present in the individual’s 
considerations before engaging in that illicit behavior, as the evaluation of the 
consequences is, in any case, obviously negative. However, as many citizens in Latin 
America are aware of, petty corruption is a very common thing that transpires in a 
daily basis without any of the parties involved facing any legal damage. Del Castillo 
and Guerrero (2003) argues that, for the inhabitants of Mexico City, there are always 
corrupt alternatives to the formal application of the law, hence eroding its effective 
implementation for the punishment of bribery. And the consequences are clear 
enough: As Blake (2009, p. 96) explains, “[w]here a circle of impunity is perceived 
within the government, citizens find it harder to maintain an outright rejection of 
corruption because such a position seems like folly.” Consequently, the following 
hypothesis may be presented for the individual’s decision to act in a collusive way: 
 
LCT-H3: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive the legal bodies of 
the State to be ineffective.   																																																								
71 http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic3_per_ley28355.pdf 
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The individual’s attitudes toward collusive bribery can be a consequence of 
objective considerations regarding his/her fellow countrymen, its convenience, and 
the potential legal consequences; but can also be a result of more subjective 
determinants, such as seeing a bribe as fundamentally unethical. This is the case 
when citizens feel that there is something essentially wrong with corruption, 
something that escapes the immediate material consequences or benefits, and that 
reflects on their own image as members of society. However, as observed by Karklins 
(2005), the legitimacy of the regime, its policies and institutions, and ultimately the 
State, play a pivotal role in the construction of those anti-corruption ethics to an 
extent that without the citizen’s satisfaction with the political environment, bribery 
becomes an acceptable and justifiable behavior:  
 
“[O]fficials and the citizenry are much more likely to observe the law and be guided by public 
spiritedness if they believe that a government has the right to rule and does so in a way that promotes 
the public interest. If, on the contrary, citizens see the regime or specific institutions as repressive, 
predatory, or incompetent, their support wanes and they tend to focus on their personal good.” 
(Karklins, 2005, p. 92) 
 
 Uslaner (2008, p. 188) corroborates the preceding statement, explaining that 
the “ethical dilemma” of individuals facing corruption is much smaller to the degree 
that they perceive the same corrupt behavior in their political leaders (which is always 
considered reprehensible). Clearly, there is a connection with the corruptibility of the 
government and other high-ranking officials; however, the point we are trying to 
make here exclusively emphasizes the legitimacy of the legal order of society, how it 
can be perceived as only complementary of other more personalized alternatives, and 
how these conditions diminishes the ethical dilemma behind bribery (del Castillo and 
Guerrero, 2003; Assies et al., 2002). If the non-unethicality of low-level corruption 
stems from the illegitimacy of the political environment, and its evaluation is also 
constrained by the latter, then it’s possible to posit the following hypothesis: 
 
 LCT-H4: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive the formal 
institutions of the country to be ineffective/illegitimate. 
 
 Moving on now to the descriptive beliefs concerning subjective norms, we are 
interested in addressing the individual’s perception that others are engaging in 
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bribery. Although this connection is completely explicit in the model adopted, there 
is also plenty of literature the supports such approach. Uslaner (2008, p. 27) states that 
“[o]ur actions reflect not only our own desires and beliefs, but also how we feel that 
others will act… If you believe that ‘everyone is corrupt,’ you will follow the herd 
and act corruptly yourself.” This, ultimately, would devolve in a situation resembling 
the tragedy of the commons, or as Rothstein (2005) describes it, a “social trap” in 
which the perception that everyone else is involved in wrongdoing ends up becoming 
a self-fulfilling prophecy72. Therefore, this interactive model behind the decision to 
engage in bribery is widely recognized as crucial in explaining an individual’s 
behavior (Karklins, 2005; del Castillo and Guerrero, 2003), and it doesn’t just applies 
to cases of collusive (deviant) corruption, but also to cases of extortion (compliance), 
as people may feel more comfortable with the idea of surrendering a bribe if they 
perceive such reaction to be normal and in line with social expectations. 
Consequently, the following hypothesis is presented: 
 
LCT-H5: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that most other 
people are doing the same. 
 
  As already mentioned earlier, the perceived high-level corruption involving 
the country’s elites can also be a source of tolerance towards collusive bribery, a way 
of justifying the individual’s own behavior by reference to others’, although the 
mechanism and inner logic is somehow different. In this case the inspiration for the 
illicit act comes straight from the resentment with other groups that are considered to 
have an advantageous (if not opportunistic) power position, and seen them getting 
illicit profits without meeting any justice: “This does not mean that people believe 
that [bribe] payments are morally justified, but only that the means to support your in-
group, especially if you see a dominant out-group as privileged, become less 
troublesome”, asserts Uslaner (2008, p. 51). This justifiability of bribery (if not 
morally speaking) is also addressed by Karklins (2005) in similar terms, emphasizing 
the citizens’ perception of corrupt activities in the top as a subjective self-approval to 
																																																								72	Quoting Bardhan, Rothstein (2011, p. 100) adds that “corruption represents an example of what are 
called frequency-dependent equilibria, and our expected gain from corruption depends crucially on the 
number of other people we expect to be corrupt”. Morris (2008, p. 401) finds such statistical linkage 
between participation and perception in his analysis of Mexican states.	
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engage in petty corruption themselves. For the present study, hence, a hypothesis is 
presented in the following terms: 
 
LCT-H6: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive widespread high-
level corruption. 
 
Concerning control and choice beliefs, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p. 170) 
argue that they are a result of two considerations (as in the case of attitudinal beliefs): 
First, the belief that a certain condition will be present to allow the control or the 
choice over a certain behavior (in our case, bribery); and second, the perceived power 
of such condition “to facilitate or impede the performance of the behavior”. The 
present study will focus only on the first of these considerations, as there is no data in 
the LAPOP survey that would account for the second.  
 
The next determinant to consider in our model, then, is the citizens’ perception 
that public officials are corruptible, which is closely connected to the perception 
that others are also engaging in petty corruption. The reason is fairly obvious: 
Without corrupt officials, there wouldn’t be individuals paying bribes; and without 
the latter, the former wouldn’t exist either. Here, thus, we have a reciprocal relation 
where the behavior of one group influences, and is dependent on, the behavior of the 
other. As Karklins (2005, p. 43) states, “anticipation73 of what others in society 
expect or how they will act” is the basis for the spread of a culture of corruption, a 
reasoning that Blake (2009, p. 97) builds on, stating that “[i]f citizens perceive the 
police as protecting certain criminals or eliciting bribes themselves, it becomes harder 
to develop and retain a consistent rejection of corruption.” In other words, the 
interaction between an individual’s perception of the bureaucratic environment and 
his/her own decision to comply with the law follows an adaptive process, which 
concludes with the appropriate response based entirely on the circumstances. Such 
process is described by del Castillo and Guerrero (2003) for the Mexican case, but is 
also statistically found by Moyal et al. (2004) in Uruguay, and by Cabelkova (2001) 
in Ukraine. Consequently, we produce the following hypothesis for the Peruvian case: 
 																																																								
73 Italics are ours.  
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LCT-H7: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive public officials to be 
corruptible/corrupted. 
 
While Peruvian citizens may perceive that they have some control over the 
possibility of bribing, due to the common idea of Peruvian bureaucrats being corrupt, 
they also may be forced to engage in such illicit activity if they perceive that there is 
no other economical choice or alternative. “Poverty forces most citizens to focus on 
basic survival concerns that form a fertile breeding ground for clientelism”, Blake 
(2009, p. 100) stated and we cited for the determinants of HCT. This idea of 
“survival” as a pivotal determinant of bribery, stemming from the individual’s income 
and economic satisfaction, is also a major element in Karklins’ (2005) analysis of 
post-communist countries, and recognized by Uslaner (2008, p. 188) when he 
suggests that “playing at the edge of moral acceptability is the only way to survive” in 
many underdeveloped societies, where citizens pay the corrupt price out of pure 
necessity. And this situation is not exclusive of collusive bribery, but also determines 
the perceived choices besides complying with an extortionist’s demand, particularly 
in cases where the individual cannot afford to lose a certain service.  According to the 
ISS National Victims of Crime Survey – 2003 (van Vuuren, 2004), while the third 
and fourth more common cases of bribe request by a public official in South Africa 
involved some exploitation of the vulnerable condition of the citizen 
(employment/jobs and pension/social welfare), half of the people reported having 
complied (49% and 51%, respectively), and the rate increased for payments regarding 
water/electricity access (73%). Therefore, it’s completely possible to identify cases 
where citizens accept the heavy burden of corruption on themselves when this is 
seemed as the only way to gain access to the services they depend on74 (Uslaner, 
2008; Karklins, 2005). For the present study, we hypothesize that, in Peru:  
 
LCT-H8: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that there is no 
economical alternative, and if they cannot afford to lose the service. 
 
																																																								74	In the case of Peru, Durand (2005, p. 295) reports (although in purely anecdotic and non-empiric 
historical terms) that the “fatal occurrence of a series of recessive and inflationary crises was an 
element of the broader context that needs to be taken into account because it loosened up the retaining 
walls of corruption, extending its tolerance” (translated from Spanish). 
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Finally, many citizens may feel alienated from the legal and enforcement 
bodies of society, and perceive that, when confronted with a corrupt official, it may be 
dangerous to refuse to pay a bribe. To assert this idea, we refer to the interviewees’ 
reports in del Castillo and Guerrero (2003, p. 14) about “75bribery for fear of the 
implications that may carry not offering an illicit payment.” In such situations, the 
individuals explain to see a bribe as a way to secure their own safety through money, 
particularly when the agents of the law are considered treacherous, or even involved 
in criminal activities beyond petty corruption. The exact same argument is reported by 
Karklins (2005), further suggesting the lack of safe choices by which individuals in 
these countries may be able to refrain from engaging in collusive corruption.  
 
Based on those accounts, we can propose a hypothesis for bribery in the 
following terms: 
 
LCT-H9: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that is dangerous to 
do otherwise.  
 
 
5.3. THE DETERMINANTS OF LCT AS A COMPLIANT BEHAVIOR 
  
 Moving on to the determinants of compliant (extorted) bribery, Figure 5-3 
describes the literature-driven suggestions behind such phenomenon, described in the 
same model as before with the corrections proposed in the theoretical framework of 
Chapter 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								
75 Translated from Spanish. 
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FIGURE 5-3. THE POTENTIAL DETERMINANTS OF LCT – COMPLIANT BEHAVIOR 
 
  
 Although extortion is a commonly acknowledged and mentioned problem in 
the corruption literature, as it has been commented before, the lack of any systematic 
study of this particular case of low-level (or petty) corruption necessarily hinders our 
possibilities to assume the generally salient beliefs behind the individual’s compliant 
behavior in such situations, as we did for the case of collusive corruption. The 
reduced number of determinants included in the model is a graphical proof of those 
limiting circumstances.  Moreover, two of the five beliefs identified (3 and 5) have 
already been addressed in the previous section due to their substantial similarities 
respecting both collusion and extortion, leaving us with only three determinants that 
may be said to correspond exclusively with the citizen’s corruption-compliance. 
These can be introductorily described as attitudinal beliefs (1) and (2)76, and choice 
belief (4).  
 
																																																								76	As explained in the theoretical framework, these cannot possibly be described as attempt beliefs, but 
only as behavioral. This is because there are no empirical reports concerning the occurrence of failed 
extorted payments: While the actual payment of a collusive bribe would denote the minimum tolerance 
level, the payment of an extorted bribe will always represent the actual tolerance level of the citizen, as 
he/she would not attempt to bribe a public official out of his/her own initiative when there is no need or 
benefit behind such payment. The only possible sequence showing extortion tolerance is the public 
official’s demand for a payment in order to provide a service to which the citizen is entitled, and the 
subsequent compliance.	
Extortion-compliant	bribery	
Intention	to	bribe	an	extortionist	
Attitude	towards	bribing	an	extortionist	
(1)	Bribing	helps	the	underpaid	public	ofUicials	
(2)	Surrendering	a	bribe	creates	a	feeling	of	impotence	 Subjective	norm	towards	bribing	an	extortionist	(3)	Most	people	surrender	a	bribe	to	extortion	
Perceived	behavioral	choice	over	bribing	an	extortionist	
(4)	Ineffective	or	dangerous	complaint	mechanisms	(5)	Can't	afford	to	lose	the	service	
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 The first identified determinant to review is the belief that a bribe helps the 
underpaid public official. Although such statement from an extortion victim may 
sound counterintuitive, we find some grounds to regard it as plausible at least. First, 
there is the common reference in the corruption literature, particularly from the 
economics field, that low wages of public officials may work as an incentive to 
engage in petty corruption (Tanzi, 1998, p. 572; Dadalauri, 2007; Khan, 2006, p. 20; 
Lendeng, 2010); Campos-Ortiz (2010), for example, presents experimental results 
showing that subjects are more inclined to resort to rent-seeking behaviors if the 
situation is framed as supplementing low salaries. If this is the case (as most likely is), 
then the perception of that reality may indeed make citizens more tolerant of 
surrendering some money to help those public officials in distress.  Del Castillo and 
Guerrero (2003, p. 23) arrives to that conclusion: 
 
“77[W]e find an image of policemen as the victims and the last link of a huge chain of corruption, as 
private performers of alternative [sic] and with miserable salaries, and who by the same token can be 
justified. We have presented above the way in which it’s perceived that they are extorted from inside 
their own police corporation, and how they are apparently demanded for specific quotas in case they 
wish to have a police motorcycle, a patrol, a new uniform, to improve their equipment or to have the 
possibility of enjoying a day off.”   
 
 As a bribe has the obvious outcome of generating an extra rent for the public 
official, what remains to be seen is if this result is evaluated as positive, which will 
occur to the same degree that citizens believe public officials deserve it. In other 
words, the individual’s satisfaction with the bureaucratic service can be regarded as 
the primary source of the belief that public workers indeed deserve extra income. 
With that logic in mind, the following hypothesis is presented: 
 
LCT-H10: Citizens will surrender a bribe if they are satisfied with the work 
of public officials. 
 
  A second attitudinal belief that may be present in the individual’s calculation 
of an extortion’s outcome is the sense of impotency that may pervade him/her as a 
consequence of his/her compliant behavior. This idea is closely related to the concept 																																																								
77 Translated from Spanish. 
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of self-efficacy (introduced in the section involving the determinants of HCT), which 
refers to the individual’s perceived capacity to control his/her surroundings. As there 
is no concrete research regarding the impact of the citizen’s self-image over his/her 
vulnerability to corrupt victimization, we can only assume the possibility of a link 
connecting them both. Therefore, an original hypothesis is presented: 
 
LCT-H11: Citizens will not surrender a bribe if they hold a high perception of 
self-efficacy. 
 
 The final determinant of LCT-compliance to address can be said to relate to 
the feeling that is dangerous to refuse to bribe a public official, which was described 
in the previous section. The collapse or malfunctioning of the legal apparatus, set in 
place to protect the rights of the citizenry, is clearly an important determinant behind 
the individuals’ conduct; therefore, the presence of ineffective (or blatantly 
dangerous) complaint mechanisms and other redress venues have the natural 
consequence of stripping the citizen of any choice but to comply with illicit 
requirements. If these measures are in place, however, an active citizenry fighting and 
denouncing cases of extortion can be expected; at least that is the message behind 
Kohen’s (1998) argument in defense of the expansion of civic participation and 
guarantees in Argentina, for example. Unfortunately, in underdeveloped countries is 
much more common to find a negative trend, as Karklins (2005, p. 66) explains:  
 
“A survey conducted in Armenia in 2002 found that few citizens are prepared to report bribery to the 
law enforcement agencies, because they do not believe that any action will be taken. In the words of a 
housewife: ‘They have it all – the power, the connections, and the force. I’m not going to fight them. 
I’d rather give them the couple of dollars they ask for and spare myself an endless bureaucratic 
ordeal.’” 
 
 The same situation is reported by van Vuuren (2004, p. 15), who shows that 
up to 73% of surveyed South Africans who were victimized by corrupt officials, but 
didn’t report the incident, declared having inhibited from doing so due to the beliefs 
that such an action “would not have changed anything” (46%), or because they were 
“afraid of being victimized” even further (27%). In consequence, we apply the same 
argument, an hypothesize that: 
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LCT-H12: Citizens will surrender a bribe if they perceive that complaining to 
a higher authority is either useless or dangerous.  
 5.4. SUMMARY  
 
 To discover the specific determinants of the phenomena of high-level and low-
level corruption tolerance in Peru (an objective which is the core of Part Two), 
multiple variables have been identified throughout the corruption literature (and 
studies on other topics) with the potential to account for the differing levels of 
tolerance among individuals, in terms of political support, and deviant and compliant 
behavior. Based on them, we made several assumptions regarding their relation with 
HCT and LCT as operationalized in the present study, all of which will be later tested 
by statistical means in Chapters 6 and 7. These hypotheses are: 
 
 Hypotheses regarding the determinants of high-level corruption tolerance 
• HCT-H1: Higher media exposure relates to lower HCT. 
• HCT-H2: Higher political awareness relates to lower HCT. 
• HCT-H3: Higher partisanship relates to higher HCT. 
• HCT-H4: A more corruption-friendly bureaucratic culture relates to higher 
HCT. 
• HCT-H5: Lower economic satisfaction relates to lower HCT. 
• HCT-H6: Higher clientelistic tendencies relate to higher HCT. 
• HCT-H7: Perception of generalized HLC relates to higher HCT. 
• HCT-H8: Individual democratic values and HCT are statistically related. 
• HCT-H9: Better attitudes toward HLC relate to higher HCT. 
• HCT-H10: Lower political efficacy relates to higher HCT. 
 
 Hypotheses regarding the determinants of low-level corruption tolerance 
• LCT-H1: Citizens will refrain from engaging in bribery if they have a better 
evaluation of their society. 
• LCT-H2: Citizens will engage in bribery if they hold its potential benefits in 
higher esteem. 
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• LCT-H3: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive the legal bodies of 
the State to be ineffective. 
• LCT-H4: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive the formal 
institutions of the country to be ineffective/illegitimate. 
• LCT-H5: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that most other 
people are doing the same. 
• LCT-H6: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive widespread high-
level corruption. 
• LCT-H7: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive public officials to be 
corruptible/corrupted. 
• LCT-H8: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that there is no 
alternative, and if they cannot afford to lose the service. 
• LCT-H9: Citizens will engage in bribery if they perceive that is dangerous to 
do otherwise. 
• LCT-H10: Citizens will surrender a bribe if they are satisfied with the work 
of public officials. 
• LCT-H11: Citizens will not surrender a bribe if they hold a high perception of 
self-efficacy. 
• LCT-H12: Citizens will surrender a bribe if they perceive that complaining to 
a higher authority is either useless or dangerous. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF  
HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE IN PERU 
 
 
 With the complete set of tools obtained from the theoretical developments 
presented in Part One, we are now able to move on and focus our efforts in the study 
of Peru as a specific case. In this chapter we will undertake the empirical analysis of 
the various determinants of high-level corruption (HLC) identified in Chapter 5. For 
this task, the first step will be to determine which items in the LAPOP 
AmericasBarometer – 2006 database can be used as indicators for each variable, 
following the wording of the ten hypotheses posited earlier. Appendix 3 presents a 
complete list of variables, indicators, codes, categories, and expected relation of each 
of them with the behavioral measure of high-level corruption tolerance (HCT); 
however, to conduct an analysis both feasible and clearly interpretable, multiple 
manipulations of data will be performed, which need to be addressed first.  
 
 
 6.1. CREATING COMPOSITE INDICATORS   
 
 After identifying the potential measures for each variable (determinant), we 
proceed to combine them into composite indicators by employing either principal-
components factoring analysis, which allows us to “summarize a set of individual 
indicators while preserving the maximum possible proportion of the total variation in 
the original data set” (OECD, 2008, p. 26), or a more simple aggregation process.  
 
 Although the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is generally advised as a necessary 
test for the selection of indicators to be considered, it is noted that internal consistency 
of the selected items should only be sought when they are considered to be measures 
of the same uni-dimensional object (OECD, 2008), as the coefficient’s 
meaningfulness may vary due to their relation with the latent construct as either cause 
or effect (Neuendorf, 2011). Hence, although we will report on the alpha coefficient 
of each set of indicators, we advice to interpret the results of such analysis with 
leniency.  
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 Additionally, we will consider only the observations for the subjects that 
reported to have voted for one of the six major candidates of the Peruvian presidential 
elections of 2006, leaving aside subjects who did not vote, or voted in blank 
(N=1194).  
 
 The internal consistency of the seven measures related to media exposure, 
after being standardized, was 0.54. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was 
developed to account for the nature of the indicators (ordinal), and promax rotation78 
was applied. The results are presented in the Table 6-1 (n=1158). 
 
TABLE 6-1. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘MEDIA EXPOSURE’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
pervb8c -0.215 0.870 0.345 
pervb8d 0.430 0.255 0.663 
a1 0.562 -0.054 0.705 
a2 0.825 -0.122 0.384 
a3 0.723 -0.052 0.504 
a4i 0.073 0.596 0.605 
pol2 0.232 0.536 0.561 
    
 
 Based on the exhibited high loadings (hereinafter >=0.400; Asakawa and 
Okano, 2009), consequently, two factors are predicted, dubbed media exposure – 
regular (pervb8d, a1, a2, and a3, all of them concerning official media outlets) and 
media exposure – casual (pervb8c, a4i, and pol2, concerning casual sources). These 
factors are hypothesized to be positively related to HCT. 
 
 To build a single composite indicator of political awareness, an index was 
developed by summing up the correct answers to three questions about the Peruvian 
political system (gi2, gi3, gi4), an approach favored by Zaller (1992) and Carreras 
(2012). The results are presented in Table 6-2. 																																																								
78 Rotation is a technique commonly employed in factor analysis to make initial results more 
understandable and readable. Promax is a specific type of oblique rotation generally used for large 
datasets, as it is computationally faster.  
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TABLE 6-2. INDEX OF ‘POLITICAL AWARENESS’ 
Correct answers Frequency Percentage 
0 71 5.95 
1 349 29.23 
2 591 49.5 
3 183 15.33 
Total 1194 100 
 
 
 The index is hypothesized to be negatively related to HCT. 
 
 For the case of partisanship, an index was developed as a result of averaging 
the measures reflecting such construct (pervb12 and cp13), and taking into account if 
the subjects indeed identified or not with a political party (vb10) as a requirement to 
consider the former. The results are presented in Table 6-3. 
  
TABLE 6-3. INDEX OF ‘PARTISANSHIP’ 
Level of partisanship Frequency Percentage 
0 802 67.17 
1 18 1.51 
1.5 85 7.12 
2 127 10.64 
2.5 85 7.12 
3 36 3.02 
3.5 28 2.35 
4 13 1.09 
Total 1194 100 
 
 
 This index is hypothesized to be positively related to HCT. 
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 The internal consistency of the two measures of bureaucratic culture, after 
being standardized, was 0.35, which is not surprising considering their unequal 
meaning to citizens. Following the logic of this determinant as hindering the 
appropriate perception of corruption, we are interested in knowing specifically if the 
subject can understand the question’s case as corruption; therefore, we combined 
categories 1 and 2 (“corrupt”), and changed the value of category 3 (“not corrupt”) to 
zero. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was 
applied. The results are presented in Table 6-4 (n=1174). 
 
TABLE 6-4. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘BUREAUCRATIC CULTURE’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
dc1 0.914 0.164 
dc13 0.914 0.164 
 
 
 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be negatively related to HCT. 
 
 For the determinant economic satisfaction, it was decided to divide the 
indicators between economic interest (pervb13), and two measures of economic 
income and self-evaluation (idio1 and q10d), in line with the theoretical and empirical 
support drawn from the literature in Chapter 5. The intention was to allow the future 
analysis of any interaction between both constructs, which ultimately could determine 
their impact over HCT. The internal consistency of the two measures of economic 
income and self-evaluation, after being standardized, was 0.51. Next, a polychoric 
correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was applied. The results are 
presented in Table 6-5 (n=1187). 
 
TABLE 6-5. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘ECONOMIC INCOME AND SELF-EVALUATION’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
idio1 0.846 0.284 
q10d 0.846 0.284 
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 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be negatively related to HCT. 
 
 The internal consistency of the four measures related to clientelism, after 
being standardized, was 0.58. Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed, 
and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 6-6 (n=1184). 
 
TABLE 6-6. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘CLIENTELISM’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
cp2 0.852 0.273 
cp4a 0.840 0.295 
cp4 0.836 0.302 
np2 0.658 0.567 
 
 
 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be negatively related to HCT. 
 
 The internal consistency of the five measures related to perceived 
generalized high-level corruption, after being standardized, was 0.66. Next, a 
polychoric correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was applied. The 
results are presented in Table 6-7 (n=1127). 
 
TABLE 6-7. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘PERCEIVED GENERALIZED HLC’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
exc7 0.238 0.943 
b2 0.597 0.644 
b13 0.839 0.295 
b21 0.745 0.444 
b14 0.836 0.302 
 
 
 As the indicator exc7 did not exhibited a high enough loading (>=0.400), it 
was removed and the analysis repeated. The results are presented in Table 6-8 
(n=1156). 
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TABLE 6-8. REVISED FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘PERCEIVED GENERALIZED HLC’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
b2 0.607 0.632 
b13 0.844 0.288 
b21 0.751 0.436 
b14 0.838 0.298 
 
 
 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be negatively related to HCT. 
 
 For the case of democratic values, we divided the indicators between two 
different (but hypothetically correlated) variables: Community-oriented values 
(measured by and index of the amount of subject’s contribution – cp5, cp5a, and 
cp5b) and democratic values per se (jc13 and b6). The internal consistency of the two 
measures related to democratic values per se, after being standardized, was 0.18, 
which is not surprising given the nature and specificity of the survey questions. Next, 
a polychoric correlation matrix was developed for jc13, b6, and the index dubbed 
contribution, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 6-9 
(n=1134).  
 
TABLE 6-9. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘DEMOCRATIC VALUES’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
jc13 0.717 -0.323 0.365 
b6 0.781 0.282 0.325 
contribution 0.031 0.923 0.149 
 
 
 As expected, the analysis shows two factors present; community-oriented 
values (factor 2) is hypothesized to be negatively related to HCT. Democratic values 
(factor 1), on the other hand, cannot be expected to have a clearly positive or negative 
relation to HCT, due to the nature of its indicators. 
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 To build a composite indicator of attitudes toward high-level corruption, we 
operate once again on dc1 and dc13 (questions regarding the justifiability of specific 
corrupt scenarios) as we did before in the case of the bureaucratic culture 
determinant. This time, we simply exclude the observations regarding category 
number 3 (“not corrupt”), to focus on the subject’s attitude regarding a perceived case 
of corruption. The internal consistency of the two measures, after being standardized, 
was 0.29, which again is not surprising considering their unequal meaning to citizens. 
Next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was 
applied. The results are presented in Table 6-10 (n=1141). 
 
TABLE 6-10. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘ATTITUDES TOWARD HLC’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
dc1 0.882 0.222 
dc13 0.882 0.222 
 
 
 The resulting factor is hypothesized to be positively related to HCT. 
 
 The internal consistency of the four measures related to political efficacy, 
after being standardized, was 0.21, an indeed particularly low alpha coefficient. Next, 
a polychoric correlation matrix was developed, and promax rotation was applied. The 
results are presented in Table 6-11 (n=501). 
 
TABLE 6-11. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘POLITICAL EFFICACY’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Uniqueness 
prot2 0.551 -0.374 0.549 
cp8 0.689 0.096 0.518 
cp5d 0.633 -0.072 0.593 
np1b -0.030 0.836 0.299 
np1 0.653 0.171 0.248 
muni11 0.144 0.672 0.531 
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 Based on the exhibited high loadings, consequently, two factors are predicted, 
dubbed external political efficacy (prot2, cp8, cp5d, and np1, all of them measuring 
actual behavioral self-efficacy) and internal political efficacy (np1b, and muni11, 
measuring attitudinal or perceived self-efficacy). These factors are hypothesized to be 
positively related to HCT. 
 
 
 6.2. STRUCTURAL EQUATION MODELING 
 
 Now that we have the composite indicators for each determinant, we proceed 
to lay them in a structural equation model (SEM) following the basic shape of the 
vertical accountability approach presented in Chapter 2, with two important changes. 
First, we will treat the determinants of the latent variables ‘perception’ and ‘attitudes’ 
as indicators themselves of the accountability stages reached by the subject79, 
meaning that the latter will be reflected in the conduct measured by the former; this is 
graphically represented by the arrows going from the accountability stages of 
perception and attitudes to the measured variables. Second, some connections are 
added to the original theoretical model to allow for potential correlations between 
some of the determinants, based on logical interdependences, and to consider the 
possible direct impact of ‘perception’ over behavior (HCT), by-passing the stage of 
corrected attitudes; although such connection is not anticipated by the theoretical 
model, we would like to test that assumption against factual data. In Figure 6-1 we 
present the first SEM built for the purposes of HCT (N=1194), employing the method 
of ‘maximum likelihood with missing values’ to account for the heterogeneous 
number of observations across the variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 																																																								79	Such stages, from an individual’s perspective, might be referred to as ‘low perceptibility’ and 
‘tolerant attitude’.  
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FIGURE 6-1. THEORIZED SEM OF A VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS (HCT)  
 
 
  
 After omitting the statistically non-significant paths originally modeled, the 
final equation is presented in Figure 6-2, with a Root Mean Squared Error of 
Approximation (RMSEA) of 0.064. 
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FIGURE 6-2. MODIFIED SEM OF A VERTICAL ACCOUNTABILITY PROCESS (HCT) 
 
 
 
  
 The standardized coefficients of the statistically significant paths are presented 
in Table 6-12. 
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TABLE 6-12. THE DETERMINANTS OF HCT IN PERU 
  
 
 Measured 
variables  
-> 
Perception 
-> 
attitude 
Attitude 
-> 
behavior 
Perception 
-> 
behavior 
Influence 
over 
behavior 
Hypothesized 
direction of 
influence 
Media 
exposure 
casual 
0.42 -0.198 0.114 -0.153 -0.074 + 
Media 
exposure 
regular 
0.33 -0.198 0.114 -0.153 -0.058 + 
Political 
awareness 
-0.189 -0.198 0.114 -0.153 0.033 - 
Partisanship -0.669 -0.198 0.114 -0.153 0.117 + 
Income and 
economic 
evaluation 
-0.175 
 
0.114  -0.020 - 
Perceived 
generalized 
HLC 
0.538 
 
0.114  0.061 - 
Community-
oriented 
values 
0.429 
 
0.114  0.049 - 
Democratic 
values 
0.825 
 
0.114  0.094 ? 
Attitude 
towards 
HLC 
0.115 
 
0.114  0.013 + 
External 
political 
efficacy 
0.096 
  
 0.096 + 
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 6.3. RESULTS 
 
 The previous analysis resulted in the confirmation of a straight path between 
perception of corruption and actual punishment, suggesting a non-linear process of 
vertical accountability as previously assumed for HCT. Additionally, the SEM shows 
an expected covariance between media exposure ‘casual’ and ‘regular’ (0.274), and 
between both of them and ‘political awareness’ (-0.243 and -0.235, respectively). 
Most importantly, however, was the finding of some enigmatic relations between the 
identified potential determinants of corruption tolerance, and the behavioral indicator 
of HCT. As a way to conclude the current chapter, we present the interpretation of the 
final influence of each determinant, as found by the structural equation modeling: 
 
• Lower amount of information through casual contacts relates to less 
tolerance of high-level corruption. 
• Lower amount of official information relates to less tolerance of high-level 
corruption. 
• Higher political knowledge relates to more tolerance of high-level 
corruption. 
• Higher partisan contacts relates to more tolerance of high-level corruption. 
• Less economically satisfied individuals are less tolerant of high-level 
corruption. 
• The less high-level corruption citizens perceive in general, the more 
tolerant they are. 
• More community-oriented people are more tolerant of high-level 
corruption. 
• Stronger democratic values relates to more tolerance of high-level 
corruption. 
• Better attitudes toward high-level corruption relates to more tolerance of 
such phenomenon. 
• Less political efficacy relates to more high-level corruption tolerance. 
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CHAPTER 7 
ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF  
LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE IN PERU 
 
  
 The second part of the main analytical stage of this study involves the 
identification of the statistically relevant determinants of low-level corruption 
tolerance (LCT) as experienced by the actual Peruvian citizens. As we previously 
found, the literature on low-level (or petty) corruption provides multiple factors 
(theoretically and empirically) that may, to varying degrees, hinder or encourage an 
individual’s willingness to engage in bribery. From such exercise (described in 
Chapter 5), twelve hypotheses were drawn. 
 
The present Chapter focuses on the empirical test of those hypotheses for both 
models of LCT, as appropriate, namely deviant and compliant. Although part of this 
analysis will mirror the same kind undertaken in the previous chapter concerning 
HCT, some important differences are present which need to be addressed before 
conducting any analysis. 
 
 
 7.1. METHODOLOGY: PROXIES AND CORRELATIONS 
  
 The first concern presented by the adopted TPB model is the type of data that 
may be consider feasible for analysis. As has been explained in Chapter 2, the TPB 
draws attention to the specific behavior under study, which is low-level corruption 
(LLC) or plain bribery in our case, and the behavioral, normative, and control (and 
choice) beliefs underpinning its execution; therefore, such sets of beliefs must be 
worded following the logic of the behavior they are assumed to be linked to. That is 
the essence of the principle of compatibility. However, as the LAPOP’s 
AmericasBarometer 2006 is not by itself a corruption-centered survey, the individual 
information available in the dataset does not considered some of the cases we have 
identified as potential determinants of LCT, hence only allowing for the employment 
of proxy variables that will stand for the more LCT-specific beliefs. Therefore, we 
advice to interpret the results with caution, understanding that a more specific set of 
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questions may raise some discrepancies. The indicators from the Peruvian dataset of 
2006 (N=1500) considered for each variable of the two LCT models are presented in 
Appendix 4.  
 
 Following the rationale presented in the previous Chapter, we employ 
principal-components factoring analysis to reduce the number of indicators available 
to composite ones, when necessary, which will allow for a better handling of the data.  
Again, Cronbach’s alpha won’t be considered to be a reliable test of the 
appropriateness of the chosen indicators, especially due to the employment of 
proxies80 that are not expected to be related between each other, but rather to capture 
as many dimensions of the underlying construct as possible. For this reason, we will 
omit this test. 
 
 A second and more important concern involves the appropriateness of 
employing a regression model, in any of its varieties, as is common practice in most 
contemporary social research (including our own practice in previous chapters). To 
present this issue, we refer explicitly to the words of the creators of the TPB model, 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p. 124):  
 
“Our discussion suggests that a given belief’s contribution to the overall attitude, and its ability to 
account for variation in the attitude, can be discerned by examining the value of the b x e product and 
its correlation with the overall attitude. It has sometimes been proposed… that a better way of 
identifying the relative contributions of different beliefs is to regress the overall attitude on all belief-
by-evaluation products and to use the regression coefficients as estimates of each belief’s importance 
as a determinant of attitude. It should be realized, however, that the regression coefficients in such an 
analysis represent the unique variance in attitudes explained by each of the beliefs. When two beliefs 
are highly correlated with each other, only one will receive a high regression weight, and the other 
would thus be regarded as unimportant. From a psychological perspective, this conclusion will often be 
invalid… It would be unreasonable to conclude… that the other beliefs were irrelevant or that 
considering the other beliefs did not add important information to our understanding of the attitude… 
Disregarding the second belief because it did not have a significant regression coefficient would be a 
mistake”. 
 
																																																								
80 Contrary to proxies, the test of internal consistency (alpha) is used to assess multiple items serving 
as direct measures of an underlying construct. 
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 For the reasons exposed above, we choose to employ the Spearman’s rank 
correlation coefficient (rho) as it is suited to handle ordinal variables of the kind 
included in the LAPOP dataset, and to examine directly the correlation between 
beliefs and behavior81 . Besides the feasibility of this strategy being explicitly 
acknowledged by the creators of the TPB model themselves, it fits perfectly the 
current capabilities of this study, particularly regarding the available variables of the 
LAPOP dataset, which do not include measures of descriptive norms, behavioral 
control/choice, or intentions to engage in bribery. 
 
 
 7.2. CREATING COMPOSITE INDICATORS 
  
 The first set of measures to compound is of those related to the individual’s 
evaluation of his/her society (it1, cp5c, b6). We started by inverting the values of 
‘b6’ to align their expected relation to LCT in the same direction as ‘it1’ and ‘cp5c’; 
next, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the 
indicators, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-1 
(n=630). 
 
TABLE 7-1. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘EVALUATION OF SOCIETY’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
it1 0.718 0.484 
cp5c 0.430 0.815 
b6 0.682 0.535 
 
 
 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be positively related to LCT-deviant. 
 
																																																								
81 This strategy is supported by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010), who, in addition to their traditional belief-
attitude/norm/PBC-intention-behavior step-by-step analysis, also describe “the explanatory value of 
beliefs”: “The stronger the correlation, the more the belief in question discriminates between those who 
do and do not perform (or intend to perform) the behavior in question” (p. 206). This decision is not a 
minor one, since it has been proposed in the theoretical framework of Chapter 2 that PBC has a 
potential direct impact on behavior; therefore, a direct correlation of beliefs over behavior will 
effectively by-pass a possible focus on this path.  
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 In the case of the individual’s esteem for the potential benefits of bribery, 
we have decided to individually assess the two identified indicators (lgl3 and cp5a), 
as the possible gains of analyzing these two different dimensions of the hypothesized 
belief might outweigh the scarcity of those derived from a reduction process. Both 
indicators are hypothesized to be positively related to LCT-deviant. 
 
 For the belief that the legal bodies of the State are ineffective, a polychoric 
correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators (aoj12 
and b1) after we had inverted the values of ‘b1’ to align them in the same 
hypothesized direction as ‘aoj12’, and promax rotation was applied. The results are 
presented in Table 7-2 (n=1385).   
 
TABLE 7-2. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘EFFECTIVENESS OF LEGAL BODIES’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
aoj12 0.782 0.389 
b1 0.782 0.389 
 
 
 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be positively related to LCT-deviant. 
 
 For the belief that the formal institutions of the country are ineffective 
and/or illegitimate, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the 
nature of the indicators (b3, b32, muni15, and pn4) after we had inverted the values of 
‘pn4’ to align them in the same hypothesized direction as the rest, and promax 
rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-3 (n=1345). 
  
TABLE 7-3. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR  
‘EFFICACY/LEGITIMACY OF FORMAL INSTITUTIONS’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
b3 0.602 0.637 
b32 0.812 0.340 
muni15 0.671 0.549 
pn4 0.562 0.684 
	 123	
 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be negatively related to LCT-deviant. 
  
 For the belief that most others are engaging in bribery (H5) we employ the 
indicator pertaining to the belief that public officials are corruptible/corrupted 
(H7), as there is no single question in the LAPOP survey focusing in the individual’s 
perception of his/her fellow citizens concerning corruption. However, as suggested in 
in Chapter 5, both variables are intrinsically related, for there are no corrupt officials 
without corrupt citizens; therefore, we consider appropriate the usage of ‘exc7’ to test 
both hypothesis 5 and 7. This indicator is hypothesized to be negatively related to 
both LCT-deviant and LCT-compliant. 
 
 In the case of the individual’s perception that high-level corruption is 
widespread, we have again decided to individually assess the two identified 
indicators (muni6 and n9), as the possible gains of analyzing these two different 
dimensions of the hypothesized belief might outweigh the scarcity of those derived 
from a reduction process. Both indicators are hypothesized to be negatively related to 
LCT-deviant. 
 
 For the belief that there is no economical alternative to bribery, a polychoric 
correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators (idio1, 
q10, and q10d) after we had inverted the values of ‘q10’ to align them in the same 
hypothesized direction as ‘idio1’ and ‘q10d’, and promax rotation was applied. The 
results are presented in Table 7-4 (n=1418). 
 
TABLE 7-4. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘ECONOMICAL ALTERNATIVE TO BRIBERY’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
idio1 0.714 0.490 
q10 0.783 0.387 
q10d 0.861 0.258 
 
 
 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be positively related to LCT-deviant. 
Additionally, it will also serve as the composite indicator for the probability that the 
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individual cannot afford to lose the service, therefore forcing him/her to surrender a 
bribe; again, in such case, this factor is hypothesized to be positively related to LCT-
compliant.   
 
 For the belief that it’s dangerous to refuse to pay a bribe, three indicators 
were identified pertaining two potentially different dimensions. For this reason, with 
regards to the principal-components factoring analysis of ‘b18’ and ‘b10a’, a 
polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the 
indicators, and promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-5 
(n=1475).   
 
TABLE 7-5. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘DANGEROUS TO REFUSE’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
b18 0.855 0.269 
b10a 0.855 0.269 
 
 
 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be negatively related to LCT-deviant. 
On the other hand, ‘aoj1’ is hypothesized to be positively related. 
 
 Turning now to the indicators and variables for the LCT-compliant model, we 
start by addressing the individual’s satisfaction with the work of public officials. 
We identify two indicators (st1 and st2) tapping in such construct. Again, a polychoric 
correlation matrix was developed to account for the nature of the indicators, and 
promax rotation was applied. The results are presented in Table 7-6 (n=1459). 
 
TABLE 7-6. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘SATISFACTORY WORK OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
st1 0.892 0.204 
st2 0.892 0.204 
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 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be negatively related to LCT-
compliant. 
 
 For the belief that surrendering an extorted bribe is against the individual’s 
perceived self-efficacy, a polychoric correlation matrix was developed to account for 
the nature of the indicators (prot2, cp8, cp5d, and np1), and promax rotation was 
applied. The results are presented in Table 7-7 (n=633). 
  
TABLE 7-7. FACTOR LOADINGS FOR ‘PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY’ 
Indicator Factor 1 Uniqueness 
prot2 0.623 0.612 
cp8 0.677 0.541 
cp5d 0.650 0.577 
np1 0.626 0.608 
 
 
 This resulting factor is hypothesized to be positively related to LCT-
compliant. 
 
 Finally, in the case of the individual’s perception that complaining to a 
higher authority is either useless or dangerous, we have again decided to 
individually assess the three identified indicators (muni10, b10a, and aoj1), due to the 
high heterogeneity of the dimensions represented by them and the possibility of 
extracting much more information from each one of them, as opposed to the benefits 
of their aggregation. Both ‘muni10’ and ‘b10a’ are hypothesized to be negatively 
related to LCT-compliant, while ‘aoj1’ is hypothesized to be positively related. 
 
  
 7.3. SPEARMAN’S RANK CORRELATIONS 
 
 In this section we will get the Spearman’s rho for the correlations between the 
single and composite indicators (factors) presented above, on one hand, and the 
behavioral indicator of bribery with dichotomized values (‘no incident’: zero-times; 
	 126	
‘incident’: one or more times), which includes all the subjects that have had 
interactions with a public institution at least once in the previous twelve months, as 
described in Chapter 4. The first model to be tested will be that of LCT-deviant. 
 
TABLE 7-8. CORRELATION BETWEEN DETERMINANTS  
AND BEHAVIOR OF DEVIANT BRIBERY 
 Bribe 
(rho) 
p n Hypothesized 
direction of 
influence 
Evaluation of his/her society 0.058 0.247 398 + 
Esteem for the potential benefits (lgl3) 0 0.995 856 + 
Esteem for the potential benefits (cp5a) -0.133 0.007 411 + 
Legal bodies of the State are ineffective 0.05 0.148 824 + 
Formal institutions of the country are 
ineffective/illegitimate 
-0.079 0.024 815 - 
Most others are engaging in bribery 0.035 0.304 874 - 
High-level corruption is widespread 
(muni6) 
-0.033 0.333 874 - 
High-level corruption is widespread (n9) -0.037 0.275 880 - 
Public officials are corruptible/corrupted 0.035 0.304 874 - 
No economical alternative to bribery 0.055 0.11 851 + 
Dangerous to refuse to pay a bribe (b18 & 
b10a) 
-0.037 0.266 880 - 
Dangerous to refuse to pay a bribe (aoj1) -0.054 0.417 227 + 
 
 
 As it’s possible to appreciate from Table 7-8, only two determinants were 
found to be statistically significant: The individual’s esteem for the potential benefits 
of corruption, and his/her perception regarding the efficacy and legitimacy of 
Peruvian formal institutions. Now, we will test the model of LCT-compliant.  
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TABLE 7-9. CORRELATION BETWEEN DETERMINANTS  
AND BEHAVIOR OF COMPLIANT BRIBERY 
 Bribe 
(rho) 
p n Hypothesized 
direction of 
influence 
Satisfaction with the work of public 
officials 
-0.077 388 127 - 
Detrimental to perceived self-efficacy -0.01 0.939 62 + 
Most others are engaging in bribery -0.306 0 125 - 
Complaining is useless/dangerous 
(muni10) 
-0.258 0.128 36 - 
Complaining is useless/dangerous (b10a) -0.049 0.581 128 - 
Complaining is useless/dangerous (aoj1) 0.086 0.538 54 + 
Cannot afford to lose the service 0.042 0.637 126 + 
 
 
 This time, only one of the determinants was found to be statistically 
significant: The individual’s perception that others are paying bribes when extorted. 
However, due to the small number of observations and its sizable rho, we consider 
appropriate to include ‘muni10’ (the belief that complaining is useless or dangerous) 
as a second determinant of the Peruvian LCT-compliant level, even though it did not 
reach statistical significance. As its ‘n’ was as small as 36, it is completely feasible 
that the p value would actually decrease to significant levels if there would be more 
observations. In any case, we recommend interpreting these results with caution. 
 
 
 7.4. RESULTS 
 
 The above results showed that for each of the two models of LCT, two 
determinants had some real impact on the individual’s decision to engage or not in 
bribery: For collusive bribery, hypothesis 4 was corroborated while hypothesis 2 
showed an opposite relation to LCT than the one expected; for extorted bribes, on the 
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other hand, hypotheses 5 and 12 were corroborated. All other assumptions regarding 
the reasons why individuals may engage in petty corruption failed to be significant for 
the Peruvian case.  
 
 As these variables were measured in most cases through the employment of 
proxy indicators, we judge appropriate to take a few steps away from the theoretical 
constructs included originally in the models, and to address them through the specific 
meaning of their measured indicators in the next stage of the analysis, where the 
results will be interpreted in the context of Peruvian reality. Parallel to the wording of 
the questions presented in Appendix 4, we present the main results of this chapter: 
   
• Less economic support to the community relates to less engagement in 
collusive corruption. 
• People who feel more satisfied with politics, engage less in collusive 
corruption. 
 
• People who believe that others don’t surrender to extortion, are less tolerant of 
extortive corruption. 
• People who believe that redress channels are effective, are less tolerant of 
extortive corruption. 
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CHAPTER 8 
DETERMINANTS OF HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE 
IN PERUVIAN CONTEXT 
 
  
 Up until now, our efforts has been guided by the necessity to quantitatively 
measure the phenomenon of citizens’ corruption tolerance in Peru, and to identify the 
specific determinants, through different statistical techniques, that cause or relate to it. 
We found that between the factors that positively impact in citizens’ behavioral 
tolerance regarding high-level corruption (HCT) are the amount of information which 
the person is exposed to, his/her level of political awareness, partisanship and 
economic satisfaction, the commitment to democratic values, the level of participation 
in community affairs, and the actual attitudes the citizen has respecting high-level 
corruption. Negatively impacting in HCT, we found the perceived level of generalized 
high-level corruption, and the beliefs regarding external political efficacy.  
 
 It is possible to appreciate that some of these quantitative results are, at first 
sight, at odds with many of the assumptions that we previously derived from the 
literature in relation to the expected sign of the influence. This is the case, to give one 
example, of the impact of political awareness (or knowledge). Intuitively, it had been 
expected to find that people would be less tolerant of high-level corruption to the 
same degree that they had acquired sufficient political information and awareness; in 
other words, citizens who are more aware of the pernicious effects of such type of 
corruption, should at the same time be the ones less willing to support a candidate 
with a high propensity to conduct him/herself in a corrupt way. This, however, was 
refuted by the data from LAPOP. The results of the equation modeling showed that, 
in reality, Peruvian citizens who are more prepared to deal with political issues, those 
that one would expect (or desire) to have an active participation in public affairs and 
to support essential anti-corruption reforms, actually are more inclined to vote for 
corrupt candidates in national presidential elections. How can we explain this? 
 
 In order to understand the results of Chapter 6 it is necessary to take a closer 
look to the evolution of these determinants in the concrete case of the Peruvian 
reality. By somehow leaving the essentially quantitative approach that the present 
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study has adopted until now, this chapter aims at assessing the conditions surrounding 
each of the identified determinants in their natural context, and to interpret their 
relation to corruption tolerance in a way that allows us to find meaningful patterns in 
citizens’ behavior. Only through the process of converting numbers and quantified 
relations into significant explanations, will the study be able to deliver some answers 
behind the reasons for supporting corruption in Peru. 
  
  
 8.1. HIGHER EXPOSITION TO INFORMATION RELATES TO HIGHER HCT 
  
 This is the first determinant in our model that challenges common academic 
intuition. Hypothetically, it was expected that people who consume more public 
information, either from the mass media outlets (official information) or from 
private/individual sources (such as the internet, political propaganda, and casual 
conversations), would have the possibility to perceive the corrupt or honest nature of 
the presidential candidates, and therefore cast an informed vote based on it. However, 
some characteristics of Peruvian society may contradict this assumption and explain 
our results. 
 
 Mass media and Peruvian politics 
 Historically, mass media in Peru has been prone to behave more like a 
political actor than a simple source of public information; what is more, this media as 
political actor has many times shown even partisan characteristics. In the words of 
Catherine M. Conaghan, “[t]he paradigm of impartiality and neutrality, so pivotal to 
the development of North American journalism, was never fully embraced in the 
Peruvian media” (Conaghan, 2005, p. 20). As she briefly accounts, throughout the 
twentieth century Peruvian media outlets (primarily in the form of newspapers and 
magazines first, then in television broadcast) have recurrently taken ideological and/or 
class interests as their own, sold the editorial lines to political parties or movements, 
and have even been founded as a kind of soapbox for political purposes. In this 
circumstances, it doesn’t come as a big surprise that Peruvian media has sometimes 
played a major role in sustaining corrupt governments, or in one way or another 
benefiting the less effective candidate in terms of anti-corruption reforms. A quick 
review of the last three decades should make this fact apparent. 
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    The first government of Alan García Perez (1985-1990) saw very few 
corruption scandals surfaced in its first two years, due mostly to the tolerant attitude 
of newspaper, radio and television owners who at the time were being benefited by 
their proximity to the government (Quiroz, 2008). Through privileged access to 
subsidized dollars and influential connections, García secured an unofficial silence 
regarding many incidences of low and high-level corruption permeating the 
government and the party’s ranks, which tended to fuse at an increasing speed 
(Durand, 2005). By the end of his government, it wasn’t a secret to any Peruvian that 
the president’s party, APRA, has undergone a systematic takeover of civil service 
posts and institutions. Although early concerns related to political and bureaucratic 
corruption were raised since the beginning by opposition deputy Fernando Olivera, it 
wasn’t until García’s attempt to nationalize the country’s banks in 1987 that mass 
media started to actively oppose the government, and as a result increasing number of 
corruption scandals started surfacing in public debate. 
 
 However, it wasn’t until the second period of Alberto Fujimori’s government 
that the media’s complicity in sustaining high-level corruption reached record levels. 
From the early 1990’s the country’s media outlets had timidly contested Fujimori’s 
autocratic style, being usually harassed by members of the government and the 
National Intelligence Service (SIN) especially after the 1992’s ‘self-coup’. An 
example of some of the pro-government editorial line that gradually appeared was the 
case of Frecuencia Latina (Channel 2), owned by majority stockholder Barus Ivcher, 
which until late 1995 was scorned by critics as the “SIN network” due to its 
sympathetic coverage of government activities and the proximity of Ivcher with top 
administration officials (Conaghan, 2005, p. 142). In time, as many Peruvians 
suspected and were actually able to appreciate for themselves after the fall of the 
regime in 2000, the government effectively bought the editorial line of most television 
stations and tabloids82, and some of the most important newspapers in the country, in 
order to provide sufficient support to Fujimori’s electoral rerun (Quiroz, 2008; 
Ugarteche 2005; Dargent, 2005). As Schmidt (2000) recounts, the government’s 																																																								
82 Fujimori’s government was indeed particularly aggressive in the control of editorial lines. Through 
the SIN’s control of the tabloids, or prensa chicha, Conaghan (2005, p. 251) comments, “low-income 
Peruvians were fed a steady stream of propaganda that high-lighted the president’s great successes and 
trashed opponents in every conceivable way.” 
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dominance over the content of news coverage by 1999 got to such a point that even a 
media mogul was reported saying that broadcasters could no longer give favorable 
attention to opposition parties without becoming subject to official and unofficial 
economic sanctions. 
 
 Although the post-Fujimori era saw a recovery in freedom of the press, this by 
no means meant that the Peruvian media had left its historical partisan role in 
electoral processes. Regarding the state of Peruvian journalism, Alfonso Quiroz 
states: 
 
“The media or ‘fourth power’ has made major contributions to uncovering corruption and 
informing the public of same [sic]. The role of the media is essential in maintaining public 
vigilance of graft and corruption. However, corrupt political and business interests continue to 
threaten the independence of major TV networks and newspapers in Peru. The legal settlement 
of pending issues regarding ownership and control over major networks was complicated by 
the prosecution of media moguls charged with corruption.” (Quiroz, 2008, p. 427) 
 
 To say it again, more explicitly, even though press freedom in Peru may have 
recovered after the nefarious Fujimori regime of the 90’s, it remains highly politicized 
and therefore hasn’t reached appropriate levels of impartiality and neutrality, two 
aspects that are essential to fight corruption in the highest spheres of government. 
Even when the media is not been pressured (openly) by the government, for example 
in the case that the party in power is not running for office, it is still heavily 
influenced by private interests. Such was the context of the 2006 presidential 
elections, where the mainstream media mobilized during the first round in support of 
the Christian-democrat candidate Lourdes Flores, against the candidacy of political 
newcomer Ollanta Humala (and on a smaller scale against Alan García) (Masías and 
Segura, 2006). 
 
  
 The first assumption that is possible to conclude from this quick review of 
Peruvian media, and in light of the quantitative results of the previous chapter, is that 
people might be exposing themselves to information that restricts their accurate 
perception of corruption regarding specific political actors, and in that way rendering 
their ability to punish corrupt politicians completely useless. This problem seems to 
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deepen when considering that most people tend to expose themselves to information 
sources that will reinforce existing preferences or orientations. With such a distorted 
image of the political menu during national elections, it seems completely plausible 
and even expected that citizens who consume more mainstream information will 
consequently be subject to a corruption-related history that will not reflect reality, not 
even the one presented by all media outlets taken as a group. Hence, Peruvian citizens 
might have a better chance to punish corrupt behavior, and to reward honest 
politicians, if they consider more than just one outlet of information; 
paradigmatically, it would seem appropriate to conclude that people who stand in 
front of the corner kiosk (a habit that is widespread in Peru for getting informed 
without spending any money) will have a better tool to fight corruption than those 
who exhaustively read just one chosen newspaper. 
 
 Directly related to this interpretation of the effect of media exposure, a 
possible explanation regarding the relation between what we have dubbed casual 
information and HCT may be in the same line as the story proposed above: The less 
amount of influence exerted over the individual by his/her peers will allow him/her 
the possibility to assess correctly the convenience of different electoral options, 
without the interference of politically biased information. Or from the opposite 
perspective, individuals who expose themselves to more casual information will be 
unable to cast an informed vote regarding the corruptibility of his/her candidate of 
choice. This assumption, however, requires further research, preferably in the way of 
ethnographic (or other qualitative) design. 
 
 Alternative explanation: ‘Disensibilization’ and ‘over-sensibilization’ 
 Notwithstanding the historical support to the effect of media exposure over 
HCT in Peru that has been developed above, two supportive hypotheses should be 
considered. First, there is the possibility of an ‘over-exposition’ to corruption-related 
news in the period of 2001-2006, which would mean that people who consume more 
news might become less sensitive to corruption scandals involving presidential 
candidates or their parties. Kalin S. Ivanov has already reported this problem for the 
international community, when stating, “if anticorruption rhetoric lacks tangible 
results, it may reinforce popular cynicism about politics” (Ivanov, 2007, p. 39). When 
corruption stories are presented on the headlines of major news outlets in the country 
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on a regular basis (or even daily, as it happened with the vladivideos that were 
incessantly showed and discussed in 2001), and the culprits are not incarcerated (or 
not with hefty enough convictions) then it naturally occurs that citizens will develop 
an emotional resistance to these kind of information, and reports of corruption will 
end up mainly as a media show (Kohen, 1998, p. 4). Such effect seems to have taken 
place in the period referred to earlier.  
 
 The spectacular fall of the Fujimori regime in the late 2000 prompted a huge 
national movement in support to the anti-corruption efforts of the Transitional 
Government headed by Valentin Paniagua (2000-2001). However, this popular 
interest in the extent of unfolded corruption started to wane as a consequence of the 
natural cycles of political attention, when normalcy is restored and new demands and 
interests are pushed forward in the public agenda (Weyland, 2000). Public agents and 
journalists uncovered fresh corruption scandals, but they couldn't attract the same 
levels of popular attention, as they were correctly considered petty compared to the 
ones incurred in the previous decade. Alongside this movement towards generalized 
higher tolerance of high-level corruption came a gradual saturation of the media with 
incessant information regarding cases of petty corruption pervading the government 
of Alejandro Toledo and members of the congress, and congressional and 
governmental commissions and sub-commissions charged with the task of 
investigating current and past corruption (Quiroz, 2008), ending most of the time in 
no apparent results. All these circumstance may have finally incurred in a process of 
popular ‘disensibilization’ 83  about high-level corruption, especially among those 
citizens who consume information in a higher basis. 
 
 A second, but complementary, possibility refers to the situation involving the 
opposite group of people, namely those who has less exposition to the media. When 
accounting for this subjects and their reduced tolerance towards high-level corruption 
(HCT), it is very much probable that this group would remain over-sensitive long 
after the debacle of the Fujimori regime, as they may be unaware of the real 
improvements in anti-corruption legislation and policies undertaken in the period 																																																								83	Németh et al. (2011, p. 62) similarly suggest that “[i]f corruption spreads intensively in a country, 
then the majority of people will sooner or later become indifferent to it or get mixed up in corruption 
practices and turn into accomplices.”  
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2001-2006, most extensively by the Transitional Government but also under the 
presidency of Alejandro Toledo (2001-2006). To back this assumption, we draw again 
from the work of Alfonso Quiroz: 
 
“Transparency in budgetary transactions and hiring in public sector institutions has improved markedly 
through specific legislation (laws 2780 and 27482) that encourage the establishment of official 
websites form information dissemination and the publication of civil servants’ income tax returns. 
However, public opinion polls of the overall transparency of the state continued to rate it low because 
of general mistrust of government officials and issues of limited effective transparency.” (Quiroz, 
2008, p. 427) 
 
 What is proposed here, therefore, is the possibility that many citizens may still 
characterize the electoral process, and the electoral candidates, in a situation of 
generalized high-level corruption, which the results have shown that also impacts on a 
lower HCT. This connection, however, is not initially supported by the data. The 
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient (or Spearman’s rho) test between both types 
of information exposition (official media and casual) and our generalized high-level 
corruption factor results in statistical non-significance in both cases. Said in another 
way, there is no apparent correlation between remaining relatively ignorant of the 
progress made in the anti-corruption field, and perceiving that corruption in the higher 
political spheres is widespread.  
 
 Making information exposure a tool against corruption 
 To sum up: How, if Peruvian citizens are to develop the appropriate 
perception of high-level corruption represented by the electoral options, can low HCT 
actually be nurtured? Although additional qualitative research seems advisable to 
come with a definitive answer to this problem, from the previous examination of the 
Peruvian reality we can assume that the best individual strategy to punish corrupt 
candidates will be to stay open and receptive to multiple media sources of 
information, making an effort to screen for pieces of factual information while 
purging any partisan or other types of private bias that may come with the news84. 
Additionally, the results of our model suggest that besides looking out for media 																																																								
84 Which is not to say that Peruvian media outlets wouldn’t benefit from an increase in the amount and 
quality of analytical opinion among their coverage, as long as they guarantee the neutrality and 
impartiality of the editorial line (Sanchez, 2010). 
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manipulation, citizens may have a better luck at processing corruption-related 
information by staying away from the influences of private (and openly politicized) 
opinions that they may encounter in daily life. 
  
 Notwithstanding this conclusion, it is worth noting that, even while staying 
impervious to the bulk of mass media, citizens would still be able to obtain important 
corruption-related information over which base their electoral decisions in other ways. 
Such is the case of the popular manifestations in support of the government’s 
intervention over the ownership of television agency Frecuencia Latina, which took 
place in 1997. Gonzalez (1998) refers in that event to the existence of oral and 
informal circuits that got activated with the purpose of sharing messages and ideas, as 
it may have similarly occurred in support of Fujimori’s presidential run in the first 
electoral round of 1990. In both opportunities, as it will later be further elaborated, 
citizens manifested a decline in their levels of HCT, and if Gonzalez is right, it 
occurred with the intervening effect of such informal circuits. Such discussion 
suggests that, although statistically pernicious in our 2006 data, exposure to casual 
sources of political information could as well work in particular cases as a catalyst to 
fight perceived high-level corruption. The potential dependency on circumstantial 
factors makes those casual sources an interesting topic for future research. 
 
  
 8.2. HIGHER POLITICAL AWARENESS RELATES TO HIGHER HCT 
  
 Another instance of enigmatic results is provided by the statistical relation 
between the citizen’s level of political awareness, measured by means of factual 
political knowledge, and HCT. As seen in Chapter 6, against our hypothetical and 
intuitive expectations the relation between both variables showed a positive, rather 
than negative, sign, indicating that people who are more politically aware would also 
tend to be more tolerant towards potentially corrupt presidential candidates when 
casting their vote. However, a review of the corresponding literature brings some 
support to the logic of our results85. If this is indeed the case, then a contextualization 																																																								85	In a cross-country study aimed at assessing the characteristics that impact on the individual’s 
perception of corruption, Tverdova (2007) finds that more educated people in more corrupt societies 
have a more benign evaluation of corruption, contrary to her (and our) expectations.	
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of this relation is needed in order to explain the rather negative effect of education 
over corruption tolerance. 
 
 Socialization process and legality in Peru 
 Talking about the rule of law in Peru, Oscar Ugarteche (2005, p. 109) explains 
that the way in which Peruvians assimilate the idea of “law” is heavily influenced by 
the historical development of the State. In colonial times, he comments, the justice 
system clearly differentiated the role of indians, white individuals, and members of 
nobility in society, and laws were enacted following this pattern of thought. 
Furthermore, this entire order emanated directly from the figure of the King of Spain, 
who was above the law. From those circumstances, Ugarteche believe to see a 
connection between the importance (or dominance) of the law over an individual’s 
behavior, and his/her relative position in the social structure. This would explain why 
such a big part of the present Peruvian population actively believe that the law is only 
applicable to the ‘losers’ of the economic and political distribution of power, and 
hence actively pursue a position that would informally entitle them to act above the 
legal control of the rest of society. The impact of this set of beliefs is by no means 
negligible. There is in Peru a set of mind that mandates the emulation of others who 
may seem immune to the legal prescriptions, and it gets incarnated in non-cooperative 
and illegal behaviors and the overarching (but dissimulated) admiration of the 
‘winners’ from the part of the citizenry that have no material option but to follow the 
rules (Portocarrero, 2005). 
 
 In terms of corruption tolerance, such scenario of disdain for the rule of law 
gets enunciated in the famous Latin American quote ‘steals but builds’, which in 
general terms means that high-level corruption might be tolerated if the political 
leader does his/her work of supplying benefits (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2012, p. 
9), and is not actually caught red-handed. This tolerance, and even admiration and 
respect, of politicians that manage to circumvent the rules and make private profits 
without being subordinated by the force of the legal institutions at the end, relates to 
the concepts of myth system and operational code (Reisman, 1979, Chapter 1); in 
other words, drawing from the previous arguments, there is a set of rules for the losers 
of society and a different one for the winners.  
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 Such reading of Peruvian society could explain the reasons behind the 
continuous and increasing popular support for ex-President Alberto Fujimori 
throughout all the period 2001-2006. It would also explain the levels of support 
behind Callao’s Mayor Alexander Kouri, notorious character not only for his 
generally acclaimed municipal government but also for his proximity to the nefarious 
Vladimiro Montesinos (Ugarteche, 2005, p. 110). Gonzalo Portocarrero ellaborates: 
 
“86In order to understand why Montesinos wasn’t stopped despite the large criminal record that he had 
accumulated before 1990, we need to consider that the image of Montesinos needs to be seen against 
the background of a society where the pendejada87 is praised, as synonym of manhood, cleverness and 
self-confidence, where the offender is tolerated and the relation between individuals, more than support 
between fellow citizens, is about complicity. His wrongdoings don’t disqualify him.” (Portocarrero, 
2005, p. 233) 
  
 For the case that prompt us, that of HCT, we can conclude based on the 
previous description of Peruvian social norms pertaining corruption, that the positive 
statistical impact of political awareness may evidence the continuity of a colonial 
mindset which envisions politics as an instrument for private profit: To understand the 
inner workings of the political process results in a perverse incentive to acquire 
political knowledge in order to obtain rents from the State (for those who can gain 
access to it), or in a generalized state of cynicism for those who are only spectators of 
political and bureaucratic corruption. Putted in another way, Peruvian citizens who 
are familiar with politics may be used to read and hear about corruption, and be less 
inclined to punish it in the ballot box. 
 
 Awareness and corruption 
 Partial statistical support for this claim comes from the result of a Spearman’s 
rho test regarding the correlation between our measure of political knowledge and the 
individual’s perception of the extent of corruption among public officials88 (rho=-
0.119, p<0.001, obs.=1160). Hence, we can say that politically aware people are also 
more aware of the levels of corruption in the country. If, as the structural equation 
model showed, they are also more tolerant of high-level corruption, it is only logic to 																																																								
86 Translated from Spanish. 
87 Slang, deeply rooted in the Peruvian culture, which means ‘dirty trick’. 
88 Question coded EXC7 in the LAPOP database. 
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conclude that citizens who know the most about actual cases of corruption in Peru 
discard that information as unimportant in their electoral preferences.    
 
 Such is the situation for the vast majority of Peruvians, who think of the State 
as the winners’ spoils (Durand, 2005). This fact is apparent in the content of the 
vladivideos, where members of the military, judiciary system, congress, media, 
entrepreneurs, and even entertainers were shown being bribed by the President’s main 
advisor, all the while believing (to a certain degree) that their behavior was normal 
and justifiable, part of the benefits of having contact with political power (Dargent, 
2005). 
 
  
 8.3. HIGHER PARTISANSHIP RELATES TO HIGHER HCT   
  
 Partisanship, as past literature has established, can have an important influence 
in the individual’s capacity to perceive high-level corruption, and to react 
accordingly. Due to the inherent bias that political affiliation imposes over objective 
evaluations, members (and sympathizers) of different political parties tend to disagree 
over the quality, importance, and even veracity of corruption-related news. These 
tendencies would naturally get exacerbated during electoral processes, as candidates 
challenge each other’s views and perspectives about national issues; and when 
followers are not supporting the party from a particular platform, they provide their 
human resources in the hope to gain some private benefits later in case of victory. 
With so many interests (altruist or self-inspired) on the line, it doesn’t come as a 
shock that partisans will neglect to give priority to concerns that affect the image of 
their political leader, such as corruption. Indeed, as we found in the previous chapter, 
this intuitive assumption holds for the case of the 2006 presidential elections in Peru.  
 
 APRA’s political allegiance: A historical case in point 
  Such kind of tolerant behavior stemming from the ranks of Peruvian parties is 
nothing new. In the recent past, one of the parties that exceled in the high levels of 
HCT of its members was the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), the 
oldest, and by most accounts the biggest, political party in Peru. After being in the 
public scene for over half a century, the APRA’s first government came in 1985 with 
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the presidency of the young leader Alan García Perez (1985-1990). Despite much 
enthusiasm, however, the emergence of a poorly managed economic crisis and the 
scandals and stories of high and low-level corruption that started flourishing in the 
media during the second half of its government caused a great dissatisfaction with 
both the APRA and the so-called traditional parties89. Particularly widespread was 
the accurate perception that increasing numbers of Apra’s militants and sympathizers 
were taking over public jobs and institutions, even when they didn’t have the 
technical requirements to fulfill the tasks (Durand, 2005). Other instances where the 
HCT of APRA’s partisans and party members was observed were against the 
corruption allegations that came immediately after the end of Garcia’s government, 
and lasted throughout the entire decade of the 90s. In every occasion, experts 
affiliated to the party took first stage offering legal refutations regarding the 
unconstitutionality, the technical impropriety, and the political bias of such efforts to 
bring legal consequences to the multiple cases of corruption implicating directly or 
indirectly the figure of ex-President García 90 . The same conduct couldn’t be 
obeserved, however, when party members were displaced to secondary positions due 
to ideological and other disparities with the group led by García. In such ocassions, as 
the one involving APRA’s elected deputy Vargas Haya in 1985, those ‘rogue’ 
apristas were counted between the first ones who denounced the government’s 
inability to fight corruption (Quiroz, 2008). 
 
 However tolerant that APRA sympathizers might have been considered, the 
partisanship tendency to obscure any rationalization of corruption-related information 
has never really being absent from the political calculus of presidential, congressional, 
and even municipal candidates. It is a part of the Peruvian operational code, one that 
vast portions of the citizenry is quite aware of, that party militants would turn a blind 
eye (and many times even actively participate themselves) when confronted with 
allegations of corruption involving their political representatives (Dargent, 2005). 
Hence, a usual comment regarding the extent of patron-client relations in Peruvian 																																																								
89 Adding an increasing problem of subversive terrorist attacks in large regions of the country, 
including the capital, caused an irreversible alienation of the citizenry against most historical political 
parties. This context would eventually lead to the collapse of the party system in Peru, and the rising of 
outsiders in the political scene (Tanaka, 1998).  
90 In line with our argument, it is very eloquent that even in the midst of popular dissatisfaction and 
multiple claims of corruption, the APRA still managed to pull about a forth of the electorate (Schmidt, 
1996) in the presidential elections of 1990. 
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politics, as in other countries of Latin America (Bailey, 2009), is common practice in 
scholarly production regarding corruption in the region. Nevertheless, it is important 
to keep in mind that, while partisanship was found to be statistically significant for the 
level of HCT, clientelism was not. This circumstance points to the conclusion that, 
most likely, the relation between partisanship and HCT runs through ideological 
and/or emotional mental processes, and is not specifically derived from a completely 
private calculation of material benefits. 
 
 
     8.4. LOWER ECONOMIC SATISFACTION RELATES TO LOWER HCT 
  
 As hypothesized earlier in this study, the results of the structural equation 
model showed that individuals who feel less satisfied with their personal economic 
status are also less tolerant of high-level corruption. This statistical relation is in line 
with the intuitive idea that, due to the economic distortions caused by corruption 
(widely researched and corroborated by the literature), people are not inclined to 
tolerate the appropriation and exploitation of public resources while they are kept 
with unsatisfied needs, which in many instances in Peru generate situations where not 
even the basic needs of the individual are met. It is not a matter of political culture or 
social norms anymore, as was the case of the influence of political awareness over 
HCT, but the reality of a big part of the population that is counted by statistical tools 
as living in extreme poverty. For them, our results show, political leaders that misuse 
the power entrusted to them and end up worsening the economy of the common 
people should be consequently punished, at least in terms of their electoral 
possibilities. 
 
 Economic trends in Peru: 80s, 90s, and 2000s 
 The individual’s economic satisfaction is deeply intertwined with his/her 
general evaluation of multiple issues of national interest, including that of corruption. 
Furthermore, the government’s failure to address acute social problems may even be 
perceived by part of the population as being a result of high-level corruption practices 
involving the political leaders. Such was the case, as Quiroz (2008) comments, of the 
deep economic crisis faced, and partially instigated, by the first government of Alan 
García (1985-1990) during his last two years as President, and the citizens’ perception 
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that failed public investments were all instances of graft. Such public dissatisfaction, 
which originated from the disastrous economic situation of the country, quickly 
transformed into public support for legal actions against various leaders of the APRA 
regime, including of course president García. 
 
 To better understand the Peruvian logic that punishes corruption when 
individual economic satisfaction lowers, it is necessary first to take a look at some of 
the main indicators of interest for the economic well-being of a nation. 
 
FIGURE 8-1. PER CAPITA GDP AND POVERTY RATES, PERU, 1980-2007  
 
(source: Jaramillo and Saavedra, 201091) 
 
 
 As we can appreciate in Figure 8-1, Peruvian annual growth rate in terms of 
GDP per capita for the period July 1980-2007 has had clear periods of dramatic 
change. What deserves attention here, in particular, are the specific periods 
surrounding national presidential elections. By the time the first round of the 
presidential elections of 1990 took place, Peruvian economy was in the midst of a 
deep recession, with GDP per capita on free fall and poverty levels on a staggering 
high record for the entire period. Five years, later, however, the economy seemed to 
be steadily recovering, and poverty was dropping.  
																																																								
91 “Sources: GDP in 2005 U.S. dollars (purchasing power parity) from the National Institute of 
Statistics (INEI); 1985-96 poverty rates from the Living Standards Measurement Study (ENNIV); 
1999-2007 poverty rates from the National Household Survey (ENAHO). Authors’ calculations.” 
(Jaramillo and Saavedra, 2010, p. 222) 
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 This trend was shortly lived, as in 1997 GDP per capita started stalling and 
poverty increased again, and it wasn’t until 2001 that things started looking better of 
the Peruvian population. By the end of 2006, poverty had been reduced in over 15% 
and the economy was steadily on the rise, with no signals of abate. Jaramillo and 
Saavedra (2010) describe this entire process as having four distinguishable phases, 
which matches our succinct interpretation of the data. Additional indicators follow the 
general trend depicted above. 
 
FIGURE 8-2. MONTHLY EMPLOYMENT INDEX IN PRIVATE SECTOR, 1997-2006 
 
Data source: Ministry of Work and Employment Promotion (MINTRA)  
  
 
 Here in Figure 8-2 we see the progression of employment rates for the last two 
important phases of the period considered by Jaramillo and Saavedra (2010). Again, it 
is apparent the recovery obtained from 2002 onwards, which sharply contrasts the 
trend that was being followed during the latter part of the 90’s.  
 
 The same tendencies are observed one more time (although somehow softened 
around the turn of the century) when looking at the evolution of consumer spending92 
in Figure 8-3.  
 
 
 
 																																																								
92 Consumer spending, also called consumer consumption or expenditure, is the amount of money that 
households spend on goods and services in order to satisfy their needs. 
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FIGURE 8-3. PERU CONSUMER SPENDING, 1986-2006 
  
 Source: www.tradingeconomics.com | Central Reserve Bank of Peru 
 
 
 Electoral behavior: An economic reading against corruption, 1990-2006 
 What does this all mean for the level of HCT in the Peruvian citizenry? For 
the sake of simplicity, let’s present the argument by focusing on the corruption-related 
history of ex-President Alberto Fujimori and his political parties 93 , and their 
performance in the 1990, 1995, 200094, 2001, and 2006 presidential elections. 
 
FIGURE 8-4. ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN FIRST ROUND OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 
OF PRO-FUJIMORI POLITICAL PARTIES, 1990-2006 
 
 Data source: www.perupolitico.com 
  
																																																								
93 Change 90 (C90), New Majority (NM), and Let’s Go Neighbor (VV). For the electoral process of 
2000 these three parties were grouped in the alliance Peru 2000. In 2001, being banned from political 
participation, the remaining pro-Fujimori factions supported Popular Solution, an electoral alliance 
between VV and With Force Peru. For 2006, a new alliance of pro-Fujimori parties was erected, called 
Alliance for the Future (AF).  
94 Due to the amount of evidence regarding electoral fraud in the 2000 elections, we use the percentage 
of votes estimated by the exit poll from Apoyo (Conaghan, 2005).  
	 145	
 With some precaution, it’s possible to extrapolate the tendencies shown in 
Figure 8-4 over the movements of the Peruvian economy, and find some similarities. 
First, when Alberto Fujimori first run for president in 1990, amidst a severe economic 
crisis and a public decry for changes including a more aggressive fight against 
corruption, he may have embodied the hopes for a clear cut with the past, not least of 
all evidenced by his campaign slogan “honesty, technology, work” (Schmidt, 1996, p. 
343). Peruvians were tired of the so-called ‘traditional’ parties, and were ready for a 
change that would involve a more honest management of public affairs. In time, 
however, Fujimori proved to be not much different from previous leaders, and from 
the beginning of his government some stories involving corrupt activities in his close 
circles started to surface. But the news about corruption couldn’t compete with the 
most acclaimed successes accomplished by Fujimori’s first government, such as the 
apprehension of terrorist leaders and the gradual victory in the fight against 
subversive groups, the control of inflation, and the recovery of the economy (Zapata, 
2005; Taylor, 2000; Weyland, 2000). Indeed, as Conaghan (2005, p. 78) notices, 
during the presidential campaign of 1995 “[p]oll after poll showed that the most 
salient issues in the minds of voters were economic ones” 95 . The ongoing 
improvement of the economic performance, linked to better individual conditions, 
granted Alberto Fujimori enough support to win the presidency for a second period in 
199596.  
  
 As economic conditions started to plummet in 1997, so did the approval of 
Fujimori’s regime; additionally, multiple instances of corruption and other scandals 
started to have frequent coverage in some opposition media outlets97. The point we 
want to make here is that the electoral support for the regime, and therefore the level 
of HCT, was being clearly influenced by the overall performance of the economic 
indicators, and from an individual perspective the level of economic satisfaction of 
the citizenry98.  																																																								
95 According to a poll cited in Schmidt (2000, p. 118), pro-Fujimori voters explicitly stated to have 
done so driven by economic reasons (7.7%) over the President’s honesty (2.8%). 
96 Taylor (2005) also makes the point of Peruvians’ tolerance of authoritarianism in exchange of 
economic stability during in the aftermath of Fujimori’s self-coup. 97	As we have recounted before, the last years of the regime saw both high-level corruption brought 
into light, with the vast majority still kept in the shadows until Fujimori’s fall in the late 2000.	98	Conaghan (2005, p. 186) states, “discontent with political aspects of Fujimorismo intersected with 
growing concerns about Peru’s poor economic performance.”	
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 Still, Fujimori’s presidential campaign, which included a vast mobilization of 
the State machinery in order to secure popular electoral support and manifold 
promises of economic funding to poor and rural areas, managed to draw 43.6% of the 
votes according to exit polls on the day of elections (Conaghan, 2005). The economic 
conditions of the country hasn't even gotten close to the levels of 1990, either, and 
many Peruvians seemed willing to continue backing a regime marked by suspicions 
of state capture (Dargent, 2005).  
 
 After the fall of the Fujimori regime in November of 2000, new elections were 
announced for 2001, in which a feeble pro-Fujimori group managed to gather no more 
than 2% of the valid votes. Although the economy continued to fall all the period 
leading to the inauguration of Toledo’s government99, it’s impossible to assert that in 
this particular case there was a relation between lower economic satisfaction and 
lower HCT. The proofs about systemic corruption against hundreds of figures 
belonging to all subsystems of the country was just too overwhelming for most of the 
previous followers of Fujimori’s government, and hence what has been called by 
Francisco Durand the “moral reserve” of society (Durand, 2005, p. 291) took place. 
This newly found intolerant behavior towards high-level corruption would be shortly 
lived, though. 
 
 Finally, the 2006 elections saw a recovery in the levels of HCT among the 
citizenry. As the economy changed direction and followed an impressive pattern of 
growth (Schmidt, 2007) that remains steady until the present100, so did the electoral 
choices of important numbers of the population who showed their support for 
representatives of past governments previously decried as corrupt without abate. Such 
were the cases of the recovery in voters’ support for Martha Chavez, hardcore 
defendant of ex-President Alberto Fujimori, and especially the electoral success of ex-
President Alan García, who had already surprised most political analyst in his 2001 
campaign that brought him close to office.  
 
																																																								
99 For a brief description of the economic conditions leading to the 2001 elections, see Franco (2001). 
100 For a rebuttal of some pessimistic reviews of the Peruvian economy during Toledo’s presidency, 
see Taylor (2005). 
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 The best explanatory review of the victory of a political actor who had in the 
past being accused of various incidents of corruption, and was considered by most 
Peruvians to have held one of the most corrupt governments of the previous twenty 
five years, specially when considered in front of other electoral options that were 
without a doubt more honest and uncorrupted, is presented by Roberto Masías and 
Federico Segura (2006). We reproduce their comments: 
 
“101In this search for explanatory variables regarding Garcías victory, we can mention the fact that 
public opinion tended to recognize in him a government of continuity with the economic policies of 
Toledo’s government, which had favorable results for the country. As it is known, the country grew 
4,19% on average in 2001-2005 and had an average inflation of 1,94%. The image of a violent, 
improvised and anti-system Ollanta Humala, basically confronted with the big capitals, besides his 
relation with president Chavez of Venezuela, benefitted Alan Garcia, because in the second round he 
managed to attract the votes of the private sector and of those who incline for a market economy with 
limited state intervention.” (Masías and Segura, 2006, p. 21)   
 
 Thus, Alan García (Quiroz, 2008), and to a smaller degree Martha Chavez, 
can be regarded as having benefitted from the improving economic conditions of 
many Peruvians (and their worries about the possibility of a setback), who 
consequently, following our empirical results, were more inclined to cast aside their 
concerns about high-level corruption102. In more technical terms, it is then reasonable 
to believe that the level of economic satisfaction may be related to the idea of political 
sensibility: When there is satisfaction with the economy, corruption may not even 
enter the politic-economic calculations behind the act of voting for a chosen 
candidate. 
 
 Economy, perception, and information: Additional links 
 Additional support to the previous argument is provided by a statistically 
significant Spearman’s rho coefficient (-0.1389, p<0.001, obs. = 1149), which shows 
that economic satisfaction is indeed correlated to our measure of perceived 																																																								
101 Translated from Spanish. 
102 It is also illustrative that Ollanta Humala, the third more potentially honest candidate in 2006 
according to our own estimates, won most of the votes in 18 regions of the country, “5 of them – all 
located in the southern sierra – with more than 50% of the vote. He was also the strongest performer in 
Lima’s populous shantytowns.” (Schmidt, 2007, p. 817) Alan García, on the other hand, won in four 
regions of the north coast. Economically and historically speaking, the levels of poverty are 
considerably higher in the Peruvian sierra compared to the coast. 
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generalized high-level corruption. In other words, when citizens feels dissatisfied 
with their individual economic conditions, they also perceive that corruption is 
running unchecked across the political higher spheres; and when they approve of the 
way the economy is performing, their perception of high-level corruption is reduced.  
Hence, both determinants of HCT work hand by hand to cause a decline (or increase, 
given the circumstances) in the citizens’ tolerance of high-level corruption. 
 
 To conclude this review of economic satisfaction and HCT, it is necessary to 
include an additional possibility that would add an extra dimension to the above 
discussion: As people in lower economic conditions would also tend to consume less 
information (Conaghan, 2005) the relation between media (and casual) exposure and 
HCT might be heavily determined by the citizen’s economic satisfaction. Indeed, this 
seems to be the case, as the Spearman’s rho test shows (rho=0.187, p<0.001, 
obs.=1151). The result of this simple correlation suggests that the level of economic 
satisfaction may also have an added indirect influence not theoretically assumed by 
our model. Future work on the determinants of HCT from a qualitative perspective 
should consider this additional venue of influence in the model. 
 
 
 8.5. GENERALIZED HIGH-LEVEL CORRUPTION RELATES TO LOWER HCT 
  
 In this section we engage in the discussion of yet another piece of information 
regarding HCT that contradicts our original assumption. Inspired on the idea of the 
routinization of corruption (Salzman, 2009) that somehow pervades Latin American 
societies, Peru included, we expected that the perception of a ‘rotten’ political 
leadership would develop in the growth of cynical citizens who would be more 
tolerant of high-level corruption. Such relation, actually, manifested in the opposite 
direction in the LAPOP data. A new look at these findings, formulated in the above 
statement ‘generalized high-level corruption relates to lower HCT’, forces us to see 
the connection from a different pair of lenses. It now seems quite reasonable, indeed, 
to assume that in a scenario where most political options wear marks of past (and 
potential) corrupt activities, the citizenry at large will tend to be in high-alert and to 
lower its HCT. 
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 But, what if we would invert the circumstance, and to restate the relation by 
saying that controlled and particularized instances of high-level corruption causes an 
increase in HCT? Evidently, there is a dissonant effect in the relation when presented 
in this way. It implies that Peruvians are more willing to, and actually do support 
more corrupt politicians when the political scenario is filled with enough honest and 
clean officials and representatives. To answer Adam Brinegar’s (2009, p. 132) 
question, “[d]oes a country’s internationally low level of corruption – or the 
perception of citizens about low levels of corruption because of elite discourse – 
mitigate accountability?”, we have to say that, for the Peruvian case, the answer is 
‘Yes’. How can we explain this? 
 
 Corruption cycles and moral reserve 
 To put things in perspective, we are saying that Peruvian citizens tolerate 
high-level corruption when it’s controlled, but become intolerant when it is perceived 
as widespread. This may be so due to the fact that corruption in Peru is rather a 
constant, an element that has been present since the beginning of the republic era, and 
even before, during colonial times, corruption (although not necessarily considered so 
by legal standards of the time) was a very common activity, part of the way public 
affairs were handed. Commenting only on the period starting from the independence 
in 1821, Alfonso Quiroz states:  
 
“[T]he history of Peru has been in part the history of successive cycles of corruption followed by very 
short anticorruption reform periods that are brought to an end by antireformist vested interests… There 
has been no historical period or cycle of little or no corruption; all the cycles surveyed were 
characterized by moderately high, high, and very high indicators of corruption.”  (Quiroz, 2008, p. 432)   
 
 In this order of things, it isn’t shocking that Peruvians might have gotten used 
to the existence of corruption scandals involving the government and important 
politicians, and that consequently they learned how to cope with that reality. A perfect 
example may be the trends of anti-corruption mobilization that spammed from the 
infamous vladivideos. As it was mentioned earlier, the fall of Fujimori took place in a 
context where the so-called “moral reserve” of society (Durand, 2005, p. 291) was 
being massively activated in all strati of Peruvian society after a long period of 
stagnation that can be said to have lasted almost the entire decade of the 1990’s. As 
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Quiroz (2008) posits, the sudden realization of the extension and complexity of the 
regime’s corruption couldn’t be tolerated even in a country like Peru, and a drastic 
(although temporary) change in the attitudes and behavior of the citizenry towards 
this national endemic problem occurred. “Corruption seems to be tolerated, even in 
countries with weak institutions, only up to a certain degree” (Qurioz, 2008, pp. 416-
417).  
 
 In the eve of this new historical opportunity, the mostly acclaimed ‘virtuous’ 
transitional government of Valentín Paniagua was possible in the middle of a fast 
collapse of the engineered pro-Fujimori apparatus in Congress. This transitional 
period saw an impressive popular and political mobilization in support of the 
apprehension and prosecution of the corrupt hosts of the previous regime, and the 
recovery of stolen assets, and for this purpose a great deal of legal reforms had to be 
undertaken in the briefest time possible (Peña-Mancillas, 2011; Jorge, 2008; 
Calderón, 2006).   
 
 What happened afterwards, sadly, was a steady process where anti-corruption 
efforts were gradually brought to a halt, first by a negligent management under 
Toledo’s government (2001-2006), and later by the prioritization of other issues, and 
even the reversion in the anti-corruption effort (Quiroz, 2008), under García’s second 
government (2006-2011) (Peña-Mancillas, 2011). From this perspective, as Quiroz 
(2008) would probably agree, Peru turns the wheel of the corruption-anticorruption 
cycle and experiences the new resistance of antireformists, or at least tolerant, groups. 
The moral reserve is quickly depleted, and after the crisis is perceived as having being 
weathered, most Peruvians are ready to move one on new issues, thus stop pushing 
forward for a new generation of reforms or even for the appropriate 
institutionalization of previous ones (Weyland, 2000).  
 
 Modern cycles: Peru, 1990-2006 
 The same tendencies for HCT as the ones described above can be observed in 
the presidential elections for the period 1990-2006. To show this, we proceed to 
compare the percentage of valid votes obtained in the first round of elections by 
political parties divided in two groups: Those who were perceived as potentially 
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corrupt, and those perceived as potentially honest. In Table 8-1 we present the details 
of both groups. 
 
TABLE 8-1. MAIN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND THEIR ELECTORAL SUPPORT,  
 PERU 1990-2006 
1990 2000 
Candidate Party Votes % Candidate Party Votes % 
Vargas Llosa FREDEMO 33% Fujimori Perú 2000 44% 
Fujimori C90 29% Toledo PP 46% 
Alva Castro APRA 22% Andrade SP 3% 
Henry Pease IU 8% Salas Avancemos 2% 
Barrantes IS 5% Castañeda SN 2% 
Cáceres FNTC 2% Salinas APRA 1% 
1995 2001 
Candidate Party Votes % Candidate Party Votes % 
Fujimori C90-NM 64% Toledo PP 37% 
Perez de 
Cuellar 
UPP 22% García APRA 26% 
Cabanillas APRA 4% Flores UN 24% 
Toledo CODE-PP 3% Olivera FIM 10% 
Belmont OBRAS 2% Boloña SP 2% 
Diez Canseco AP 2%  
Data source: www.perupolitico.com 
Note: Potentially honest candidates are written in 
italics; candidates not considered for further analysis 
are written with strikethrough.  
2006 
Candidate Party Votes % 
Humala UPP 31% 
García APRA 24% 
Flores UN 24% 
Chávez AF 7% 
Paniagua FDC 6% 
Lay RN 4% 
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 What the table presents is the relation of all presidential candidates for the 
period 1990-2006 that are among the six most voted, and had received at least 1% of 
the valid votes. The ones belonging to each of the groups can be identified by italics 
in the case of ‘potentially honest’, and by regular type in the case of ‘potentially 
corrupt’; the ones that have strikethrough (for example) have not been included in any 
of the groups, mostly due to lack of sufficient data103 (1990-2001) or because of their 
evident neutrality in the matter (2006). Nevertheless, it is reassuring to consider that 
those omitted cases have in no case accounted for more than 1/10 of the electorate 
(2% in 1990, 7% in 1995, 8% in 2000) with the sole exception of Lourdes Flores in 
2006, who was placed in the middle range by the ranking developed in Chapter 3, 
therefore not creating any foreseeable problem. 
  
 Thus, we recreate the patterns of electoral support for potentially honest and 
corrupt candidates for the same in Figure 8-5. 
 
FIGURE 8-5. ELECTORAL SUPPORT FOR CORRUPT AND  
NON-CORRUPT POLITICAL PARTIES, 1990-2006 
 
 
 To interpret the above graph, we shall make a brief recount of the state of 
corruption during those electoral encounters keeping in mind that our discussion 
																																																								
103 The unavailability of data includes both quantitative measurements of corruption-related news, and 
the theoretical difficulty of controlling for the actual manipulation of the media and the possibilities of 
the citizenry to discriminate between different sources of information. 
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involves not particularly the level of corruption affecting the government’s image, but 
the presence or absence of a situation of generalized high-level corruption.  
 
 Fujimori’s cycle: 1990-2000 
 After a decade of growing corruption involving the constitutional governments 
of Fernando Belaunde (1980-1985) from Popular Action (AP), and Alan García 
(1985-1990) from the APRA (Taylor, 2005), most Peruvians were in a severe process 
of disaffection with the traditional political parties, which were being blamed for the 
raging economic crisis and increasing internal violence. The perception of high-level 
corruption, influenced by the economic conditions of the country (as we have 
reviewed earlier), affected not only those parties actually involved in scandals, but the 
entire spectrum of politics. As Schmidt (1996, p. 325) reports, only 17% of surveyed 
Peruvians trusted political parties, compared to a dramatic 77% that declared to 
mistrust them. In such scenario of perceived corruption affecting most political 
parties, and in line with our argument, lauded writer and semi-independent candidate 
Mario Vargas Llosa104, from FREDEMO, and newcomer Alberto Fujimori105 (C90) 
received 62% of the valid votes between the two of them, while the traditional parties 
could only raise 35%.  
 
 Five years later, for the presidential elections of 1995, the country’s situation 
had changed drastically, in both political and economic terms. The economic crisis 
was finally abating and giving path to growth in the GDP, inflation was being kept 
under control, and the fight against internal guerrillas was being won. In the political 
sphere, although the crisis of the party regime was showing no signs of improvement, 
new actors appeared on the scene, with Javier Perez de Cuellar deserving a special 
mention. Albeit having shown some reluctance at participating in the 1995 
presidential elections, due to what was considered a ‘not-even’ scenario, the 																																																								
104 Vargas Llosa had actively begun his political career since the campaign against the nationalization 
of the banks pursued by García in 1987. Although throughout the 1990’s campaign tried to identify 
himself as an ‘independent’ politician, the fact that he was running as the head of the FREDEMO, a 
coalition of ‘traditional' right-wing parties, eventually determined his electoral defeat. (For another 
interpretation of the electoral results, however, see Schmidt, 1996)  105	About Fujimori’s figure as an honest and non-corrupt candidate, we refer to Lewis Taylor’s words: 
“[B]uffeted on all sides by economic and political chaos of epic proportions, voters lost patience with 
the political class and their party organisations [sic], in the 1990 general elections opting for an 
‘outsider’ who was untainted by accusations of incompetence or corruption – Alberto Fujimori.” 
(Taylor, 2000, p. 392) 
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renowned diplomat and ex-Secretary General of the United Nations eventually 
stepped up to the opportunity, founding the political party Unity for Peru (UPP) and 
refusing to make any coalition with the vituperated traditional parties, contrary to 
what Vargas Llosa had done in 1990 (Conaghan, 2005).  
 
   With no other potential threat for Fujimori’s aspiration, the electoral attention 
was naturally on Perez de Cuellar; other independent candidates were still unknown 
to the vast majority of the electorate, and the APRA was still under fire by 
accusations of corruption regarding its 1985-1990 government. In a focus group 
related by Schmidt (2000, p. 107), citizens of Lima described the diplomat as 
“honorable”, while the image of president Fujimori was that of “crafty if not 
duplicitous”. Indeed, this perception of the President was drawn from an increasing 
number of journalist investigations and public scandals that tended to show him as a 
person that would use any means necessary to accomplish power, not least of all 
corruption. As Conaghan (2005) reviews in her narrative about Fujimori’s regime, 
from 1990 to 1995 there were several occasions when, despite the increasing 
harassment being suffered from the State’s apparatus, the independent media were 
informing of shady, illegal, and/or corrupt activities involving Fujimori’s family (case 
of used clothe and APENKAI106, denounced by Fujimori’s wife herself), his electoral 
campaign (misuse of public employees and case ‘General Rodríguez’ 107 ), and 
suspicions of state-capture (suggestions of electoral fraud on the making and 
manipulation of the National Electoral Jury – JNE108). What is more, as in the case of 
corruption allegations made by Fujimori’s wife, Susana Higuchi, against his family, 
most Peruvians reported believing her109. 
 
 However pressing were the allegations of corruption against the regime, Perez 
de Cuellar couldn’t garner more than 22% of the valid votes, granting the victory in 
first round to incumbent Alberto Fujimori. Such results support once again our 
argument regarding the ironic effect of lower levels of generalized high-level 
corruption on HCT. 																																																								
106 Zapata, 2005, p. 252. 
107 Conaghan, 2005, p. 82. 
108 Ibid., p. 93-94.  
109 67% from Apoyo’s poll (Conaghan, 2005, p. 87). 
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The second part of Fujimori’s government was marked by a systematic 
capture of most public institutions, made possible by the most extended and complex 
corrupt network that had ever taken power in Peru. These events, however, were only 
known to the public after the fall of Fujimori from power in November of 2000. For 
the presidential elections in April of 2000, however, most of the regime’s corruption 
was kept hidden, but still the little evidence of obscure transactions and maneuvers 
that was made public by the investigative media that remained in opposition 
represented a clear increase from the limited scandals that surfaced in the previous 
five-year-period. And these corruption-related stories didn’t involve just the executive 
branch anymore, either. There were evident cases of legislative capture (turncoats 
moving from the ranks of the opposition into the government’s party110), politically 
motivated congressional actions against the Constitutional Tribunal, dubious and 
partisan-driven legislative production, attacks against press freedom (cases Varus 
Ivcher and Frecuencia Latina), editorial purchase (sensationalist press called in Peru 
prensa chicha111), and harassment of opposition municipal mayors and consequent 
desertion of many of them to increase the ranks of C90-NM 112. In other words, 
national, regional, institutional, and even private actors where increasingly being 
involved in shady dealings with a government that was being perceived more and 
more as corrupt and authoritarian. Even opposition leaders as Alberto Andrade and 
Luis Castañeda Lossio were publicly accused of corrupt dealings by some of the 
government financed tabloids113, a concerted attack that eventually showed to have 
some results. 
 
 Under such circumstances of an evident generalization of high-level 
corruption reports affecting multiple actors and institutions of the political and social 
spheres, it is not surprising, considering the quantitative results of our structural 
equation model, that the levels of HCT among Peruvian citizens had gone down 
again, although not yet as low as it was in 1990, or as it would only one year later for 
the presidential elections of 2001. 																																																								
110  “During the first six months of 1996, desertions from the ranks of the opposition and 
‘independents’ increased the number of votes that C90-NM could potentially count on for an 
amendment vote in congress.” (Conaghan, 2005, p. 121) 
111 Conaghan, 2005, p. 158. 
112 Ibid., pp. 166-167. 
113 Ibid., pp. 169, 186. Also, Schmidt, 2000, p. 125. 
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Rise and fall of moral reserve: 2001-2006 
As the electoral process of 2001 has already been discussed, it’s only 
necessary to point out some additional features that couldn't be contemplated before. 
Although we focused before on the impact that the vladivideos had on the Peruvian 
frame of mind regarding high-level corruption, the point that our model of HCT made 
clear wasn’t only that of the effect of perceived governmental corruption, but that of 
generalized corruption, involving thus multiple actors from different political 
affiliations. The best example of this generalization of problem across Peruvian elites 
is Federico Salas, presidential candidate in 2000 for Let’s Move Forward 
(Avancemos). After Salas made a name for himself as the honorable and committed 
Mayor of Huancavelica (the poorest region of Peru114), position that awarded him the 
recognition of Caretas magazine115 for his courageous efforts to get governmental 
support to the impoverished population of his region, his entrance into national 
politics managed to garner 2% of the valid votes. However, as from the inauguration 
or the third period of Fujimori’s government, Federico Salas became another addition 
to the already bulked ranks of Perú 2000 with the surprising office of Prime Minister. 
This event, evidently, made him a focal point of criticism, as his action made him the 
most infamous turncoat of the final stage of the Fujimori regime. 
 
 In post-Fujimori Peru, regular citizens got used to find on the daily news 
constant surprises pertaining the diversity of characters that in one way or another 
participated in the huge corrupt façade that became the government in the last years of 
the 1990s. From ex-soccer stars to opposition members of the congress, from popular 
rock singers to Army generals, nobody seemed to have a secured position as the 
country’s honesty champion (Ford, 2003; Franco, 2001; Conaghan, 2005). Even close 
colleagues of reputed corruption-fighters (Schmidt, 2003) were involved in the mafia 
that was being exposed. And such media show was presented night after night on 
television for all Peruvians to watch.   
 
 The results of the first round of the 2001 presidential elections, presented in 
Figure 8-5, show that HCT touched a record low for the 1990-2006 period, while 
Durand’s (2005) “moral reserve” spiked. From this account, the surprise of most 																																																								
114 http://www.huancavelicaperu.com/pobreza.htm#1 
115 Caretas, N0 1497, 26-12-1997. 
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political analysts regarding the incredible electoral comeback of ex-president Alan 
García seems now only part of the constant in Peruvian history of a real, if not always 
high, tolerance towards corruption. The point of interest here, therefore, is to continue 
looking for the direction of the HCT, be it either on the downslide or on the rise.  
 
 Although the government of Alejadro Toledo (2001-2006) was also fertile in 
corruption scandals, and the newly found freedom of the press took full advantage of 
the opportunity to cover such kind of sensational stories (most of the time such 
scandals never amounted to more than petty corruption on high circles), the level of 
generalization didn’t come even close to that observed during the 1990’s (in 
retrospective). This is why many Peruvians considered corruption to be even more 
widespread116 in 2006, as Transparency International’s CPI suggested, but probably 
more localized (government’s party) and minimized (involving small sums of 
money). Perceived widespread corruption under Toledo’s government may have been 
mere attitudes regarding bureaucracy in general, or government officials in particular, 
and not necessarily a passive extendable to political alternatives during the electoral 
process. Still, more precise measures of corruption perception than the ones currently 
existing are required to support this assertion. What can be said for now is that, by 
2006, the support for honest and potentially anti-corruption leaders was decaying, 
while HCT was, once more, increasing. 
 
 Perception of generalized HLC and additional links 
 To sum up, the low level of generalized scandals of political corruption may 
allow the support of potentially corrupt leaders, as happened in 1995 and 2006, either 
by reelecting the incumbent (1995), or electing a new president with no better résumé 
(2006). On the other hand, a sense of generalized high-level corruption pervading the 
political spectrum may cause a turnover towards the candidate perceived as less 
corrupt (1990, 2000, 2001). Finally, the non-relation to information exposition 
commented earlier suggests that, while a higher amount of corruption-related 
information may develop into higher tolerance of corruption, it has no impact on the 
individual’s perception of generalized high-level corruption. In other words, 																																																								116	This kind of “generalized corruption, but involving smaller amounts and less sophistication” 
(Tanaka 2005, p. 360) may do great damage to the legitimacy of the government, but is not really 
compatible to the kind we have been arguing about in this section.	
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frequency and importance of news have independent and opposite effects on 
individual’s HCT. This would explain why TI’s CPI fails to describe Peruvian 
electoral tendencies regarding corruption tolerance. 
 
 To part from the present discussion, we would like to comment on two 
alternative explanations regarding the role of perceived generalized high-level 
corruption. The first one suggests that the level of individual economic satisfaction 
may also cause the relation depicted above. Indeed, the Spearman’s rho test shows a 
correlation between economic self-evaluation and perception of HLC (rho = -0.139, 
p<0.001, obs.=1149). Further analysis is required to untangle this connection. The 
second alternative is that the perception of generalized high-level corruption might 
only be mirroring the perceived corruption of the government, which would go in line 
with our introductory assessment of corruption tolerance in Peru (‘accepted when 
inside normal levels’). The correlation between perceived generalized HLC, and the 
individual’s opinion regarding how government is handling corruption inside its own 
structures (coded “n9” in the LAPOP database) gives a supportive result (rho = 0.482, 
p<0.001, obs.=1147). This second reading would highlight some problems that most 
measurements of corruption carry, which is the impossibility of differentiating 
perception of corruption in the government from that of the general political 
spectrum. For the purpose of the present study, we can only recognize that both may 
have an interactive relation possibly determined by a feedback mechanism. Again, 
further examination in the form of qualitative research is required.   
  
 
  8.6. HIGHER COMMUNITY-ORIENTED VALUES RELATE TO HIGHER HCT 
  
 Originally derived from a factor analysis of multiple measures related to 
democratic values, the citizen’s self-reported proclivity to contribute to the solution of 
community problems (either with their time, energy, or money) was grouped and 
labeled community-oriented values in the present study. As Chapter 6 showed, the 
relation of this factor to the level of HCT had a positive sign, telling a rather bleak 
story about the electoral decisions of the most active members of society, who could 
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even be said to form the social capital of Peru117. The theoretical expectation 
embedded earlier in the present study suggested the probability that people who are 
more active and cooperative in their communities, should also have a lower tolerance 
towards high-level corruption; after all, as we reviewed in the introductory section, 
corruption has invariably a distorting effect over the national economy, creates 
inequality, and redirects public spending away from social programs and towards 
sectors that are less transparent and allow for corrupt dealings. Therefore, how are we 
to explain that socially responsible Peruvians prefer to vote for potentially corrupt 
candidates, instead of choosing a more honest leader for themselves? The answer goes 
through the process of understanding the historic relationship between popular and 
rural communities, and elected (or autocratic) leaders. 
 
 The fulfillment of ‘citizenship’ in Peru 
 Citing another study, Weyland (2000, p. 496) comments on the social 
demands of Peruvian citizens, especially the ones of lower economic conditions: 
 
“Based on conversations with 600 inhabitants of Lima’s popular districts, Parodi and Twanama 
(1993:63-65) found that according to prevailing conceptions, political leaders constantly need to 
provide socioeconomic benefits in order to maintain their following.”  
 
 If the kind of trust developed by the highly proactive citizens of these 
communities is in fact of the kind called by Uslaner (2002) particularized trust, hence 
not being appropriate for the construction of social capital, it is completely possible 
and understandable that examples of community values would go hand by hand with a 
proclivity to prioritize patronage relations instead of pursuing the punishment of 
corrupt leaders. As higher HCT actually entails not the actual preference for corrupt 
politicians, but a lower concern for such issues, it will be completely reasonable then 
to expect Peruvians with high community-oriented values, who sacrifice multiple 
resources for their fellow citizens, to also sacrifice the importance of corruption-
related news in their electoral calculations, and to support candidates who make the 
best economic offers not for the individual’s benefit, but for that of the entire 
community. This last aspect of the relationship is reflected in the statistical non-																																																								
117 Indeed, the Spearman’s rho test shows that community-oriented values and the level of trust in 
fellow community members are related (rho = -0.088, p<0.01, ob.=1171). 
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significance of clientelistic tendencies in our structural equation model, implying a 
collective-driven interest from the part of the citizen in supporting corruption, as 
opposed to a purely individualistic one. At the same time, it suggests the perseverance 
of a traditional type of social and political organization where patron-client relations 
are still the foundations of the communal economy, even if in this case we have to 
understand the client118 in the figure of the community as a whole. Such social 
composition is characteristically opposed to modern formulas of citizenship and 
democratic representation, exactly the ones that engage and invest in anti-corruption 
reforms.   
 
 Such trends of governmental sponsorship of electoral and/or politically-driven 
public investments in projects of community-development, although can be traced 
from a historical perspective since a long time ago, will be briefly reviewed in the 
following lines by focusing on the government of Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000), who, 
as Zapata (2005) recognizes, was able to draw popular support by the funding of 
small projects of direct and evident social impact on a scale not accomplished by any 
of the previous populist governments in Peruvian history. 
 
 Collectivist clientelism under Fujimori’s regime   
 For the presidential elections of 1995, a common and important example of 
the use of public resources to captivate voters was the arbitrary spent of moneys from 
the National Fund of Compensation and National Development (FONCODES), 
institution that provided the government with an unusually and “truly discretionary” 
(Schady, 2000, p. 303) source of financing, which were to be used as a tool for 
political mobilization. Indeed, in his study, Schady (2000) finds quantitative proof 
that the allocation of funds from FONCODES followed an electoral logic of two 
objectives: First, the projects for implementation were selected from areas where the 
political impact in favor of Fujimori’s reelection would have the most success rate; 
and second, public works should serve to recover the depressed support for his 																																																								
118 Most recounts of Fujimori’s government highlight the usage of clientelistic network as a tool of 
political mobilization of popular sectors, and allegiance of rent-seeking public officials and corruptible 
actors (for example, Zapata, 2005, p. 256; and, Taylor, 2005, p. 569). For our discussion of 
community-oriented values, we only consider the case pertaining to the first group, and even then just 
the State’s financing of community-shared actives (such differentiation is also made by Quiroz, 2008, 
p. 369). 
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government as demonstrated by the results of the 1993 constitutional referendum, 
which was backed by a feeble 52% of voters compared to 48% of Peruvians who 
voted against the constitutional project119. This spending pattern, finally, had the 
expected results (Schmidt, 2000). 
 
 In real terms, the 1995 campaign saw a massive spending display from the 
State, in which social programs were heavily funded and public works personally 
inaugurated by president Fujimori on an increasing rate, all in order to secure 
Fujimori’s second term in power (Weyland, 2000; Conaghan, 2005). Schmidt (2000, 
p. 104) reports that, with the funds resulting from the wave of privatizations, foreign 
loans, and greater tax revenue, various types of public works (among the favorites of 
the President were schools, roads, and health posts) targeted at the poor increased by 
60% in 1994 and an additional 90% in 1995. It’s difficult, therefore, not to see a clear 
intentionality in the way that the government was spending the country’s resources in 
relation to the proximity of the presidential elections. By the same token, it’s not hard 
to understand Fujimori’s victory in first round. In the eloquent words of Catherine M. 
Conaghan (2005, p. 95), “[T]he biggest problem was that Pérez de Cuéllar failed to 
make a compelling case that he could do a better job then Fujimori in delivering the 
concrete economic benefits and neighborhood improvements that voters wanted.” In 
other words, the importance of corruption was considered trivial next to the 
possibility of seen their communities improved for poor Peruvians. 
 
 The same pattern of community-oriented values’ prioritization occurred 
during Fujimori’s second period, specifically in cases like the public efforts to control 
the damages caused by el Niño phenomenon in 1997-1998 (Broad and Orlove, 2007), 
of which president Fujimori took personal charge and subsequently drew an increase 
in his popularity, albeit scandals of corruption (Zapata, 2005; Dargent, 2005).  
 
 This argument suggests that, from a historical and realistic perspective, 
Peruvians has tended to prioritize the kind of State-society relations that would better 
fit their material needs as a collectivity, although not necessarily (and enigmatically) 
																																																								
119 Source: www.perupolitico.com 
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as particular individuals, while sacrificing their capacity and willingness to punish 
corrupt leaders. 
 
 The operationalization of ‘clientelism’: Citizen empowerment 
 Regarding the differentiation between community values and clientelism, 
however, there exists the possibility that our measurement of clientelism did not, in 
fact, tap effectively this construct. The measurement of political clientelism is not an 
easy task, and one usually has to resort to proxy variables. This is the strategy that the 
present study adopted by using survey questions regarding the self-reported instances 
when the individuals had approached public officials with a request. However, if this 
proxy measure is not effectively tapping clientelism, then it would be currently not 
possible to state that community-oriented values is an independent variable from that 
of clientelism. In order to examine this possibility, we conduct a Spearman’s rho test 
between both constructs. The results show that they are correlated (rho = -0.225, 
p<0.001, obs.=1125), which means that, for the LAPOP data, more clientelism relates 
to more community-oriented values. However, in a subsequent test we find that 
clientelism also correlates with our efficacious behavior factor (rho = 0.328, p<0.001, 
obs.=496), indicating that higher levels of the former relate to practices evidencing 
more political efficacy from the part of the individual. Such results clearly show a big 
deal of discrepancy from a logical stand: Even if we accept, from the Peruvian case, 
that community-oriented citizens are actually more inclined to behave in a clientelistic 
way, there is still no reasonable connection between depending on the government to 
solve one’s problems and, at the same time, behaving in a political efficacious way; in 
fact, aside from their statistical correlation, such connection challenges common 
logic. 
 
 The above results regarding our measurement of clientelism may indicate that 
its operationalization in the present study actually taps into levels of citizen 
empowerment, a middle point between community-oriented and political efficacy. 
This would possibly explain why it correlates with higher levels of both variables, 
while they have opposite effects on HCT, and thus failing to reach statistical 
significance according to the results of our structural equation model. Therefore, it is 
possible to assume that the impact of community-oriented values on HCT may 
include the effect of real clientelistic tendencies, not tapped in the present study.  
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 8.7. DEMOCRATIC VALUES RELATE TO HIGHER HCT 
  
 The last enigmatic relationship that the structural equation model reveals, 
regarding the Peruvian determinants of HCT, is the influence that self-reported 
support for the democratic system have over citizens’ levels of corruption tolerance. 
As the data from LAPOP AmericasBarometer 2006 shows, Peruvians who are more 
committed to the ideals of democracy, also tend to vote for more potentially corrupt 
presidential candidates. If theoretically, as well as from a vast scholarly production, 
democracy and corruption are supposed to have an antithetic relation, how are we to 
explain the behavior of the Peruvian electorate? This phenomenon is rather complex. 
 
 An instrumental view of democracy 
 The experience of the Peruvian citizenry with democratic regimes can be said 
to be feeble, if not disappointing. Throughout its republican history, Peru has had as 
many authoritarian (and some straight dictatorship) as democratic administrations, 
and this tendency has continued until the end of the 20th century: constitutional 
presiendency of Manuel Prado (1956-1962) (which ended with a coup d’état), 
Military Junta of 1962-1963, the first government of constitutional president 
Fernando Belaúnde (1963-1968) (which ended with a coup d’etat), Revolutionary 
Government of the Armed Forces (1968-1980), second government of Belaúnde 
(1980-1985), first government of Alan García (1985-1990), and government of 
Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) (which included a self-coup in 1992 to close the 
congress and create a new Constitution). This historic swing between different 
constitutional and governmental arrangements has inevitably created an equal strain 
on the political and civic values of different sectors of the population. When linked to 
the unstable economic history of the country, particularly of the last four decades, it’s 
possible to make some assumptions regarding the level of citizens’ support for 
democratic governments. As Monzón et al. (1997) find at the beginning of Fujimori’s 
governments, Peruvians were going through a process of alienation from the main 
democratic structures of the State, and it comes to reason that the authoritarian 
practices seen during the decade of the 1990’s (Meléndez and León, 2010) have only 
worsened the chances of democracy spreading its roots in a growingly cynic 
population. In its current state, many Peruvians only support democracy to the same 
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degree that they expect the economy to keep growing under a democratic rule, and not 
due to its inherent political and social benefits. 
 
 At the same time, for most of the 1980’s and 1990’s, democratic governments 
had been increasingly seen as a source of corruption and mismanagement of 
economic affairs. The above mentioned ‘swing’ between democratic and authoritarian 
values, heavily influenced by purely economic motivations, had a central role in the 
1985 presidential campaign; as Quiroz (2008, p. 340) explains: 
 
 “[t]he growing perception of the inadequacy of liberal democracy to solve urgent problems raised the 
stakes in favor of the populist, state-interventionist positions embraced by the young Aprista candidate 
Alan García Pérez who promised honesty and urgent measures to overcome the crisis.” 
 
 The conception of democracy as a mere tool or instrument, and not an end by 
itself, was also recognized to be a major characteristic of the Peruvian public opinion 
in the creation of the Plan Verde, or green plan, a secret project envisioning a 
militaristic intervention (coup d’état) against Garcia’s government that was devised in 
1988 (Quiroz, 2008; Conaghan, 2005). In such documents, which were later obtained 
and made public by an influential magazine in 1993, the citizenry was considered to 
tolerate, if not support, such an intervention due to the increasing disaffection with the 
government caused by the corruption scandals and the economic crisis. Although this 
plan was never fully materialized as originally envisioned, its appropriation by 
Vladimiro Montesinos and later implementation in the form of the self-coup in 1992 
demonstrated that the tenets regarding Peruvian attitudes behind it weren’t mistaken.  
 
 The closure of the Congress in April of 1992 came with the President’s 
discourse regarding the de-legitimization of the Peruvian representative democracy, 
and with a call for a more ‘direct’ way of popular participation. Fujimori blamed the 
current democratic institutions, such as the Congress and the traditional political 
parties, as a source of corruption and overall private interests, a form of corrosive 
institutionalization that was responsible for all the country’s evils (González, 1998). 
As Taylor (2005, p. 568) comments, the “Government of Emergency and National 
Reconstruction” that Fujimori announced, and the programmatic measures (in the 
form of decrees) that were implemented as a result, were broadly supported by 
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Peruvians of all classes; this reaction to the temporary but unconstitutional suspension 
of democratic representativeness could only be possible thanks to the popular 
resentment towards the rampant administrative corruption and the economic handling 
of the previous government, and the perception that most traditional politicians in the 
Congress of 1990 were crooks.  
 
 However, as Schmidt (2000, p. 126) states, “Peruvians have also consistently 
emphasized institutional constraints over vertical accountability” ever since 
Fujimori’s self-coup, which can be interpreted as a popular refusal in the post Cold 
War era to just renounce all forms of democratic control and to give Fujimori absolute 
control. Although Peruvians didn’t seem too interested in actively participating in 
public affairs through the formation of grass-roots organizations (mostly because of 
the delicate economic situation of most of the population during the entire decade), 
they still considered necessary for some institutional order of checks and balances to 
be in place. In other words, people deemed necessary the provision of control and 
channels of accountability in the political system, even if they were willing to 
sacrifice their own political representation for the sake of economic stabilization and 
administrative reform.    
 
 Democracy versus anti-corruption: The 2006 elections 
 The brief exposition of the democratic-authoritarian strains, and their relation 
to economic well-being of the Peruvian society brings us to the presidential election 
of 2006. As it has been mentioned earlier, the candidates who received the bulk of 
votes for the first round election were Ollanta Humala (30.6%) from UPP-PNP, Alan 
García (24.3%) from APRA, and Lourdes Flores (23.8%) from UN. Looking into the 
AmericasBarometer 2006 data, on the other hand, we find that the order of the results 
is replicated with small variances in the distribution of electoral support, this time 
with Humala garnering 36.1%, García 29.1%, and Flores 23.1% of the valid votes; 
what is important to notice here, however, is that in the actual event and in our data 
base, those three candidates combined managed to pull 78.7% and 88.3%, 
respectively. Therefore, it is completely feasible that their relative image as 
democratic or authoritarian leaders might be the main influence responsible for the 
effect found on HCT in this specific data set.  
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 Such reading seems appropriate, indeed, if the relation between democratic 
support and corruption tolerance could be attributed to the number of observations 
that reported to have voted for Humala, on one hand, and for Lourdes Flores or Alan 
García, on the other.  
 
 The reason behind this assumption are the big issues raised during the 2006 
campaign about Humala’s authoritarian tendencies, inspired in his military path and 
his ‘heroic’ uprising in the town of Locumba in October 29, 2000120, and further 
fueled by recurring racial and ultra-nationalist comments of members of his family 
(Montoya, 2009). Flores and García, by contrast, were considered democrats, the 
latter having been an active member of the opposition against the Fujimori regime, 
especially during the last years of the 1990’s, and the former having at least, during 
his 1985-1990 government, “respected the basic rules of the game 121  of the 
[democratic] system and called for new elections at the end of his term” (Masías and 
Segura, 2006, p. 113). These democratic badges weren’t just missing in the case of 
the candidate Ollanta Humala, but serious concerns about the possibility of him 
becoming a Peruvian version of president Hugo Chavez of Venezuela (who 
throughout the presidential campaign voiced his support and sympathy for Humala) 
were becoming common headlines in Lima’s newspapers. For all these reasons, most 
Peruvians identified Humala as being “violent”, “anti-system122”, and “against the big 
capitals” (Masías and Segura, 2006, p. 115). Considering the impressive record that 
the Peruvian economy was showing at that moment, it comes as no surprise that, this 
time, Humala’s authoritarian image wasn’t received with the same open arms as did 
Fujimori’s self-coup or other interventionist offers, as Garcia’s in 1985. 
 
 The preference for liberalism or clean government 
 Made explicit, our argument suggests that pro-democracy Peruvians are 
willing, given the appropriate circumstances, to accept potentially corrupt leaders as 																																																								
120 Caretas, No 1643. ¿Fue en Tierra de Nadie? La Sublevación de Ollanta. November 2, 2000. 
121 Italics are ours. 
122 This common label in Peruvian politics depicts, in general terms, a candidate or politician that 
stands against the current economic model (liberal), that is considered an outsider of the party system, 
and shows lack of respect for basic democratic tenets, such as freedom of press and the division of 
powers (“Un antisistema estará en la segunda vuelta del 2011”, 
http://perueconomico.com/ediciones/39-2009-nov/articulos/454--un-antisistema-estara-en-la-segunda, 
accessed on November 21, 2012).   
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long as they remain respectful of basic democratic institutions and guarantee 
economic stability. This seems to be the case in 2006, when voters who were more 
supportive of democratic rules had to choose between potentially corrupt but liberal 
options (Alan García, and to a lesser degree Lourdes Flores) and an honest but 
potentially authoritarian candidate (Ollanta Humala), and voted for the formers. Not 
surprisingly, then, a Spearman’s rho test shows that higher democratic support 
correlates with individual economic satisfaction (rho=-0.115, p<0.001, obs.=1128), 
another determinant that also has been found to impact in higher levels of HCT. 
Therefore, what we find in the Peruvian case is the instrumentalization of democratic 
rule in line with the tenets of liberal economy, which has been supporting economic 
growth for the past two decades. If democratic rule would fail to support this 
materialistic view of politics, it would be promptly discarded, as indeed occurred in 
1985 and 1992; however, if democracy is partnered with economic growth, even 
when challenged by the prospects of a corrupt government, the levels of HCT will 
tend to rise.  
 
 An intuitive counter-explanation, however, would be that pro-democracy 
Peruvians are somehow more aware of the historical costs of governmental 
corruption, which Quiroz (2008) has shown to be much higher under authoritarian 
regimes than democratic ones: “The historical persistence of systemic corruption was 
intimately tied to an institutional and political tradition of patrimonial and centralizing 
executive power undermining necessary checks and balances.” (Quiroz, 2008, p. 433) 
That would leave us with a clear evidence of democratic support having concrete 
value by itself, and not just as a reflection of economic conditions, as voting for more 
potentially corrupt candidates in the 2006 presidential elections would be in the 
pursue of a democratic government, which in time would be the most efficient result 
in terms of public resources being lost to corrupt activities. However, sadly, there is 
no statistical support for this alternative, as not even the simple Spearman’s rho test 
managed to find statistical significance in the correlation between democratic values 
and political awareness (p=0.934, obs.=1134). 
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 8.8 BETTER ATTITUDES TOWARD HCT RELATE TO HIGHER HCT 
  
 The results of our structural equation model showed, as previously theorized, 
that citizens who hold better attitudes (or less contempt) towards politicians involved 
in high-level corruption are also more inclined to vote for them. Reversed, we can say 
that people that are more critical of such kind of behavior are also less inclined to vote 
for corrupt (or potentially corrupt) candidates.  
 
 As this relation is completely straightforward (much like the relations found in 
the models of LCT), we find no need to contextualize it in Peruvian reality. 
 
 
 8.9. LOWER EXTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY RELATES TO HIGHER HCT         
   
 The last determinant of HCT found by our structural equation model is the 
level of individual political efficacy as denoted by his/her self-reported actions, as 
opposed to measures of internal self-efficacy which mostly describes the individual’s 
attitudes or opinions towards the importance he/she has in the political community, 
and the possibilities to change his/her environment. In this case, while internal 
political efficacy factor did not reach statistical significance, and was hence discarded, 
lower external political efficacy resulted in higher corruption tolerance. This result 
was concretely hypothesized earlier. In the following lines, we will try to put it in 
context, focusing on some incidences or cases that would suggest such kind of non-
efficacious behavior from the part of the Peruvian citizens. 
 
 From a sociological perspective, we find that the individual’s interest in, or 
motivation for, tossing away their vote in favor of a corrupt political leader derive 
from the persistence of patron-client relationships in the Peruvian political culture, but 
follows a more passive logic: While the client is actively looking for some kind of 
benefit that may be produced from the selling of his electoral right, the political 
inefficacious seems to be holding his end of the bargain just for the feeling of security 
or the necessary space that gives him. This space will be the minimum conditions 
over which the individual can function for his/her own interests. In this way, political 
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inefficacy conveys the idea of dependency, which is not necessarily related to the idea 
of convenience as clientelism is. Portocarrero (2005, pp. 222-223) explains: 
 
“123On the other side, lying can be a defense mechanism for the dominated, incapable of saying the 
(whole) truth when in front of the of the patron. Inhibited, afraid, it’s not possible for them to be openly 
faithful to their own wishes. The deception124 is a ‘ruse’, is to stay sideways, next to the master, not in 
front of him, so as to preserve a space of autonomy…. [T]here is everything: Masters, slaves, citizens. 
This figure even inhabits our own personal microcosms. In that labyrinth of positions, the first thing to 
get lost is the sincerity. Cautiously, people don’t say no, they prefer the ‘mecida’”125. 
 
 The meaning of Portocarrero’s description of the Peruvian political cosmos is 
straightforward: People that are citizens only in paper, but not in reality, develop a 
strategy to deal with the perceived authority that involves faking support, granting in 
that way the act of voting as a mere formality. Portocarrero (2005, p. 227) concludes: 
“[I]n Peru we are used to authoritarian models; we are looking for an Inca, or a good 
patron, or to be protected”; such is the reason why citizens may surrender their vote to 
corrupt politicians if they feel in such a subordinate and weak position. 
 
 Political subjects during Fujimori’s regime 
 In Peru, as has been explained before, there are many known cases of 
politically-driven allocation of public funds and resources to both reward 
geographical areas with high concentration of partisans, and punish areas that have 
been unfavorable to the leader during elections. One example presented earlier was 
that of the FONCODES (Schady, 2000), during Fujimori’s government. However, as 
opposed to cases of clientelism or community-oriented support, what we are looking 
for here is the presence of governmental intimidation and other more aggressive 
tactics that may explode the vulnerability and the lack of political empowerment of 
the citizens. Again, the Fujimori regime provides with some textbook examples. 
 
 Taylor (2000) informs about some forms of intimidation of voters practiced by 
public officials under the instructions of members of the government, during the 
campaign for Fujimori’s re-reelection of 2000. One of such was the threatening of 																																																								
123 Translated from Spanish. 
124 Italics are ours. 
125 Italics are ours. Mecida is a Peruvian slang that means ‘taking for a fool’. 
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vulnerable voters by officials of the Food Aid National Program (PRONAA), who 
continuously warned beneficiaries that the program would come to a stop if Fujimori 
weren’t to be reelected; additionally, poor part-timers working for the program were 
forced to distribute public propaganda. The same use of State employees was 
enforced in the National Project for Water and Soil Conservation (PRONAMACHS). 
Taylor (2000, p. 401) also reproduces the comments of a poor peasant regarding these 
“extortions” from officials of social programs: “The governor told us that us that we 
must vote for Fujimori, otherwise food and other assistance would stop. Many people 
were afraid”. To be sure, all these events depict the occurrence of intimidation from 
the part of the powerful over the weak; the difference between them and cases of 
clientelism is the same that applies to cases of extortive and collusive bribery. 
Politically inefficacious citizens are not to be considered looking to exchange their 
vote for some material benefit, but to surrender it as a way to show the ‘master’ that 
they are willing to play along, that they don’t deserve to be punished. 
 
 A legacy of the internal conflict between the military and the subversive 
guerrillas that extended from the 1980’s until the mid-1990’s, was the sense of 
vulnerability of rural and impoverished citizens that were systematically repressed 
and victimized by both conflicting sides. That complete disempowerment was shown 
to play a role in the vote for Fujimori in the presidential elections of 1995 and 2000  
(Schmidt, 2000, 2002; Taylor, 2000), when electoral watchdogs raised fears involving 
the direct or indirect influence of the military presence in many rural areas. In any 
case, as was commented before, there has always been reason for poor peasants to 
fear that their vote is no really as secret as the law states, and that even if they are not 
individually pointed as presenting opposition, the community as a whole could be 
punished for showing low electoral support for the leader.  
 
 When the citizenry develops this kind of feelings regarding their own role in 
the State, and they behave accordingly to those fears and sense of self-inefficacy, then 
it logically follows that corrupt politicians can’t be punished for their misdeeds, even 
electorally, as doing so would endanger the reproduction of material conditions 
necessary for survival. More than a discussion about the actual governmental 
capabilities to retaliate opposition voters, what it’s at stake is the construction of 
Peruvians’ self-image as political actors, and not just political subjects.  
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 8.10. SUMMARY 
  
 We found that more informed and politically sophisticated Peruvians are, 
against our expectations, more tolerant of HLC, probably due to the influence of 
historically biased media, and the corrupting interaction between a colonial mindset 
that favors the ability to generate rents and power without regards for ethical 
constraints, on one hand, and the extended cynicism among educated citizens as a 
result of the common exposure to corruption scandals, on the other. They also tend to 
absolve electorally dishonest leaders by putting first partisan values, constraining their 
rightful exercise of vertical accountability and leaving the problem for institutional 
actors to handle. The same appears to happen with the more economically satisfied 
members of society, only seem to worry about the damaging effects of corruption to 
its full extent when the economy starts declining. Hence, material conditions are a key 
condition through which Peruvians analyze the legitimacy of the ruling elites, much to 
our worry. 
 
 A reduction in the individual’s perception of HLC as a generalized 
phenomenon, covering virtually the entirety of the political system, and his/her 
appraisal of the community he/she lives in, translated in the amount of effort he/she is 
willing to exert to support it, have also been found to be two determinants empirically 
related to higher levels of HCT. The first describes the Peruvian cycles of corruption, 
characterized by a constant increment in the spread of corrupt activities until a tipping 
point, after which the cycle restarts with low levels of malfeasance just to go 
eventually back up. This aspect of Peruvian reality is sadly consistent with the 
accounts of Quiroz (2008) and Durand (2005). HCT also follow those cycles, and 
reacts to few cases of graft with high tolerance, moving in the opposite direction as 
corruption spreads to all political quarters. Such movement denotes the commonly 
acknowledged Latin American tendency to peacefully coexist with ‘acceptable’ levels 
of corruption, only denouncing it and adopting an active opposition when the situation 
becomes intolerable. Indeed, Peruvians worry more about the future of their 
communities than the future of corrupt politicians. Although not exactly reflecting 
clientelistic tendencies (another variable that did not reach statistical significance), 
this second result evidences the level of dependency of many rural and impoverished 
communities on governmental assistance, and the traditional reliance on a politically 
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paternalistic figure to which offer their support in exchange for protection; in sum, the 
selling of political rights for local development.  
 
 As many young and/or not fully developed democracies, many Peruvians still 
cherish the military regimes of the past through an almost romantic and skewed 
memory of the economic and social conditions. This difficulty in the construction of 
democratic institutions has not been eased by the rampant corruption and economic 
crisis experienced (and allowed) by constitutional regimes in the past decades, to the 
point that against all odds, democracy and malfeasance goes hand by hand in the 
minds of a big part of the citizenry. This perception, however, has a very real 
reflection on reality, as pro-democracy citizens are found to be willing to support 
potentially corrupt leaders as long as they secure the stability of the system, whereas 
others would sacrifice their political participation for the punishment of wrongdoings.  
 
 The last two factors that were found to increase the level of HCT among 
Peruvians were, not surprisingly, their attitudes toward the phenomenon, and a low 
exercise of political efficacy. Very much like their prioritization of the local 
community, citizens that do not express any sense of political power seem to be 
willing to toss away their votes to keep the favor of their leaders, as they may 
perceive that doing otherwise would be a futile effort either way. Therefore, looking 
for the causes of the spread of HLC in Peru, we would need no more than to look for 
those individuals who feel alienated from the polity to understand that, in Peru, it 
might well be the case that there are as many subjects as there are citizens. The 
consequences follow naturally: As Sánchez (2010, p. 13) states, “it’s impossible to 
fight corruption effectively without the participation [of the private sector].” 
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CHAPTER 9 
DETERMINANTS OF LOW-LEVEL CORRUPTION TOLERANCE 
IN PERUVIAN CONTEXT 
 
 
 In the previous chapter we have engaged in a historical approach to the 
interpretation of quantified relations between various economical and political 
variables, and HCT. In the present chapter we adopt the same strategy with respect to 
low-level corruption tolerance (LCT). The multiple correlations performed in Chapter 
7 showed that people who don’t support their community by economic means, and 
also those who are more political satisfied, tend to engage less in collusive bribery. 
On the other hand, perceiving that most other people accepts to pay an extorted bribe 
(in order to gain access to a service which they are legally entitled to), and regarding 
administrative complaint mechanisms as mostly ineffective, cause the citizen to be 
tolerant of extortive corruption. 
 
 Most of these results were expected based in the hypothesized relations 
suggested (or empirically demonstrated) by previous literature, and due to the 
inherent logic of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) described in the discussion of 
the LCT’s theoretical framework, there is no real need to contextualize the statistical 
results as it was for the case of the determinants of HCT. Indeed, most of the relations 
described above are by themselves self-explanatory. However, a quick review of the 
meaning behind them will still be undertaken, trying to reflect the patterns of 
Peruvian micro-political behavior that may have bigger (and more complex) 
consequences than that of LCT. 
 
 
 9.1. LESS ECONOMIC SUPPORT TO THE COMMUNITY RELATES TO LOWER LCT-
DEVIANT 
  
 Operationalization issues and interpretation 
 The present study has made a case for the employment of proxy variables to 
measure the basic determinants behind attitudes, subjective norm, and PBC, based on 
corresponding scholarly production on the topic. Fishbein and Ajzen (2010) have 
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explained that, although this approach should not be considered the most appropriate 
for the task (indeed, they advice to rely on individual salient beliefs, p. 100), there are 
many instances of research involving the use of the TPB that rely on beliefs’ selection 
as “collected from the literature” (p. 109). In the present study, we stretched the 
model to include the employment of proxies; however, the interpretation of the results 
of the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient tests must keep in mind the specific 
survey questions used as indicators. Such is the case of ‘economic support to the 
community’, which was one of the two indicators that were set in place in the effort to 
capture the individual’s opinion about collusive bribes being more economically 
convenient. The reason behind it has been described earlier: To recount, people who 
believe that a bribe represents a more convenient solution to a problem in economic 
terms, will hold improved attitudes towards that behavior. To measure this 
perspective, we needed to consider the belief that bribes have indeed such a 
convenient result, and that such a result is considered important or valuable. As the 
first belief is rather obvious by itself126, we focused on the second one, and applied a 
logic connection where the importance of saving time and/or money will naturally 
have priority for more materialistic and self-interested individuals127. Two questions 
in the LAPOP database offered that information, one of which being “having donated 
time or money to address a problem in the community”. Our reasoning was that, 
people who hold time/money as very precious, even to the point to resort to 
corruption for it, would be less inclined to donate it. If that were the case, then it 
would naturally follow that individuals who don’t collaborate on the solution of their 
community’s problems, would also tend to engage more in collusive bribery. 
 
 However, the Spearman’s rho coefficient showed that the actual relation 
between both variables was of the opposite sign as expected, implying that our 
hypothesized argument was wrong: In reality, self-centered citizens engaged less in 
corrupt deals than their more community-oriented counterparts.  
 
																																																								
126 Collusive bribes, by definition, are transactions inspired in some material benefit for both actors 
involved, with a subsequent lose for society as a whole. 
127 Although a material benefit would be considered generally desirable, the actual importance of such 
benefit will be relative to the specific individual in question. 
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 The first intuitive explanation that can be suggested to interpret this odd result 
points to an important presence of people who may not be willing (or capable) to 
spend additional money to solve (or to facilitate the solution of) problems, either 
communal or their own. On the opposite side, people who are economically capable 
of supporting their community would also be capable to engage in corruption. 
However, this explanation seems too blunt, and would still leave reasonable doubt 
regarding the association between giving money to the community and paying bribes, 
if for no other reason than to be able to afford it.  
 
 Corporative ethics and the rise of the modern citizen 
 Trying to find another feasible explanation more embedded in cultural traits, 
we find that, possibly in the same logical structure as in the case of HCT, Peruvians 
manifest what Sánchez (2010, p. 2) has called “corporative ethics”, which would be a 
behavioral pattern deeply rooted in they cultural legacy. This ethical characteristic, 
Sánchez explains, would demand people to benefit first the family, and then, 
progressively up, the clan, the community, the party, etc., from the close, 
homogeneous circles, to the more distant ones. In consequence, therefore, such 
corporative ethics mandate to benefit the State at large as a last condition, after the 
duties to the direct associates are fulfilled. If that is the case, then, it’s understandable 
why individuals who support their community will have no repairs in engaging in 
bribery to obtain some private benefit; and, if they do not manifest the same pattern of 
social norms, they will be less inclined to favor either their community (through the 
investment of private material resources) or themselves (through their participation in 
illegal transactions). 
 
 What this line of argument seems to suggest is a kind of departure from the 
traditional cultural legacy depicted by Sánchez (2010), by which Peruvians would be 
showing a break from a previous self-image as members of a close community, and 
the development of a citizenship fully aware of their role and that of the State’s. In 
other words, a deeper interpretation of the statistical relation between economic 
support to the community, and collusive bribery, would indicate a tendency to clearly 
differentiate the public from the private sphere, an improvement over a common 
problem in most developing countries. If the individual considers him/herself a 
citizen, a political member of the society by own rights, then the responsibility for the 
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solution of communities’ problems clearly rests in the State and its institutions, and 
the citizen may see that his/her action should be aimed at influencing policy making 
and implementation (through administrative and legal channels) instead of personally 
undertaking the task of solving them. Such is the reading of the Peruvian reality that 
Catalina Romero (2007, p. 103) makes when she states that “the exercise of power 
relations don’t fully become depersonalized” 128  across different socio-economic 
levels, which is the reason why many Peruvians migrate to more advanced countries 
in the pursue of a role not tied to kinship or friendship.  
 
 A partial statistical test of this assumption, however, is not possible at the 
time, due to the limitations and serious concerns raised regarding the propriety of our 
clientelism variable. 
 
 Alternative explanation: Back to economics 
 A competing interpretation of the relation between the variables under 
consideration, could suggest that people who economically support their community 
might belong to a lower economic strata, hence being more prone to choose collusive 
bribery as an economically efficient solution; however, not only the latter proposition 
has been proved to be invalid (having no economic alternative didn’t correlate with 
engagement in collusive bribery), but the indicator of economic support to the 
community correlates with both household income (rho=-0.154, p<0.001, obs.=543) 
and household economic satisfaction (rho=0.149, p<0.001, obs.=570), indicating that 
people who don’t support their community are actually the ones of lower economic 
strata. This leads us, finally, back to our original an intuitively naive interpretation: 
People who don’t have the material resources to contribute, can’t afford to bribe 
either. 
 
 
 9.2. MORE POLITICAL SATISFACTION RELATES TO LOWER LCT-DEVIANT  
  
 Moving on to more familiar grounds, it’s rather easy to understand the reason 
behind the statistical relation between the citizen’s political satisfaction and his/her 																																																								
128 Translated from Spanish. 
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behavior when interacting with representatives of the government. As was addressed 
in Chapter 5, a process of delegitimization of state institutions and political bodies 
naturally translates in a change of the ways people interact with them. Talking 
specifically about petty (or low-level) corruption, from an economical perspective is 
understandable to find individuals resorting to bribery a last channel for getting from 
the State what is perceived as rightfully theirs (Karklins, 2005), or from game theory 
to appreciate the logic behind people’s decision to stop complying with rules and 
regulations (Bergman, 2009). But, how does the delegitimization of Peruvian political 
institutions affect citizens’ behavior? 
 
 The idea of popular disenchantment with political leaders and the regimes and 
institutions that support them, as has been addressed earlier for some determinants of 
HCT, and the consequent erosion of healthy citizenship, is nothing new (nor specific) 
to the study of corruption. Portocarrero (2005) notices the gradual reduction of tax 
collection and institutionalization as an aftermath of Fujimori’s fall and subsequent 
unveiled of the systemic corruption inside (among many other institutions) the 
National Superintendent’s Office of Customs and Tax Administration (SUNAT), 
stating that “129the fact of not paying taxes has become legitimized” (Portocarrero, 
2005, p. 220) among Peruvians. Quiroz (2008, p. 340) makes the same kind of 
connection regarding the process of popular alienation from democratic institutions 
following a spread of corrupt practices in both public offices and “daily life”. In these 
cases we see the inverted direction from the one found in Chapter 7: The link from 
corruption to a declining perception of regime legitimacy (a classic thesis from 
Seligson, 2002).  
 
 But the reality of life under a democratic regime (and any other kind of 
regime, for that matter) in Peru is that individuals heavily resort to their feelings and 
understanding regarding the legitimacy of the State and the government, when having 
to interact with bureaucratic officials and choosing appropriate strategies. As the 
intermediation of civic associations and popular organizations have diminished over 
the decades of the 80’s and 90’s (for various reasons that are not the subject of the 
present study), and at the same time the democratic engineering has imposed multiple 																																																								
129 Translated from Spanish. 
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(but legally impervious) institutional actors standing between the people and the 
leaders, many Peruvians have got no other choice than to resort to personal relations 
to obtain the benefits they deem legitimate from the State (Romero, 2007), the same 
kind of relations that foster collusive bribery. 
 
 In this way, either as an emotional reaction to the perceived illegitimacy of the 
State, the regime or its representatives, or as a strategic behavior aimed at negotiating 
scarce and necessary public resources, Peruvians are found to rely on collusive 
bribery in their interactions with unresponsive bureaucrats.    
 
 
 9.3. PERCEIVED NORMS RELATE TO LCT-COMPLIANT 
  
 The relation between the individual’s perception regarding the actions and 
behavior of others, and his/her own actions and behavior, is a rather straightforward 
one. Although the same connection didn’t reach statistical significance in the case of 
collusive bribery, when turning to extortion the Spearman’s rho test found that, as 
hypothesized, Peruvians tend to emulate the socially accepted reaction when 
confronted with a scenario of extortion130.  
 
 Due to the possibility of such a transparent interpretation, and the otherwise 
current lack of Peruvian (or Peruvian-centered) scholarly literature on the subject, we 
find no reason to go any deeper in the contextualization of this determinant for the 
Peruvian case.    
 
  
 9.4. MORE EFFECTIVE MECHANISMS OF COMPLAINT RELATES TO LOWER LCT-
COMPLIANT 
  
 The final determinant of LCT, specifically for cases involving extortion, is the 
individual’s perception of the effectiveness of redress channels and/or complaint 
mechanisms. When the citizen’s access to lawful services is refused, either directly or 																																																								130	Although the variable coded EXC7 in the LAPOP data cannot be interpreted as a direct question 
about extortion, an argument was presented supporting its usage in such way.	
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by harassment strategies, many considerations can pass through his/her mind; all 
these were included earlier in our model of LCT-compliant. Here we will discuss the 
importance of legal securities behind his/her decision over surrendering or refusing to 
pay an extorted bribe. 
 
 The state of Peruvian complaint mechanisms 
 Described by the Peruvian official response to the questionnaire of the second 
round of analysis of the Follow-Up Mechanism for the Implementation of the Inter-
American Convention Against Corruption (MESICIC), by 2006 there weren’t in place 
any substantial mechanisms to help and protect whistleblowers131; aside from formal 
redress venues, there wasn’t any specific policy regarding the implementation of user-
friendly practices for such cases, and there was yet no legislation contemplating actual 
measures to protect citizens from reprisals. Probably for this reason, the general 
perception among the Peruvian citizenry was that, against corrupt officials and their 
cronies, there was nothing much to do. Ford (2003, p. 200) reports the results of the 
First National Survey About Corruption and Governability conducted by Apoyo, 
opinión y Mercado in 2002, where 58% of the subjects reported not having 
denounced an act of bribery132 due to the beliefs that the guilty parties wouldn’t be 
punished, there was no way of proving it, and the procedures were too complex. Such 
amount of people sharing the same opinion regarding the effectiveness and worthiness 
of relying in redress mechanisms describes in a blunt way the state of the art of 
Peruvian anti-corruption reforms in 2002. Four years later, whatever the institutional 
changes undertaken by the government were, the public perception of their capability 
to refuse to surrender an extorted bribe hadn’t got much better. In the Fourth National 
Survey Corruption 2006 developed by Proética and Apoyo, 44% of subjects reported 
not having denounced bribery due to the beliefs that the guilty parties wouldn’t be 
punished and that there was no way of proving it (Proética, 2007, p. 125).  
 
 Citizens’ legal analphabetism 
 Such sense of vulnerability against corrupt officials is, hence, widespread 
among the Peruvian population, having its worth impact on people of scarce resources 																																																								
131 http://www.oas.org/juridico/spanish/mesicic2_per_sp.htm 
132 Unfortunately, the Apoyo, Opinión y Mercado data didn’t differentiate between cases of collusion 
and extortion, rendering their results of limited support to our study. 
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(U4, 2008, p. 3). As Armando Guevara (2006, p. 10) posits, the deep economic and 
symbolic inequalities cutting across so many different social and geographic groups in 
Peru, “prevent the universal validity of the official law and generates its social 
illegitimacy.” In other words, the economic reality of part of the population (which 
creates a situation where these are more subjects than citizens) translates into a state 
of legal ‘analphabetism’ or overall pessimism, and could be the origin behind their 
tendency to surrender when extorted. Such hypothesized relation is statistical 
significant, indeed, showing that the perception of effective complaint mechanisms 
correlates well with income (rho=0.272, p=0.085, obs.=41) and one measure of 
economic satisfaction133 (q10d [rho=-0.48, p<0.01, obs.=41]), therefore indicating 
that the capacity to denounce an extortion may be hindered by the individual’s 
economic status. On the other hand, perceptions of effective complaint mechanisms 
failed to correlate with either the level of education, or the rural-urban environment. 
 
 For the effects of our discussion over LCT-compliant, it implies that any anti-
corruption reform that stays in the legislative and regulatory part of the production, 
without implementing effective and economical mechanisms allowing citizens the 
complete exercise of their rights (in this case, the right to refuse a bribe and to 
denounce the offender), is doomed to have limited results. It also highlights, lastly, 
the heterogeneous reality of the Peruvian population (for not using the denomination 
of ‘citizens’) and the importance of a consequent and responsible policy formulation 
to address the issues behind their legal analphabetism, in order to bring down the 
scourge of corruption.  
 
 
 9.5. SUMMARY 
 
 The study of low-level corruption tolerance (LCT) among Peruvians found 
that they willingly engage more in bribery when they show stronger ties to their 
communities in terms of financial investment in the solution of collective problems, 
suggesting a potential division between the trends of political culture among different 
sectors of society, from a traditional one that envisages close ties as the means for 																																																								
133 In an ordered logistic regression of all the variables contained in the paragraph, only Q10D showed 
a statistically significant coefficient (-1.905; Z=-2.38; obs.=41). 
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social wellbeing, to a more ‘modern’ and liberal that constructs the image of the 
citizen as a member of a wider collectivity with impersonal ties to his/her means of  
welfare. This interpretation, however, should be taken with caution, as further 
statistical analysis would be needed to corroborate our assumptions.  
 
 As expected, Peruvian citizens also showed to be influenced by the political 
environment in their decision to bribe, tending to engage more in LLC when they felt 
less satisfied with their local and national representatives, and the way in which the 
system was working. Since democracy was recovered in 1980, after more than a 
decade of military regime, it has spawned a variety of economic and political rights 
(although in a non-linear evolution) that often seem to clash with the material reality 
of formal institutions, and the actual performance of legal mechanisms. Because of 
such distance between the public and the leaders, brought by the complex structure of 
democratic rule and the undelivered benefits of electing national representatives that 
fail to solve the most urgent problems of society, Peruvians find bribery as an 
acceptable alternative strategy to fulfill their necessities.  
 
 Finally, they were more inclined to surrender a bribe when extorted if they 
thought that others were also reacting in the same way, but were able to defend their 
rights and refuse to be extorted when effective complaint mechanisms were available. 
However, the conditions in the country are far from ideal, and vast sectors of the 
population remain in a constant state of legal ‘analphabetism’, which is partly a 
consequence of the level of economic inequality, and the limited access to effective 
bureaucratic services in many regions of the country. The real capacity to exercise 
their rights, therefore, stands between the citizens and their possibility to reject 
extortion.  
 
 These findings suggest that Peruvians show tolerance to low-level corruption 
as a result of the socio-political environment, where their behavior is determined by 
the conditions of those contact points between the private and public spheres. 
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CHAPTER 10 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 There is no such thing as ‘the end of the road’ in the phenomenon of 
corruption. Whenever graft and malfeasance become widespread in a society, to the 
point where scholars and journalist may call it systemic, there is an increment of an 
opposite force in society, one characterized by honesty and transparency championed 
by a variety of actors, that applies stress to the political system in search for change. 
This counter-effort does, however, hide a complexity that involves more materialistic 
and cynic interests than the ones publicly hold. Because the political discourse doesn’t 
perfectly mirror (or sometimes even approach) the drives behind political actors, a 
more effective and efficient look into the problematic of corruption in any given 
society might come from the understanding of the level and patterns of corruption 
tolerance among the various societal actors. The present study has tried to address 
such concept in the case of the citizenry, unraveling some surprising results that 
usually avoid the common intuition of policy makers in Peru. 
 
 There are no corrupt periods alternating honest ones, nor governments or 
generations. Corruption is always a problem of degree, a state of equilibrium between 
factual circumstances and civic virtues that gives a particular polity its characteristics. 
This is true for Peru as for any other country. What changes, due to governmental 
intervention, public experience, or international pressure, is the amount of corruption 
that is accepted under certain conditions, and as those are in continuous change, so is 
the level of corruption tolerance. Hence, a comprehensive analysis of its singularities 
may in fact shade the necessary light to stop aimlessly drifting from one corruption 
cycle to the other, with no more understanding of their reasons but anecdotic recounts 
and popular decries for reform.  
 
 Corruption tolerance, as we saw in Chapter 2, can be defined as the citizens’ 
behavioral adherence to condone the corrupt behavior of a political actor, in cases of 
high-level corruption (HLC), and as the citizens’ bribery of a public official to gain 
access to some lawful or unlawful service or benefit, for cases of low-level extortion 
(LLC-compliant) and collusion (LLC-deviant), respectively. From these definitions 
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two important things become apparent. First, an individual’s tolerance can be 
disaggregated in exactly the same way as corruption, based on the assumption that 
different types of malfeasance have heterogeneous outcomes for him/her, and 
naturally, such results would consequently induce different attitudinal and (possibly) 
behavioral patterns in the citizen. Second, they present an argument for the 
operationalization of corruption tolerance as a specific behavior, departing from 
previous emphasis in the person’s attitudes or perception. This decision, besides being 
theoretically appropriate, highlights the importance of a behavioral intervention on 
society as the main result of any sound study regarding corruption. As Robert 
Klitgaard (1988) would probably agree, it makes no sense to research a social 
problem if there is no intention to directly or indirectly support some kind of policy 
implementation or State intervention in pursue of its solution and eradication. What 
have an impact on the level and practices of corruption are not the public attitudes 
towards it, but how these manifest in actual practices of social, economic, and 
political interaction. To be clear, we are not trying to say that the study of attitudes 
towards corruption is not important, but rather that it can be conceived only as a 
proxy for the citizens’ behavior, assuming that in fact both dimensions are empirically 
congruent. Unfortunately, this transition from opinions to actions does not appear to 
be one of Peruvians’ qualities.  
 
 Antonio Zapata (2005, p. 268) describes Peru as a society deeply marked by 
an inner contradiction between corrupt and honest tendencies, a reading that is also 
made by Quiroz (2008). Although most Peruvians would proclaim to reject the basic 
tenets of corruption, particularly governmental one, they continue to elect leaders with 
a long history of public misconduct and graft, and routinely engage in petty 
corruption themselves, either at will or by force. Such incidence of malfeasance 
throughout society cannot be explained only by reference to politicians and 
bureaucrats, or to entrepreneurs and institutional private actors. Average citizens are 
deeply engrained in the reproduction and sustain of corruption, though they may 
choose to turn a blind eye to the fact, and for that reason we would need to look no 
further than at society itself to find the reasons for the spread of the problem in the 
country. However, such exercise could only take us so far, requiring from us, as a 
next step, to elucidate the reasons and determinants behind such tolerance of corrupt 
acts. This task was undertaken in the second half of this study. 
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 The statistical results of the Structural Equation Modeling performed in 
Chapters 6 showed that a higher exposition to casual and official information; more 
political awareness, partisan involvement, and economic satisfaction; people who are 
more community-oriented and those who hold democracy in higher esteem; and better 
attitudes toward the phenomenon of HLC, all relate to higher levels of HCT. On the 
other hand, a higher perception that HLC is generalized, and higher external political 
efficacy, relate to lower levels of HCT. 
 
 In the case of LCT, the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients obtained in 
Chapter 7 showed that more economic support for the community, and less political 
satisfaction, relate to a higher tolerance of collusion, while a lower trust in the 
effectiveness of complaint mechanisms, and the perception that other citizens are 
tolerating LLC, relate to a more compliant behavior towards extortion.  
 
 Some of these results highlight the necessity to resort to historic, economic, 
sociological, and anthropological accounts of Peruvian reality in order to fully 
understand the meaning of our statistical results. In other words, a multidisciplinary 
approach is required to interpret the emergence of such relations in the Peruvian 
context. This effort was undertaken in Chapters 8 and 9, producing a detailed and 
final description of the situation of corruption tolerance in the country, where we were 
able to identify the specific circumstances surrounding all and each one of the 
statistically significant variables, shedding light over an otherwise dark and confusing 
set of relations.  
 
 Although ‘explanatory’ and ‘descriptive’ are two terms that may come to mind 
when talking about the kind of analyses performed in Chapters 6 and 7, and in 
Chapters 8 and 9, respectively, such distinction may be inappropriate in this study. 
Due to its cross-sectional design, it is not possible to grant ‘causality’, but only 
relation, between the variables considered here; while we may be able to explain the 
occurrence of corruption tolerance in Peru in 2006 by reference to the variables found 
statically significant during the analysis, there is no way to know if the same variables 
cause the phenomenon over time. For this reason, we consider that the reliance on 
purely statistical measures, first, and the later resort to a more ethnographic and 
holistic approach, must be considered the main difference between the chapters of 
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Part 2, a strategy that was considered to be crucial in understanding the complex 
phenomenon of corruption tolerance as expressed by Peruvian citizens. 
 
 Policy considerations 
 The emphasis given in this study to the behavior of the citizenry parts from a 
traditional focus on institutional actors such as the bureaucracy and economic agents. 
Although not ignoring the importance of the latter (as showed by their inclusion in the 
model of HCT), we posited that a citizen-driven explanation of the spread of 
corruption in a society represents as much as half of the potential success of any 
national reform, to which policy makers should pay as much attention as that given to 
legal and/or organizational strategies. Rasma Karklins (2005, p. 97) subscribes to 
such opinion: 
 
“A polity can be made more honest by institutional structures and procedures. Yet [formal] institutions 
alone cannot safeguard good politics: that also requires public spiritedness and commitment to the 
public good… Even the best rules can be circumvented, and thus a non-corrupt polity relies most of all 
on the quality of the behavior of its citizens and their representatives134.”  
 
 Having identified the determinants of Peruvian HCT and LCT, a crucial 
question rises as a consequence: What would be the best strategy to reduce the 
citizens’ tolerance to malfeasance, and to materialize that honesty to which most of 
the population expresses preference? Some of the findings, indeed, may suggest a 
road to achieve better levels of civic spiritedness through carefully targeted behavioral 
interventions in the areas we have found to be statistically related to corruption 
tolerance. However, would an effort to control corruption be always the most efficient 
activity? Regarding bureaucracy, Klitgaard (1988, p. 24) develops the idea of 
“optimal level of corruption”, positing that, given the required resources to control 
public misconduct and the estimated benefits of that effort, the optimal level “is not 
zero”. His logic calls attention to the actual benefits that may be expected from the 
hypothetical eradication of corruption, and the means adopted and material resources 
spent to reach that goal: “[P]olicies to crack down on corruption  have costs in terms 
of the organization’s effective performance of its primary mission” (Klitggard, 1988, 
p. 195). If we consider it as a trade, as Klitgaard suggests, a society’s anti-corruption 																																																								
134 Italics are ours. 
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drive should extent to the degree that corruption itself is pervasive and its 
consequences distorting. And the same idea may be applied to the reduction of 
corruption tolerance in a realistic perspective. The results obtained in the present 
study should be understood as a description of the state of HCT and LCT in Peru, and 
not a set of policy recommendation ready for implementation. Without a doubt, 
nobody would agree with the idea that the reduction of corruption tolerance should be 
undertaken at the cost of reducing media exposition and political awareness; that, 
certainly, would have equal or worst consequences than political graft. Nor 
democratic values should be attacked in order to obtain support for more honest 
candidates for office. Whether we agree with her or not, Catalina Romero (2007) 
highlights the importance of Alan García’s success in the Peruvian presidential 
elections of 2006 as the victory of “135the politician against the outsider, and this 
could be the first indicator of a promising democratic scenario” (p. 92), 
notwithstanding García’s long history of involvement in corruption scandals from his 
first government, against the fierce anti-corruption campaign wielded by his main 
opponent Ollanta Humala. Certainly, her position continues with the rhetoric of 
democracy as the most valuable political asset in society, by and for itself, even at the 
cost of HLC. With no intention to engage in such debate, we only suggest that an 
effort to reduce corruption tolerance among the citizenry may not be worth the 
rejection of democratic values for most of Peruvians.  
 
 A better approach, hence, would be to disconnect the relation between 
democratic support and corruption tolerance, via institutional reforms; and the same 
would partially apply to the impact of skewed and sensationalist information. Either 
through the implementation of behavioral interventions in line with the identified 
factors (as in the case of political efficacy), or by correcting some of the dynamics 
that cause the undesired effect (such as the relation between economic satisfaction 
and HCT), most of the recommendations would fall into the grounds of carefully 
engineered institutional reforms. However, here we want to briefly comment on one 
area that is usually portrayed as being fundamental in an anti-corruption (AC) effort, 
aiming directly at the citizens’ perception and attitudes towards corruption: The role 
of public education. 																																																								
135 Translated from Spanish. 
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 Taylor (2009, p. 166), arguing that “public support matters” for AC, describes 
the situation of popular understanding of corruption in Brazil:  
 
“There are also a number of ways in which whistleblowing is encouraged by various bureaucracies 
such as the Contraloria Geral da União, at least at the federal level. But there have been few broader 
efforts to educate the public at large about the pernicious effects of corruption and to enlist public 
support in fighting it. Instead, the emphasis on investigation and the absence of any perceived sanctions 
against corrupt acts tends to contribute to apathy.” 
 
 The same warning can be made for Peru. As Ortiz and Calderón (2005, pp. 
133-134) caution, the outcome of institutional and legal changes depends on the 
cultural codes of conduct and the perceived benefits of those reforms. Without proper 
communication between the social and political actors, and a learning process aiming 
to equate the legal and social realities, what Michael Reisman (1979, Chapter 1) 
dubbed the operational code and the myth system, respectively, the best policy 
intentions have very little possibilities of success. Education, with that objective, 
entails “raising awareness and providing foundations to the community (children, 
adults, public sector, private sector, foreigners) about the phenomenon of corruption, 
securing their support in the fight against this scourge” (Sanchez, 2010, p. 13). 
Following our argument, Sanchez (2010, p. 13) proposes a “virtuous circle” 
composed by deterrence, prevention, and education. We couldn't agree more. 
 
 Future venues of research 
 As we mentioned earlier, the concept of corruption tolerance describes the 
amount of graft and malfeasance that is accepted in a society under certain conditions, 
all of which can be purposively manipulated or altered by international pressure, 
governmental intervention, and public experience. This is true for the case of the 
unorganized civil society, as for any other societal actor such as the bureaucracy, 
political leaders, entrepreneurs, non-governmental organizations, etc., that may be 
considered a stakeholder in a given country. The vertical accountability model 
developed for HCT partially describes such shared responsibility by describing the 
existence of high-level corruption as a function of both formal institutions and the 
citizens’ corruption tolerance; however, it is predictable that the failure of anyone of 
them to control malfeasance might be compensated by the inclusion of other 
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influential actors into the model (in a process that would be similar to the description 
of the elements behind the level of low-level corruption), moving beyond the 
tolerance towards the phenomenon as emphasized in the present study. In sum, 
although the citizenry needs to be considered a key actor, it is by no means the only 
one, and future research on the subject needs to contemplate the possibility of 
depicting a complete picture of the dynamics of national corruption. 
 
 As a societal actor, then, the citizens’ actions and motivations are susceptible 
to governmental intervention and naturally-evolving public experience; the former is 
usually addressed in most applied research on corruption, and the second can only be 
recounted (and sometimes predicted) from a historic analysis. However, the 
international community is an added actor that just recently has started to emerge in 
the national-level efforts to control corruption. This ‘environmental actor’, external to 
the national polity, has deepened its influence over the course of the past two decades 
on the extent and implementation of anti-corruption policies and regulations adopted 
in many countries around the world (Wei and Zhang, 2010; ACCI, 2007), particularly 
through the works of International Organizations in the creation of such legal 
mechanisms as the United Nations’ Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and 
many other treaties and platforms allowing the subscribing parties to publicly declare 
their commitment to fight corruption on specific areas, and to take the necessary steps 
to implement the policy consequences of such legal instruments. Thus, the citizenry 
now have the added pressure of the international community, an element that will 
play in the future as much a role as the national government in shaping the level of 
corruption tolerance of individual citizens and all other stakeholders vulnerable 
(directly or indirectly) to foreign pressure. That is the final element to fully 
understand the dynamics of national corruption.  
 
  
 The citizen has an inherent duty to fight corruption, either by denouncing it, 
actively showing their political dissatisfaction with corruption scandals, supporting 
honest and transparent leaders, or by refusing to resort to it. In the words of Karklins 
(2005, p. 165), working on post-communist societies: 
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“Public values and views are expressed in discourse, which creates a climate of either corruption 
apologia or social rejection. Anti-corruption work needs to limit tolerance for both petty and grand 
corruption. Honest people are the core constituency for reform, but to date all too many post-
communist citizens participate in petty corruption and tolerate it in others. Yet many are also angry, 
especially about high-level corruption. When designing anti-corruption strategies, this ambivalence 
should be anticipated.” 
 
 As the source of political power, and the main force of the polity, the citizenry 
have much more influence in the health of the State than it usually realizes, and such 
passivity can be considered essential in the emergence of many of the social, 
economic, and political evils that are present in Peru. This has been the primary 
assumption of the present study, over which a carefully structured model and analysis 
of the citizens’ tolerance of malfeasance was constructed. If all members of Peruvian 
society are, as many authors consider (Ford, 2003, p. 202; Sanchez, 2010, p. 15), 
essential to bring corruption to a halt and provide the foundations for the development 
of the State, we were concerned over the void in past corruption literature regarding 
such an essential actor. To say it in fewer words, there was no significant model to 
account for the determinants of corruption tolerance among citizens, thus lacking the 
required scholarly support to a voiced warning: Without the participation of society, 
there is no way out from the harms of graft and malfeasance. Such is the historic 
lesson that many Peruvians have now come to realize, after the dramatic events that 
welcomed the country to the new century, and a reality that popular, academic, and 
politic circles can’t afford to continue ignoring.    
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APPENDIX 1 
Information Regarding Corrupt (and Anti-corrupt) Activities  
of the Six Major Candidates of 2006, and Their Political Parties 
# issue Date Party Candidate Extract Condition 
(party) 
Condition 
(candidate) 
Title-
Body 
1637 22/09/00  Martha 
Chávez 
… constitucional diseñado por Alberto Bustamante, Martha Chávez y Miriam 
Schenone –con el visto bueno de Montesinos–,  
- C B 
1640 12/10/00  Martha 
Chávez 
… montesinistas apoyados por halcones como Martha Chávez intentarían frustrar la 
ratificación de las reformas constitucionales en la segunda legislatura… 
- C B 
1640 12/10/00  Martha 
Chávez 
Aybar Cancho en prisión,... describe la manera cómo Montesinos participaba de este 
tipo de operaciones y cómo la congresista Martha Chávez,... también conocía los 
hechos… 
- (-) AC T 
1641 18/10/00  Martha 
Chávez 
Martha Chávez de Ocampo no descartó la posibilidad de tratar el tema de una 
amnistía (ver aparte), como había revelado Fernando Olivera. 
- C B 
1643 2/11/00  Martha 
Chávez 
"Las declaraciones del narcotraficante Demetrio Chávez que pretenden involucrar a 
Vladimiro Montesinos en actividades ilegales no tienen ningún fundamento y forman 
parte de una confabulación y campaña antipatriótica". 
- (-) AC B 
1643 2/11/00  Ollanta 
Humala 
… ilegitimidad del régimen, de lo fraudulento de las últimas elecciones y de la 
corrupción de algunos de los altos mandos de las Fuerzas 
- AC T 
1644 9/11/00  Martha 
Chávez 
Ugaz recibió el respaldo de todos los sectores políticos... sin embargo, Martha 
Chávez ... habrían acudido donde el Presidente, a quejarse amargamente. 
- (-) AC B 
1645 16/11/00  Alan García Alan García y Vladimiro Montesinos: las acusaciones sin pruebas y las pruebas sin 
atenuantes. 
- C B 
1650 21/12/00  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… aprobación en el Congreso del paquete de leyes extraordinarias anticorrupción ... 
la dupla García Sayán-Ugaz se apuntó un primer gran… 
- AC T 
1650 21/12/00  Ollanta 
Humala 
… se trasunta el grado de corrupción existente. Todo eso mientras el comandante 
Ollanta Humala... purgan prisión justamente por levantarse… 
- AC T 
1651 28/12/00  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… pasar al retiro a decenas de generales ..., vinculados de algún modo al círculo de 
Vladimiro Montesinos y su socio Alberto Fujimori. 
- AC B 
1652 11/1/01  Alan García ... vídeo grabado por Alfredo Zanatti en el que ... asegura que las imputaciones que 
hizo contra García en 1995 eran falsas 
- (-) C B 
1654 25/01/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
Luego del vómito negro de la corrupción, … régimen transitorio que Paniagua 
preside, pero lo que no resulta discutible es su austeridad republicana. 
- AC T 
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1655 1/2/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… apuntaba hacia… Valentín Paniagua, a quien Pereda acusó de haber recibido 
dinero … de uno de los testaferros mayores del ex asesor. 
- C (-) C T 
1656 8/2/01 APRA  … vídeo estrella de la semana: Agustín Mantilla, el jefe de campaña del APRA en las 
elecciones del 2000, siendo "coimeado" por... Montesinos. 
C - B 
1656 8/2/01  Alan García … coincidencia hace suponer que el Apra, o por lo menos García, tiene, aunque lo 
niegue, un acuerdo subterráneo con un sector del fujimorismo.  
- C T 
1660 8/3/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
La iniciativa ha sido asumida por el canciller Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, suscribirá la 
Carta Democrática Interamericana. 
- AC B 
1662 22/3/01  Lourdes 
Flores 
… terrible dilema... de Lourdes Flores: ¿hasta qué punto, ...vale la pena recibir el 
apoyo de la clase política y empresarial corrompida durante el fujimorato? 
- (-) AC B 
1663 29/3/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
..Valentín Paniagua concedió facultades al procurador ad hoc, José Ugaz y a los 
procuradores adjuntos... para interponer acciones judiciales contra Fujimori. 
- AC B 
1665 11/4/01  Alan García No cargar la administración pública con una burocracia partidaria… No detener ni 
negociar las condiciones de la lucha contra la corrupción. 
- (-) AC T 
1666 19/4/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
La lucha contra la corrupción que está impulsando el gobierno de transición es 
integral y la está enfrentando a través de muy diversas y trascendentes acciones. 
- AC T 
1666 19/4/01  Humberto Lay ... Baldo Kresalja (empresario y abogado), Humberto Lay Sun, Alvaro Rey de Castro 
(psicoanalista), Mónica Sánchez (actriz) y Jorge Santistevan de Noriega (ex Defensor 
del Pueblo) 
- AC B 
1668 3/5/01  Alan García ...la amenaza del clientelismo, que es de una altísima probabilidad, porque AGP 
necesita al Partido Aprista para que sea la tropa de su proyecto caudillista. 
- (-) AC T 
1669 10/5/01 APRA  ...en los países vecinos (que no usaban MUC). Esto produjo un negocio adicional a los 
fabricantes, distribuidores y farmacéuticos allegados al régimen.  
C - B 
1670 17/5/01 APRA Alan García ...Matanzas en los penales, casos de corrupción durante su gobierno y acogerse a una 
figura como la prescripción; escupirá uno. … 
C (-) AC B 
1670 17/5/01  Ollanta 
Humala 
...tratamiento que se dio a la rebelión del comandante Ollanta Humala, cuyo 
comportamiento se contrastaba con el de la corrupta cúpula montesinista.  
- AC (-) AC B 
1671 24/5/01  Alan García Olivera denunció la existencia de una sociedad civil constituida en París por Alan 
García y su esposa… para realizar la compra de un inmueble...  
- C (-) C T 
1674 14/6/01  Martha 
Chávez 
… indignación de la Dra. Chávez resulta desproporcionada y absurda... se ha pasado 
casi 9 años defendiendo a capa y espada a varios de los mayores ladrones… 
- (-) AC T 
1675 21/6/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
La semana pasada trascendió que el Presidente Valentín Paniagua respalda al general 
Medina, y le dio su aval para que se defienda públicamente. 
- (-) AC (-) C B 
1676 28/6/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… primera vez que el Presidente Paniagua se manifiesta de modo tan enérgico sobre 
la extradición de Fujimori, ...con la presencia de Machiavello en Lima. 
- AC T 
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1676 28/6/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… se realizó en Lima la Primera Conferencia Nacional Anticorrupción, inaugurada 
por un memorable discurso del Presidente Valentín Paniagua 
- AC B 
1678 12/7/01  Martha 
Chávez 
… aprobadas antes de la caída del régimen: la de las interceptaciones telefónicas, 
que bajo la batuta de Martha Chávez de Ocampo no llegó a ninguna parte; … 
- C T 
1679 19/7/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… las trascendentes iniciativas del Gobierno de transición han coincidido con los 
objetivos del proyecto de Acceso a la Información... del Consejo de la Prensa Peruana 
- AC B 
1680 26/7/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… ciclo del gobierno de transición se abre con la promulgación del paquete de leyes 
que han permitido procesar a los involucrados en la red de Vladimiro Montesinos 
- AC T 
1681 2/8/01 AF   Las acusaciones constitucionales contra… a los 11 congresistas y ex congresistas 
fujimoristas que se reunieron con Vladimiro Montesinos, entre otras. 
C - B 
1682 9/8/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… anticorrupción en la sociedad. Y si se hace siguiendo la línea trazada por la 
Comisión Nacional Anticorrupción creada por el gobierno de Valentín Paniagua, 
mejor. 
- AC B 
1683 16/8/01  Alan García …  muchos de los que estaban contra García… en el aspecto económico, y en 
acusaciones de corrupción, que no han sido despejadas en su totalidad. 
- C B 
1683 16/8/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… contradicciones destaca el Reglamento... de Inteligencia aprobado durante el 
Gobierno Transitorio... decreto supremo de cuestionable carácter secreto. 
- (-) AC B 
1684 23/8/01  Valentín 
Paniagua 
La autoridad moral de Paniagua fue eficiente para convocar a nuevas y limpias 
elecciones, enérgica para meter a varios generales en la cárcel, … 
- AC B 
1684 23/8/01 AF  … inhabilitar de toda función pública a 17 miembros del régimen fujimorista -entre 
los que destacan las ahora ex congresistas Luz Salgado y Carmen Lozada… 
C - T 
1686 6/9/01  Alan García Cecilia Valenzuela hace público el… que tiene "pruebas" de que AGP "negoció" con 
Montesinos la solución de sus problemas judiciales. 
- C T 
1687 13/9/01  Alan García Cecilia Valenzuela mostró los documentos en los que Montesinos y Mendel Winter 
refieren sus contactos con Alan García. Las declaraciones existen… 
- C (-) C T 
1687 13/9/01 APRA  Propuesta por Jorge del Castillo, la ley es extensiva también a quienes participaron en 
la obtención de pruebas condenatorias sobre actos de corrupción. 
AC - B 
1687 13/9/01  Alan García Probablemente en eso se basa la periodista para afirmar que ella ha demostrado que 
hubo un pacto entre García y Montesinos. 
- C B 
1691 11/10/01 APRA  Olivera protagoniza un segundo escándalo. ... Esta vez intentó relacionar al 
congresista aprista César Zumaeta con el desmentido que Vladimiro Montesinos 
hiciera esa vez, ante legisladores y periodistas, acerca del supuesto "arreglo" 
C (-) C - B 
1691 11/10/01  Martha 
Chávez 
fue en el SIN donde se redactó el recurso de amparo que presentó Chávez contra el 
fallo del Tribunal Constitucional... para el caso de Fujimori. 
- C B 
1698 29/11/01  Alan García En 1991 el "Informe Lark" -que acusaba a Alan García de poseer más de US$ 50 - (-) C B 
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millones en bancos del extranjero- se reveló como un fraude...  
1704 17/1/02 FC  Orlando Caminada Dulanto, gerente general de Invermet, sería un eslabón importante 
de una cadena de corrupción en la Municipalidad de Lima. 
(-) AC - T 
1704 17/1/02 FC  … campaña presidencial de Somos Perú, el partido contrató los servicios 
pirotécnicos… pago se habría realizado con fondos de la Municipalidad de Lima. 
C - T 
1705 24/1/02 FC  El alcalde reconoce errores acerca de cómo enfrentó políticamente el problema. 
Asegura tener la consciencia limpia. Está investigando a sus hombres… 
(-) AC - T 
1706 31/1/02 FC  … desde que Barba lo avala en conferencias de prensa y señala con mecha acusadora 
a miembros del entorno de Andrade, luce una ordenada raya al… 
(-) AC - B 
1709 21/2/02 FC  A Andrade le agobian estas noticias. Confía en que la Justicia aclarará todo y se 
lamenta por la corrupción que pudiera existir en las instancias… 
C - T 
1715 4/4/02  Valentín 
Paniagua 
US$ 15 mil supuestamente girado al ex ministro de Defensa, ...Walter Ledesma por 
parte de Tzvi Sudit, comerciante de armas vinculado a Vladimiro Montesinos 
- (-) AC (-) C T 
1726 20/6/02  Martha 
Chávez 
Denuncia contra Martha Chávez por haber coordinado en el SIN el recurso de 
amparo en contra del referéndum que impedía la re-reelección. 
- C B 
1734 15/8/02 FC  Andrade… En la Comisión de Fiscalización del Congreso lo estarían investigando 
por 62 supuestas irregularidades, muchas de las cuales fueron derivadas a la 
Contraloría. 
C - B 
1741 3/10/02 APRA  … 30 mil dólares que recibió de Montesinos para la campaña electoral del Apra, sin 
que su partido lo supiera, según Mantilla ha sostenido con obstinación. 
C (-) C - T 
1745 30/10/02 FC  Andrade también hace frente a las baterías que Rafael Rey descarga en su contra. Su 
última acusación apunta al Gran Parque de Lima, obra que… 
C - B 
1757 30/1/03 APRA  … que se comprenda en la investigación a Mantilla el periodo de 1985 a 1990, y el 
pleno lo acepta, acataré esa decisión. 
C - T 
1760 20/2/03 APRA  Mantilla... disciplinado militante, se puede presumir que se corrompió... guarda 
dólares y secretos en nombre de un partidario bien mayor. 
C - T 
1768 16/4/03  Martha 
Chávez 
...reuniones de negociación en las que habrían participado Montesinos, Martha 
Chávez, ... los hermanos Aybar Cancho y una serie de intermediarios y traficantes. 
- C B 
1769 24/4/03 APRA  ...compras efectuadas al final del gobierno aprista serían, a juicio de las 
investigaciones en el Congreso, el origen de las coimas que alimentaron las cuentas de 
Mantilla. 
C - T 
1769 24/4/03 APRA  La denuncia aprobada unánimemente por la Comisión Mulder el martes 22, acusando 
a José Ugaz de los delitos de receptación y falsedad genérica… 
(-) AC - B 
1770 30/4/03  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… estuviera preparando una lista bastante representativa -con el ex presidente 
Valentín Paniagua a la cabeza- de personalidades políticas y culturales en apoyo a 
- AC B 
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Ugaz. 
1770 30/4/03  Lourdes 
Flores 
La reconsideración de Ugaz, pedida además por Lourdes Flores, fue dejada de lado. - AC B 
1770 30/4/03 APRA  … horas antes de que la CF rechazara -con votos de PP y el FIM, más la abstención 
del Apra- el pedido de reconsideración a favor del ex Procurador. 
(-) AC - B 
1771 8/5/03 AF  … a Keiko le conviene responder a las acusaciones que se le achacan. Tres delitos: 
hurto agravado, peculado y usurpación de funciones. 
C - B 
1772 15/5/03 APRA  ...Mantilla asegura que… corresponden a "donaciones" de partidos amigos del 
aprismo-, el próximo en ser convocado podría ser el ex presidente Alan García. 
C (-) C - T 
1772 15/5/03  Ollanta 
Humala 
La empatía del carismático líder nace el 29 de octubre del 2000, cuando el teniente 
coronel Ollanta Humala se subleva a la cúpula militar adicta a Montesinos. 
- AC B 
1774 29/5/03 APRA  … interrogatorio a su hermano Miguel Angel (Mufarech) en la Comisión de 
Fiscalización del Congreso…  cuestionado presidente aprista de la Región Lima. 
(-) AC - B 
1778 26/6/03 APRA  En la actualidad, el clan Arana tiene una significativa influencia en la base aprista de 
Pueblo Libre… núcleo original de las empresas que conforman la Corporación 
Septentus.  
(-) AC - T 
1779 3/7/03 APRA  Olivera intenta acusar al congresista aprista César Zumaeta de haber ingresado a la 
Base Naval para entrevistarse con Vladimiro Montesinos.  
C (-) C - B 
1781 17/7/03 APRA  ...depósitos de apertura de las cuentas de los hermanos Mantilla (aproximadamente 
US$300 mil) provinieron de los más de US$10 millones que recibieron los israelitas… 
C - T 
1784 7/8/03 AF  … Fujimori… nuevo proceso por peculado a raíz de su participación en la irregular 
entrega de US$ 15 millones a Vladimiro Montesinos para que el ex asesor fugara... 
(-) AC - B 
1785 14/8/03 AF  … proceso abierto contra Fujimori… por los delitos de peculado, asociación ilícita 
para delinquir y contra la fe pública. 
(-) AC - T 
1789 11/9/03 AF  … en 1993 en la cual se observa al ex presidente preparando un sobre con dólares y 
ordenando su entrega a Vidal Bautista, ex jefe del Pronaa. 
(-) AC - T 
1789 11/9/03 APRA  … documentos bancarios que evidencian presuntos desvíos de dinero del gobierno 
regional de Ancash hacia cuentas personales de su presidente, Freddy Ghilardi. 
C - B 
1790 18/9/03 APRA  Max Ramírez García, presidente de la región San Martín, fue finalmente expulsado 
del partido y denunciado por la Comisión de Fiscalización del Congreso... ante el 
Ministerio Público 
AC - T 
1790 18/9/03 APRA  Freddy Ghilardi, presidente regional de Ancash... espera junto a Miguel Angel 
Mufarech -Lima Provincias- que el Legislativo se pronuncie… 
C - T 
1790 18/9/03 APRA  encuentre en el gesto algún símil con el momento en el que le tocó romper con su ex 
colaborador Agustín Mantilla, acusado de recibir dinero de Vladimiro Montesinos. 
C - B 
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1791 25/9/03  Alan García Valenzuela lanzó una "bomba" que ligaba a sus dos bestias negras, Montesinos y 
García... el Doc habló con Alan cuando estaba en Panamá. 
- C B 
1793 9/10/03 APRA  … Fredy Ghilardi, el Partido Aprista ha decidido la creación de un Tribunal de 
Honor que analice cada una de éstas y se pronuncie respecto a cuál pueda ser la mejor 
sanción aplicable… 
AC - B 
1794 16/10/03 APRA  … la dirigencia del APRA anunció su respaldo al cuestionado presidente de la región 
Ancash, Freddy Ghilardi. El partido esperará lo que diga el Poder Judicial antes de 
tomar acciones más drásticas… 
(-) AC - B 
1794 16/10/03 APRA  … denuncias que apuntan al propio presidente regional de Puno, David Jiménez 
Sardón. Lo acusan de haber recibido una coima de S/. 800 mil soles. 
C - B 
1795 23/10/03  Alan García … AGP no dijo -y se dice que no dirá- nada respecto a las expresiones de la señora 
Toledo (las mismas que lo acusaron de haberse enriquecido a su paso por el poder... 
- C (-) C T 
1795 23/10/03 AF  … declaraciones de José Kamiya Teruya, ex secretario general de la Presidencia, 
quien explicó al Ministerio Público cómo Fujimori dispuso de al menos US$ 3.8 
millones en donaciones. 
(-) AC - B 
1798 13/11/03 APRA Alan García Al mismo tiempo, deslindan fuertemente con cualquier acercamiento a Alan García y 
al PAP por temas de corrupción y derechos humanos. 
C C B 
1798 13/11/03 FC  (Raúl Diez Canseco) Acusado de haber beneficiado con exoneraciones tributarias a 
Germán de la Fuente, padre de su pareja Luciana, mediante un decreto supremo… 
C - T 
1800 27/11/03 FC  La comisión investiga si hubo funcionarios implicados en el presunto delito de tráfico 
de influencias en la dación del DS 047… 
C (-) C - T 
1801 4/12/03 AF  Han pasado casi tres años desde que se iniciaron las investigaciones judiciales a la red 
de corrupción de Vladimiro Montesinos y Alberto Fujimori. 
(-) AC - T 
1809 5/2/04  Valentín 
Paniagua 
El periodista Beto Ortiz arrojó sillao por doquier e incluyó en su larga lista de 
acusados a… Valentín Paniagua, ex presidente. Todos lo rectificaron. 
- C (-) C B 
1811 19/2/04  Alan García El italiano Sergio Siragusa, ex asesor comercial del consorcio Tralima que dijo haber 
pagado "comisiones" a Alan García en 1986, presentó ahora una extraña… 
- C B 
1817 1/4/04 AF  … la estrategia de Fujimori se divide en dos flancos: uno, el partidario, presidido por 
Carlos Orellana, y otro, el mediático, dirigido por Carlos Raffo. 
(-) AC - B 
1831 8/7/04 APRA  Seis consejeros apristas de la región lo acusaron de malos manejos administrativos en 
obras viales y de cobros ilegales en las direcciones educativas de la región. 
C - B 
1832 15/7/04 UN  Rafael Rey es un político tolerante con el fujimorismo y la agrupación política que 
lidera (Renovación Nacional) también presentó firmas falsas al momento de 
inscribirse. 
C - B 
1834 5/8/04 UN  … la agrupación de Rafael Rey y José Barba Caballero (Renovación-CODE) presentó C - B 
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la mayor cantidad de adherentes, 2’255,770, es decir, más del 15 % del universo 
electoral… 
1838 2/9/04 UN  El congresista Rafael Rey llama delincuente a Toledo por el tema de las firmas, pero 
exonera del mismo calificativo a Fujimori. Se trata de una campaña… 
(-) AC - T 
1839 9/9/04 APRA  … negociaciones entre sectores apristas y oficialistas… el partido de Alfonso 
Ugarte toleraría la baja de los miembros del equipo del procurador ad hoc Luis 
Vargas Valdivia a fin de mes… 
(-) AC - B 
1840 16/9/04 APRA  … Olivera determinó que las investigaciones contra el APRA ocupaban un lugar más 
preponderante que el cúmulo de expedientes de Alberto Fujimori y Vladimiro 
Montesinos. 
C - B 
1841 23/9/04 UN  Por increíble que parezca, el Municipio de Lima simplemente no informa qué 
empresas ganaron hasta ahora licitaciones y en qué condiciones. 
(-) AC - T 
1843 7/10/04 UN  Asimismo, si se quiere hablar de firmas, se puede investigar también las de la 
organización de Rafael Rey. 
C - B 
1844 14/10/04 AF  … US$ 59.4 millones los entregados a Fujimori desde los Ministerios de Defensa, 
Interior, Institutos Armados y Servicio de Inteligencia “para solventar sus gastos 
personales”. 
(-) AC - B 
1850 25/11/04  Martha 
Chávez 
… congresista suspendida Martha Chávez y al ex congresista Luis Cáceres 
Velásquez, acusados por Pinchi de haber recibido dinero ilícito del Doc. 
- C B 
1851 2/12/04  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… Paniagua el favorecer a los notarios durante su administración, presentándose 
luego un conflicto de intereses al trabajar para ellos una vez que retornó a la práctica 
privada. 
- C (-) C T 
1852 9/12/04  Alan García Otros le enrostran que votara por la prescripción del delito de enriquecimiento ilícito 
del que se acusaba a Alan García. 
- C (-) C B 
1857 20/01/05 UN  … tres partidos (Perú Posible, CODE–Renovación y Perú 2000) tienen denuncias en 
el Poder Judicial por falsificación de firmas… 
C - B 
1858 27/01/05  Alan García … siguieron con las revelaciones del ex patriota (transformado luego por el FIM en 
un vulgar mercenario) quien supuestamente sabría de un audio Montesinos-García… 
- C (-) C B 
1858 27/01/05 UN  "...desarticulado a Barba Caballero y a Rey, que estaban en posición ya de querer 
independizarse. Barba, que estaba yendo para el otro lado, y Rey, nuevamente ya 
empiezan a entrar acá." 
C - T 
1859 3/2/05 UN  … acercarlo a Rey era, según fuentes confiables, edificar una “oposición artificial” 
que disgregaría la opción de voto alejándola del auténtico bloque opositor al 
fujimorismo. 
C - T 
1859 3/2/05  Martha Uno de los desencuentros más notorios que salió a la luz pública fue el protagonizado - C B 
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Chávez por Martha Chávez, acusada de recibir US$ 20 mil de Montesinos… 
1861 17/2/05  Alan García Otro tema que abordará, se prevé, es el de la corrupción, empezando por las altas 
esferas actuales. … no han acatado la decisión de rebajar los sueldos de los 
congresistas. 
- AC B 
1861 17/2/05  Martha 
Chávez 
Para Chamorro no procede la reincorporación de Chávez porque no ha concluido el 
proceso judicial, al haber apelado a la sentencia el fiscal supremo. 
- (-) C T 
1864 10/3/05 UN  … habrían existido irregularidades en el primer lote de firmas entregadas por la 
agrupación Renovación para su inscripción en las elecciones generales del 2006. 
C - T 
1866 23/3/05 APRA  ...Apra es ahuyentar los fantasmas de la estatización de la banca, hiperinflación, 
racionamiento, populismo a ultranza, demagogia y más de un caso de corrupción del 
primer gobierno aprista. 
AC - B 
1867 31/3/05 UN  … se espera que en el Congreso desfile una serie de nombres vinculados al caso Code-
Renovación, entre las que se encuentran... 
C - B 
1867 31/3/05 UN  ¿No es lógico deducir que, en esto de las firmas, usted está actuando por encargo de 
los rezagos del anterior régimen? 
C - T 
1871 28/4/05 UN  … existen indicios de una masiva falsificación en CODE-Renovación, por lo que 
solicitará una prórroga de sus atribuciones para seguir con esa investigación. 
C - B 
1872 5/5/05 UN  … “la existencia de una organización criminal” dedicada a la falsificación de firmas 
en Code-Renovación… La pelota le cae sólo a José Barba Caballero y a su esposa... 
C - B 
1876 2/6/05 AF  Los comandos naranjas lo vitorearon y lo anunciaron: “Se siente, se siente, Fujimori 
presidente”. Y la Interpol, mientras tanto, lo tiene con el código rojo... 
(-) AC - T 
1881 7/7/05 AF  Fujimori tendrá cinco minutos en la televisión estatal... al amparo de los derechos 
electorales otorgados por el JNE y la ONPE a Sí Cumple, el apéndice fujimorista del 
momento. 
(-) AC - T 
1882 14/7/05 UN  Las afirmaciones de Diez Canseco alcanzan a la bancada de Unidad Nacional… C - B 
1882 14/7/05 APRA  … del total de la votación del pleno 18 de los que votaron a favor son del Apra y 13 
de Perú Posible. 
(-) AC - B 
1883 21/7/05 FC  … ambas denuncias han demostrado ser insustanciales. En el caso del Manacaru, 
se comprobó que la medida de exoneración del IGV dictada a favor del “suegro”... 
(-) C - B 
1886 11/8/05  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… necesidad de suscribir una hoja de ruta que garantice la estabilidad constitucional… 
El primer punto de este acuerdo es la iniciativa nacional anticorrupción. 
- AC B 
1887 18/8/05 APRA Alan García … gobierno honrado y de lucha frontal contra la corrupción e impunidad, incluyendo 
expresamente el caso de Alan García y su gobierno”, dice una de las cláusulas del 
documento. 
C (-) C C (-) C T 
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1888 25/8/05 UN  … Elva Llanos Seminario al ver su nombre en el acta de Constitución del Comité del 
Partido Popular Cristiano en Casma. “No pertenezco a ningún partido político” 
insistió. 
C - T 
1888 25/8/05 FC  Elva pasó de la sorpresa a la indignación cuando comprobó que su nombre también 
aparece como militante de “Somos Perú”. 
C - T 
1888 25/8/05 AF  … aparece como afiliado a tres partidos políticos, “Cambio 90”, “Sí Cumple” y 
“Alianza para el Progreso”… milita en Cambio 90, sin embargo inexplicablemente 
aparece también como afiliado n° 2 de Sí Cumple. 
C - T 
1890 8/9/05 APRA  … congresistas de prestigio como... Mauricio Mulder asumieron la defensa de lo 
indefendible y justificaron la actuación del JNE ante las inscripciones fraudulentas… 
(-) AC - T 
1890 8/9/05 UN  … congresistas de prestigio como Ántero Flores Aráoz... asumieron la defensa de lo 
indefendible y justificaron la actuación del JNE ante las inscripciones fraudulentas... 
(-) AC - T 
1890 8/9/05  Martha 
Chávez 
En 1996 chuponearon y acosaron a Javier Pérez de Cuellar y a otros líderes de la 
oposición. Martha Chávez encubrió la implacable persecución política. 
- C B 
1890 8/9/05  Ollanta 
Humala 
… la obtención del padrón bien podría servir de material para una falsificación de 
firmas masiva. Algo que Humala rechazó de plano cuando se le interrogó al 
respecto. 
- C (-) C B 
1896 20/10/05 UN  El secretario general del PPC, Luis Bedoya de Vivanco, le dio a Barba un ultimátum 
para aclarar las denuncias. 
AC - B 
1898 3/11/05 AF Martha 
Chávez 
Reggiardo, Chávez y Delgado Aparicio celebran la posibilidad de configurar una 
bancada diseñada para limpiar judicialmente a Fujimori, ocupado en azuzar el 
improbable fantasma del regreso. 
C C T 
1900 17/11/05 AF  Al testimonio de Montesinos se suma el de Matilde Pinchi Pinchi. ... sobre las 
remesas del SIN a Palacio de Gobierno. 
(-) AC - T 
1902 1/12/05  Ollanta 
Humala 
“El comportamiento de Humala ha sido limpio, en la medida que él ha desenvainado 
su espada sólo para cortar el nudo de la corrupción y para demostrar que condena… 
- AC (-) AC T 
1902 1/12/05 APRA  … “a los corruptos que han desprestigiado al partido y han lucrado del poder, que no 
pasarán en sus intenciones de candidatear en las filas apristas”. 
AC - B 
1902 1/12/05 FC  “Los informes deben ser conocidos antes de la primera vuelta”, coincide Víctor 
Andrés García Belaunde, presidente de Acción Popular. 
AC - B 
1902 1/12/05 RN  … Humberto Lay Sun, lanzado por Restauración Nacional. En sus filas hay ex 
miembros de Cambio 90, Nueva Mayoría y Vamos Vecino. 
(-) AC - B 
1903 9/12/05 AF  Carlos Raffo Arce - Jefe de prensa de “Sí Cumple” y vocero de Fujimori. (-) AC - B 
1903 9/12/05 APRA  Jorge del Castillo del PAP… cambios específicos en la forma de designar al Contralor 
de la República y de los procuradores, para “despolitizar la lucha contra la 
AC - B 
	 214	
corrupción”. 
1903 9/12/05 RN  “Se abstuvo en la votación sobre el pago inmoral de desinstalación”, citó como 
ejemplo. Alejos, en cambio, afirma que lo sacaron porque denunció la infiltración de 
fujimoristas en RN. 
AC (-) AC - B 
1904 15/12/05  Ollanta 
Humala 
Humala se levantó supuestamente contra Fujimori, pero no pone reparos en negociar 
con sus acólitos. Y contrata los servicios de uno de ellos para asesorarse legalmente. 
- AC (-) AC T 
1904 15/12/05 UPP  Lo acusó de tráfico de influencias y haber sustraído documentos con el fin de 
beneficiar a personajes de la red de Vladimiro Montesinos. 
C - B 
1904 15/12/05  Martha 
Chávez 
Al ser absuelta... estaría habilitada no solamente para reintegrarse al Congreso, sino 
también para postular en las elecciones del 2006. 
- (-) C B 
1905 22/12/05 UPP  … Torres Caro lo acusaron de ser hombre de la ex fiscal de la Nación Blanca Nélida 
Colán, que hoy purga condena debido a ser fiel ficha de Vladimiro Montesinos.  
C - B 
1905 22/12/05 APRA  … involucraron a funcionarios públicos y representantes del Estado que 
infringieron los reglamentos electorales “para favorecer apetitos personales”. 
AC / C - B 
1906 29-12-05 APRA  La Contraloría y la ONPE investigan las denuncias de uso de fondos públicos en las 
elecciones internas apristas. 
C - B 
1907 12/1/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
… levantamiento de Locumba en el 2000 y los “posibles nexos fujimontesinistas” de 
Ollanta Humala son… 
- (-) AC T 
1907 12/1/06 APRA  … se quedaban con el 10% de acciones de todas las empresas que se fundaban. –
Quién puede avalar esa infamia, qué fortuna si hasta me quitaron el trabajo, mis 
acciones... 
(-) C - B 
1907 12/1/06  Lourdes 
Flores 
… garantizar la aplicación de la ley para garantizar seguridad ciudadana y luchar 
sostenidamente contra la corrupción. La sensación de impotencia es la que exacerba 
la violencia... 
- AC B 
1907 12/1/06  Valentín 
Paniagua 
… es preciso concertar esa acción en áreas fundamentales tales como… la reforma de 
la estructura del Estado, la lucha contra la corrupción y contra el terrorismo y el 
narcotráfico... 
- AC B 
1907 12/1/06 APRA  … sostiene irresponsablemente que “sin Fujimori las elecciones son un fraude”. En 
las filas del Apra hay creciente indignación. 
(-) AC - B 
1907 12/1/06 APRA  En Cañete denunciaron votación fraudulenta a favor de Fidel Chumpitaz... En Sayán 
no hubo elecciones pero pasaron actas con 548 votos a favor de Edmundo Guardia. 
(-) AC - B 
1908 19/1/06 UN  … 296 regidores se habrían aumentado en un año las dietas indebidamente en todo 
Lima… como Marco Parra, próximo candidato al Congreso por Unidad Nacional. 
C - B 
1908 19/1/06 UPP  … Torres era Fiscal presionó por órdenes de Vladimiro Montesinos para que el ex 
congresista del Frepap Javier Noriega se pasara al oficialismo. 
C - B 
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1909 26/1/06 UPP Ollanta 
Humala 
… más de una mancha presentan los aspirantes a una curul por el Partido 
Nacionalista. Muchos de ellos enfrentan cargos por lavado de dinero, estafa, 
agresión, apropiación ilícita… 
C AC T 
1909 26/1/06 UPP  Carlos Torres Caro... ha negado las versiones periodísticas que lo sindican como el 
fiscal ad hoc nombrado por Blanca Nélida Colán para limpiar el caso de falsificación 
de firmas conocido como “el huanucazo”. 
(-) C - B 
1909 26/1/06  Alan García … advirtió que no dará paso a los “malos apristas” que solo piensan en llegar al 
Congreso para satisfacer sus intereses personales. 
- AC B 
1909 26/1/06  Martha 
Chávez 
“Con Martha Chávez presidente, Fujimori estará presente”. - C B 
1910 2/2/06 UPP Ollanta 
Humala 
Fue un duro golpe para Ollanta, sin duda, pero su reacción fue la más acertada. “No 
sólo hemos sacado a las personas que tienen investigaciones en la Fiscalía, sino 
también… 
C AC T 
1910 2/2/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
Sus nexos con elementos montesinistas tampoco han sido aclarados. … fue acusado 
por dos de sus subalternos de haberse apropiado de US$ 2,800 dólares de una 
terrorista. 
- C B 
1910 2/2/06 FC  El congresista acciopopulista Jhony Lescano presentó un proyecto de ley para 
levantar el secreto bancario de todos los candidatos a cargos de elección popular... 
AC - B 
1910 2/2/06 UPP  … denuncias y acusaciones periodísticas. –Todo empezó cuando alguien me acusó de 
manipular el caso de Genaro Delgado Parker, el ‘Huanucazo’ y el del congresista 
Noriega Febres. 
C (-) C - B 
1911 9/2/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
… tienen una conexión con Ollanta: el Huallaga. El teniente coronel EP (r) Carlos 
Enrique Rodríguez Cateriano estuvo preso nada menos que por narcotráfico... 
- (-) AC T 
1911 9/2/06 UN  … congresista Antero Flores Aráoz, quien ha anunciado que impulsará un recorte de 
las atribuciones del TC. En medio de la polémica… 
(-) AC - T 
1911 9/2/06 UN  … ‘La Ventana Indiscreta’ ha publicado el domingo pasado (5/2/2006) una relación de 
los ‘anticuchos’ de la lista congresal de Unidad Nacional. 
C - B 
1911 9/2/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
Humala había designado, entretanto, una comisión revisora… Sin embargo, no se le 
ocurrió mejor idea que nombrar a José Vega Antonio como presidente de esa 
comisión. 
- AC (-) AC B 
1911 9/2/06 UN Lourdes 
Flores 
… suspendió su gira por el sur de la República a fin de esclarecer la condición de 
algunos de sus candidatos, también acusados de afrontar investigaciones y procesos 
en el Poder Judicial. 
C AC B 
1911 9/2/06 UN Lourdes 
Flores 
… cuestionada desde algunos medios por la presencia de personajes como Horacio 
Cánepa, involucrado en el llamado “Huanucazo”. “Ni nací ayer ni me formaron como 
C AC B 
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delincuente”. 
1911 9/2/06 UN  El congresista Rafael Aíta (UN) ha propuesto una ley para limitar la inmunidad de 
los legisladores.  
AC - B 
1912 16/2/06 AF  –Hay una campaña de persecución política. Muchas de las personas que están en la 
lista y otros que están en la cárcel son personas que se han dedicado íntegramente a 
sacar al país de la quiebra. 
(-) C - T 
1913 23/2/06 AF  Dellepiane no se cansa de alegar su inocencia y esgrimir, entre otras cosas, que en el 
vídeo 888 Vladimiro Montesinos lo declara un obstáculo. 
C (-) C - B 
1914 2/3/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
Humala repitió el patrón de sus discursos: La coima es la mayor institución peruana, 
la clase política tradicional tiene sus días contados... 
- AC B 
1915 9/3/06 AF  … “El Chino va a volver”, le canta al ex presidente…  Alianza por el Futuro en una 
discoteca de Los Olivos fue una fiesta electoral. Durante el mismo concierto del dúo 
Raffo-Keiko… 
C - B 
1915 9/3/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
… conclusiones del informe sobre el insólito robo de tres documentos del legajo 
militar de Ollanta Humala… Partido Nacionalista, sus contactos militares parecen 
llegar al más alto nivel. 
- C T 
1915 9/3/06 UN  … acusado de recibir dinero del Doc para pasarse a las filas del fujimorismo en el 
2000, su inclusión en la lista de Unidad Nacional fue defendida a capa y espada. 
C - B 
1916 16/3/06  Martha 
Chávez 
… Martha Chávez y la soltó en medio del baile que se había apoderado de la 
discoteca… mientras intentaba articular pasitos de baile al “Ritmo del Chino”. 
- (-) AC B 
1917 23/3/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
El mismo que el 13 de febrero instó a su audiencia en un mitin a “denunciar a todos 
estos alcaldes corruptos para que salgan a lomo de burro”. 
- AC B 
1917 23/3/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
El 29 de octubre del 2000 a la una de la madrugada Vladimiro Montesinos huía a 
Panamá en el velero Karisma. A la misma hora los Humala se sublevaban. 
- (-) AC B 
1917 23/3/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
… lanzó atarantadamente la especie de un audio Humala-Montesinos. Según la 
información recabada por CARETAS, Popy sabría de la supuesta cinta desde el año 
2004. 
- (-) AC B 
1917 23/3/06 UN  … Unidad Nacional por Lima con el número 33 es Carmen Rosa Chávarry 
Chimoy.  … anuncia en un evento proselitista el sorteo de una mototaxi... y varios 
artefactos electrodomésticos. 
(-) AC - B 
1918 30/3/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
… el cambio de Arequipa a la base de Locumba se debió a un pedido expreso de Cano 
Angulo, otras versiones señalan que Vladimiro Montesinos hizo la recomendación. 
- (-) AC B 
1918 30/3/06  Ollanta 
Humala 
… Antauro Humala sobre una supuesta confiscación de medios de comunicación en 
un posible gobierno de su hermano… 
- (-) AC (-) C B 
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1918 30/3/06 AF  … algunos, como Alianza por el Futuro de Martha Chávez, prefirieron evitarse la 
molestia y no rindieron cuentas de nada. 
(-) AC - B 
1919 7/4/06 UPP  .. inicialmente creyó en el proyecto de Ollanta Humala y se desengañó de la peor 
manera: Con los contactos afines a Vladimiro Montesinos enraizados en su comando 
de campaña. 
(-) AC - T 
1919 7/4/06  Valentín 
Paniagua 
Ejemplares la firmeza con la que se enfrentó a los secuaces de Vladimiro 
Montesinos, el orden con el que llevó al país de retorno por la democracia y la 
sobriedad que demostró… 
- AC B 
1919 7/4/06  Martha 
Chávez 
“El objetivo es fortalecer la agrupación (Alianza por el Futuro) en el Congreso, pero 
no seré títere ni clon del presidente Alberto Fujimori”. 
- (-) C B 
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APPENDIX 2 
Dictionary of Corruption and Anticorruption-related Terms  
and Generated Observations 	
Corruption-related terms 
compra colusión ilicito impunidad tarjetazo asalto inhabilitar soborno 
captura extorsión denuncia nepotismo compadrazgo fraude lobby presión 
mafia influencia Fujimori década 90 cáncer traición patronaje irregular 
cohecho abuso Montesinos decadencia robo delinquir/delito clientelismo proselitismo 
coima conflicto de 
intereses 
fujimontesinismo copamiento enriquecimiento  contrataciones/empleados 
fantasmas 
indebido  
Anticorruption-related terms 
transparencia idóneo veeduría declaración jurada contraloría  
honestidad rendición de 
cuentas 
vigilancia ciudadana auditoria fiscalizar 
ética Participación 
ciudadana 
lucha acceso a la 
información 
independencia 
moral control cruzada erario/tesoro autonomía 			
C/AC: Intention of the usage - Corruption (1) or Anti-corruption (2) 
Implicit/explicit: Implicit (1; the construct is assumed from the reference to AC), Explicit (2; the construct is mentioned in any variant) 
Length: Structural independence - Word(s) (1; construct with or w/o attached adjective and standing with other concepts), Sentence (2; statement about the construct, standing 
alone or repeated), Paragraph (3; two or more sentences), Sub-chapter (4), Chapter (5) 
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Party C / 
AC 
Implicit / 
explicit 
Length Keywords-in-context Page DxE 
UPP 1 2 2 … una patria envilecida donde la corrupción ha carcomido la vida publica… 3 4 
UPP 1 2 2 … videos que mostraron la compra de conciencias de los propietarios de algunos… 6 4 
UPP 1 2 2 Queremos desterrar la corrupción que cobijo el neoliberalismo fujimontesinista… 10 4 
UPP 2 2 2 … Estado social y democrático capaz de enfrentar la corrupción, … 11 4 
UPP 2 1 2 Promoveremos la transparencia y efectividad en las compras estatales… 32 2 
UPP 2 2 3 … lo que se conoce como "la captura del regulador". Esto significa declinar ante... 38 6 
UPP 2 1 2 … esta materia estarán orientadas a despartidizar e independizar dichos organismos. 39 2 
UPP 2 1 1 … valores como el compromiso con el servicio publico y la honestidad en la función. 39 1 
UPP 2 1 1 … y, lo mas importante, que sea ética y moralmente idóneo. 42 1 
UPP 2 2 2 … investigación parlamentaria que ha sido denunciados por indicios de corrupción. 43 4 
UPP 2 1 1 Evaluación de la idoneidad y calidad de la fiscalización efectuada a las empresas… 46 1 
UPP 2 1 2 Rendición de cuentas de los congresistas por necesidades del servicio... 52 2 
UPP 2 1 1 … predecible, efectivo, autónomo e independiente en sus decisiones en todos… 53 1 
UPP 1 2 2 … cuando debieron enfrentar a la justicia por sus vinculaciones con redes mafiosas. 53 4 
UPP 2 2 2 Priorizaremos la lucha contra la corrupción en que el magistrado que infrinja… 53 4 
UPP 2 1 1 … experiencia de los postulantes; la moral, honestidad y ética profesionales. 54 1 
UPP 2 2 1 … etílico causantes de muerte, cohecho y corrupción de funcionarios. Asimismo… 54 2 
UPP 2 1 2 … rendición de cuentas, afirmación de la transparencia publica y desarrollo de medios de participación 
ciudadana en el control. 
54 2 
UPP 2 2 2 Corrupción cero, eliminación de coimas, tarjetazos y compadrazgos. 54 4 
UPP 2 1 2 Habrá rendición de cuenta obligatoria en todos los niveles de gobierno… 56 2 
UPP 2 1 2 Establecimiento de Sistemas de Participación y Control Ciudadano a nivel de provincias y distritos. 56 2 
UPP 2 1 2 Establecimiento de veedurías ciudadanas en lo administrativo como órgano de… 56 2 
UPP 2 2 4 Cruzada nacional contra la corrupción. 57 8 
UPP 2 2 2 … patriótico de combatir la corrupción que deteriora la sociedad peruana, … 57 4 
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UPP 2 2 1 … cruzada nacional para sancionar a las mafias y luchar contra el narcotráfico, … 57 2 
UPP 2 2 3 Combatiremos contra el cáncer de la corrupción que ataca a nuestra sociedad. 57 6 
UPP 1 2 2 … "que esta bien que los funcionarios roben, lo importante es que las obras se vean". 57 4 
UPP 2 2 3 … creando una cultura de lucha contra la corrupción, para sensibilizar a todos… 57 6 
UPP 2 2 2 La lucha anticorrupción será una política de Estado permanente y de largo plazo… 57 4 
UPP 2 2 2 La cultura contra la corrupción será formativa y encargada… 57 4 
UPP 2 1 2 … iniciativas legislativas tendientes a perfeccionar la transparencia de las compras… 57 2 
UPP 2 2 2 Instalaremos la Comisión Nacional Anticorrupción, independiente, autónoma, … 57 4 
UPP 2 2 2 … para los casos de extradición, enriquecimiento ilícito, concusión y cohecho. 57 4 
UPP 2 1 2 … redes de vigilancia ciudadana, comités cívicos distritales… de transparencia. 57 2 
UPP 2 2 2 … valores en la lucha anticorrupción, premiaremos el valor civil para evitar y denunciar… 57 4 
UPP 2 2 2 … aliados estratégicos de la lucha contra la corrupción y una herramienta… 58 4 
UPP 2 2 3 La lucha contra la corrupción será preventiva y la ley será aplicada con rigor… 58 6 
UPP 2 2 2 … buenas practicas y crear nuevos modelos de normas anticorrupción. 58 4 
UPP 2 2 2 … liderazgo moral, ético, … participación de todos en la lucha contra la corrupción. 58 4 
UPP 2 2 1 … en casi todos los casos son medios de sobreexplotación y corrupción. 65 2 
UPP 1 2 1 … Hay corrupción. 66 2 
UPP 2 2 2 … Declarando una lucha frontal contra la corrupción. 71 4 
UPP 2 2 1 … mediante la profundización de los criterios de lucha contra la corrupción, ... 78 2 
Total      141 
APRA 2 2 1 Cruzada contra la corrupción y el trafico de drogas ilícitas en todos los ámbitos… 11 2 
APRA 2 2 2 … Estado y la sociedad civil en la lucha contra la corrupción. 16 4 
APRA 2 2 2 … penalicen cualquier acto de corrupción en el gobierno y fuera de el. 41 4 
APRA 2 2 2 Luchar implacablemente contra la corrupción en las diferentes instituciones… 42 4 
APRA 2 2 4 Lucha contra la corrupción. 43 8 
APRA 2 2 2 … verdadera cruzada contra la corrupción en cuyo contexto se enfatizaría… 43 4 
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APRA 2 2 2 … impunidad, el abuso del poder, la corrupción y el atropello de los derechos.  43 4 
APRA 2 2 2 … ley, de solidaridad y de anticorrupción, que elimine las practicas violatorias… 43 4 
APRA 2 2 2 … independencia de la Procuraduría en la investigación de denuncias de corrupción. 43 4 
APRA 2 2 2 … sentencias a los acusados por corrupción y evitar que estos sigan siendo… 43 4 
APRA 2 1 2 Promover la designación transparente de las autoridades judiciales, así… 15 2 
APRA 2 1 2 Ejecutar medidas de moralización, transparencia y acceso a la información de la… 21 2 
APRA 2 1 1 … seguridad alimentaria y nutricional con un enfoque participativo y transparente. 24 1 
APRA 2 1 1 … mecanismo modernos… que busquen la eficiencia y transparencia en el manejo… 28 1 
APRA 2 1 1 … en el contexto de las recomendaciones de la CERIAJUS respetando su autonomía. 13 1 
APRA 2 1 1 … renegociar aquellos que por falta de equidad y transparencia, afecten los intereses… 32 1 
APRA 2 1 1 Velar por el desempeño responsable y transparente de la función pública. 43 1 
APRA 2 1 4 Política de transparencia y libertad de expresión. 43 4 
APRA 2 1 2 ... de los ciudadanos a solicitar y recibir información, … y la transparencia y difusión… 43 2 
APRA 2 1 2 … una cultura de transparencia, de rendición de cuentas y de difusión de los actos de… 44 2 
APRA 2 1 2 Establecerá un sistema transparente y justo de asignación de la publicidad estatal. 44 2 
APRA 2 1 2 … en la especialidad de “PROMOTORES DE ETICA PUBLICA” y promover la formación… 43 2 
APRA 2 1 2 Promover la vigilancia ciudadana de la gestión pública y el fortalecimiento… 43 2 
APRA 2 1 2 … facilitar el libre, oportuno y completo acceso a la información estatal. 44 2 
APRA 2 1 2 … el acceso a la información del Estado y la publicidad de los actos de la administración… 44 2 
APRA 2 2 2 Regular la función pública para evitar su ejercicio en función de intereses particulares. 43 4 
APRA 2 1 2 … contratado previo concurso público y sus resultados publicados en los portales... 14 2 
APRA 2 1 2 … Contralor General de la República sea nombrado por el Congreso Nacional a... 43 2 
APRA 2 1 2 … Contraloría General de la República tenga plena autonomía respecto a los poderes… 43 2 
APRA 2 2 2 Erradicar la utilización proselitista del aparato estatal y la formación de clientelas. 14 4 
Total 83 
UN 2 2 1 … en general, un país donde no exista corrupción de ninguna índole. 5 2 
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UN 2 2 1 … moral para los cargos de Contralor, Procurador Anticorrupción, Defensor del... 31 2 
UN 1 2 2 … existe ineficiencia y corrupción, y de que la justicia sirve intereses… 36 4 
UN 2 2 4 Política anticorrupción. 42 8 
UN 1 2 3 … Cualquier clase de corrupción es mala y atenta contra el desarrollo… 42 6 
UN 1 2 3 … confluyen para favorecer la corrupción de todo tipo... 42 6 
UN 1 2 3 … que las entidades más corruptas sean las que se conducen sin liderazgo… 42 6 
UN 1 2 3 … protagonistas de la corrupción grande y pequeña se sienten a salvo… 42 6 
UN 2 2 3 … firme compromiso político del más alto nivel de no tolerar la corrupción. … 42 6 
UN 2 2 2 … institucionales para luchar contra la corrupción. Se tratará de una... 43 4 
UN 2 2 2 … plan anual de lucha contra la corrupción para ser desarrollado en todas las... 43 4 
UN 2 2 2 … procedimientos y trabas burocráticas… que puedan propiciar actos de corrupción. 43 4 
UN 2 2 2 planteará iniciativas legislativas en materia de lucha contra la corrupción. 44 4 
UN 2 2 2 … ciudadanos sobre presuntos actos de corrupción o contravención… 44 4 
UN 2 2 2 … Especial, conocida como justicia anticorrupción, mejorando sus recursos… 44 4 
UN 2 2 2 … ente coordinador del sistema anticorrupción, en el que participen representantes… 44 4 
UN 2 2 2 … internacionales relativos a la lucha contra la corrupción, priorizando… 44 4 
UN 2 2 2 … internacionales de lucha contra la corrupción, tales como la Convención... 44 4 
UN 2 2 2 … dirigidas a revertir la altísima tolerancia de los peruanos frente a la corrupción… 45 4 
UN 1 2 1 … como por algunos actos de corrupción en que incurrieron ciertos altos… 48 2 
UN 1 2 1 Escasez de efectivos y recursos, deficiente distribución, alta percepción de corrupción. 50 2 
UN 2 2 1 … cada localidad. b) Lucha contra la corrupción. C) Bienestar y dignificación… 50 2 
UN 2 2 1 … en vincularla con: a) La lucha contra la corrupción; b) El cuidado... 56 2 
UN 2 2 1 … aspectos de lucha contra la corrupción hasta la dotación de los equipos… 56 2 
UN 2 2 1 … agendas comunes en cuanto a lucha contra la corrupción; lucha contra la pobreza… 57 2 
UN 1 2 1 … privatización de la violencia (narcotráfico, terrorismo, corrupción, trata de… 61 2 
UN 2 1 1 … técnico supervisor para asegurar la transparencia y calidad de los programas. 12 1 
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UN 2 1 1 … ejercerá un rol subsidiario y promoverá Asociaciones Público Privadas transparentes… 30 1 
UN 2 1 1 … asegurar la completa transparencia y el buen funcionamiento de las reglas de… 31 1 
UN 2 1 2 … la promoción de la ética y la transparencia en espacios públicos y privados. 45 2 
UN 2 1 2 … asegurar la transparencia en el otorgamiento de concesiones, dar la máxima difusión… 100 2 
UN 1 2 3 … intervenido durante el régimen fujimorista, etapa en la cual se produjo un copamiento… 36 6 
UN 2 1 2 … como privadas, en materia de promoción de la ética pública. 44 2 
UN 2 1 1 … enfatizar la eficiencia en el uso de los recursos y el control de los mismos. 9 1 
UN 2 1 3 … de resultados, fiscalización y control de gestión… adecuada rendición de cuentas. 31 3 
UN 2 1 2 … mucho más costoso ceder a presiones de privados e incurrir en irregularidades. 43 2 
Total 121 
AF      0 
FC 1 2 1 Sistema educativo centralizado, desfinanciado y con altos índices de corrupción. 8 2 
FC 2 2 2 … sancionar drásticamente los actos de corrupción, fomentando el ejercicio ético… 9 4 
FC 2 2 2 Lograr un sistema anticorrupción activo, eficaz y transparente. 16 4 
FC 2 2 2 Combatir la corrupción existente en muchos programas sociales. 17 4 
FC 2 2 2 Lucha contra la corrupción. 44 4 
FC 2 2 4 Lucha contra la Corrupción. 44 8 
FC 2 2 2 … nuevo diagnóstico que describa el estado de corrupción en el Perú. 44 4 
FC 2 2 2 Pacto político anticorrupción que defina un Plan o Programa Nacional de Lucha… 45 4 
FC 2 2 2 Fortalecer el Sistema Anticorrupción de acuerdo a los objetivos definidos en el Plan. 45 4 
FC 2 2 2 Impulsar el desarrollo normativo anticorrupción que permita contrarrestar… 45 4 
FC 2 2 2 … de Inteligencia Financiera y a las procuradurías, fiscalías y juzgados anticorrupción. 45 4 
FC 2 2 2 Modificar la ley y reglamento de la Comisión Nacional Anticorrupción. 45 4 
FC 2 1 2 Mejorar los indicadores de transparencia en la administración pública. 40 2 
FC 2 1 2 … accedan libremente a los portales de transparencia y otros medios de difusión… 43 2 
FC 2 1 2 … sanciones a quienes no cumplan con la ley de transparencia, así como… 43 2 
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FC 2 1 1 Asegurar la responsabilidad y transparencia en la gestión de la administración… 44 1 
FC 2 1 1 … del Ministerio de Defensa, transparentando el gasto sin que esto permita develar… 46 1 
FC 2 1 1 … administrativos del Ministerio del Interior, transparentando el gasto. 46 1 
FC 2 1 2 … recursos, así como de rendición de cuentas por parte de los actores educacionales… 9 2 
FC 2 1 2 … permanente política de vigilancia social y rendición de cuentas, tanto en la gestión… 9 2 
FC 2 1 2 Garantizar el acceso a la información y promover la rendición de cuentas en… 42 2 
FC 2 1 2 ...participación ciudadana y de la sociedad civil organizada en la planificación, ejecución y control… 40 2 
FC 2 1 2 … mecanismos de participación de los ciudadanos en el control de los actos del gobierno. 41 2 
FC 1 1 1 … público que no responde a las exigencias de descentralización y de control. 23 1 
FC 1 1 1 ...integrar al ciudadano en la toma de decisiones y en el control de la gestión pública. 43 1 
FC 2 1 2 … por parte del sistema nacional de control, y su independencia del poder político. 44 2 
FC 2 1 2 Implantar mecanismos de vigilancia ciudadana. 41 2 
FC 2 1 2 … Presidente de la Corte Suprema y el Contralor, sea elegidos por el Congreso. 41 2 
FC 2 1 2 Fortalecer la autonomía e independencia de las organizaciones estatales de defensa… 28 2 
FC 2 1 2 … ente autónomo que ejerza la función de control y aplicación de sanciones. 41 2 
Total 81 
RN 2 2 2 … consideramos que la lucha contra la corrupción es el compromiso impostergable...  3 4 
RN 2 2 3 … presente es vencer la corrupción. Este será un esfuerzo que partiendo… 3 6 
RN 2 2 2 … lucha contra la corrupción apoyada en una adecuada, clara y radical… 3 4 
RN 2 2 2 … por "la cultura política de la corrupción", buscamos ser un motor poderoso para… 4 4 
RN 1 2 2 … terrible cáncer de la corrupción con sus secuelas de empobrecimiento… moral... 6 4 
RN 1 2 1 … crisis de valores, una corrupción generalizada, inequidad y estructuras… 8 2 
RN 2 2 3 … salir adelante si continua la corrupción, porque sobre ella no se puede… 8 6 
RN 2 2 3 … este facilitando la corrupción. Si solo se eliminara la corrupción en la administración… 8 6 
RN 2 2 2 Legislación adecuada, clara y radical contra toda forma de corrupción. 8 4 
RN 2 2 2 Detectar y eliminar la corrupción aplicando drásticas medidas para combatirla… 11 4 
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RN 2 2 1 … permitan combatir la corrupción, así como el establecimiento de… 17 2 
RN 2 2 4 Anticorrupción 24 8 
RN 2 2 3 Detectar y eliminar la corrupción en todas sus manifestaciones. Fomentaremos… 24 6 
RN 2 2 1 … la delincuencia, la corrupción organizada, el trafico ilícito de drogas… 25 2 
RN 2 2 2 … que permitan combatir la corrupción. Asimismo como el establecimiento… 25 4 
RN 2 2 2 … esfuerzo frontal contra la corrupción, cultivando valores éticos y cívicos, … 33 4 
RN 2 1 2 … Ministerio publico, con absoluta independencia, autonomía, ética y transparencia. 17 2 
RN 2 1 2 … solida de valores, con principios éticos y procedimientos transparentes. 25 2 
RN 2 1 2 … surgimiento de una clase política impregnada de altos valores éticos y morales. 25 2 
RN 2 1 2 … FFAA y PNP a fin de eliminar cualquier posible irregularidad en estos procesos. 30 2 
RN 2 1 1 … la nación; con capacidad, honestidad, responsabilidad y eficiencia para gobernar.  12 1 
RN 2 1 2 procurando nombrar funcionarios honestos y probos conscientes de su… 24 2 
RN 2 1 2 … sistemáticamente los procedimientos de control en todos los niveles de la... 24 2 
Total 83 	
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APPENDIX 3 
Variables, Indicators, Categories and Codes Regarding HCT			
Determinant Code Indicator's survey question Categories Relation 
to HCT 
Media exposure 
  
  
  
  
  
  
pervb8c Did you receive or have knowledge of material about the candidates or political parties, their 
CV and/or their party platofrms? 
(1) Yes (2) No + 
pervb8d Did you watch any of the shows of "La mitad más uno" in Channel 7, on which the 
presidential candidates presented their party platforms? 
(1) Yes (2) No + 
a1 How frequently do you listen to the news on the radio? (1) Everyday ~ (4) Never + 
a2 How frequently do you watch the news on TV? (1) Everyday ~ (4) Never + 
a3 How frequently do you read the news in newspapers? (1) Everyday ~ (4) Never + 
a4i How frequently do you read the news on the Internet? (1) Everyday ~ (4) Never + 
pol2 How often do you discuss politics with other people? (1) Daily ~ (5) Never + 
Political 
awareness 
  
  
gi2 What is the name of the President of Congress in Peru? (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do 
not know (9) No Answer  
+ 
gi3 How many provinces does the country has?  (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do 
not know (9) No Answer  
+ 
gi4 How long is the presidential term in Peru?  (1) Correct (2) Incorrect (8) Do 
not know (9) No Answer  
+ 
Partisanship 
  
  
vb10 Do you currently identify with a political party?  (1) Yes (2) No - 
pervb12 How close do you feel to that party you sympathize with? (1) Very Close ~ (4) Do not feel 
close 
- 
cp13 The meetings of a political party or movement? You attend them… (1) Once a week ~ (4) Never - 
Bureaucratic 
culture 
  
dc1 A congressperson accepts a bribe of then thousand dollars from a company. Do you think 
that what the congressperson did is… 
(1) Corrupt and should be 
punished (2) Corrupt but justified 
(3) Not corrupt 
+ 
dc13 An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician 
uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. O you think the politician is… 
(1) Corrupt and should be 
punished (2) Corrupt but justified 
+ 
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(3) Not corrupt 
Economic 
interests 
  
  
pervb13 How much do you think that party represents your interests? (1) A lot ~ (4) Not at all - 
idio1 How would you describe your economic situation overall?  (1) Very Good ~ (5) Very Bad - 
q10d The salary that you receive and the total family income… (1) Is enough, you can save ~ (4) 
Is not enough, you can not cover 
your basic needs 
- 
Clientelism 
  
  
  
cp2 In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from a 
congressperson? 
(1) Yes (2) No - 
cp4a In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from any local 
authorities (mayor, municipality, prefect)? 
(1) Yes (2) No - 
cp4 In order to solve your problems have you ever requested help or cooperation from any 
ministry, public institution or state agency? 
(1) Yes (2) No - 
np2 Have you sought help from or presented a request to any office, official or councilman of the 
municipality within the past 12 months?  
(1) Yes (2) No - 
Perceived 
generalized HCT 
  
  
  
  
exc7 Taking into account our own experience or what you have heard, corruption among public 
officials is… 
(1) Very Common ~ (4) Very 
Uncommon 
- 
b2 To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Peru? (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
b13 To what extent do you trust the National Congress?  (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
b21 To what extent do you trust the political parties?  (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
b14 To what extent do you trust the Central Government?  (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
Democratic 
values 
  
  
  
  
cp5 In the past year have you contributed or tried to contribute toward the solution of a problem 
in your community or in your neighborhood?  
(1) Yes (2) No + 
cp5a Have you donated money or material to help address a problem in your community or in 
your neighborhood? 
(1) Yes (2) No + 
cp5b Have you contributed your own work or manual labor?  (1) Yes (2) No + 
jc13 In your opinion would a military coup be justified when there is a lot of corruption? (1) Yes (2) No + 
b6 To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Peru? (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot + 
Attitudes toward 
HC 
  
dc1 A congressperson accepts a bribe of then thousand dollars from a company. Do you think 
that what the congressperson did is… 
(1) Corrupt and should be 
punished (2) Corrupt but justified 
(3) Not corrupt 
+ 
dc13 An unemployed individual is the brother-in-law of an important politician, and the politician 
uses his influence to get his brother-in-law a job. O you think the politician is… 
(1) Corrupt and should be 
punished (2) Corrupt but justified 
+ 
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(3) Not corrupt 
Self-efficacy 
  
  
  
  
  
prot2 During last year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest? (1) Sometimes ~ (3) Never + 
cp8 Did you attend the meetings of a committee or council for community improvements? You 
attend them… 
(1) Once a week ~ (4) Never + 
cp5d Have you tried to help organize a new group to resolve a neighborhood problem or to bring 
about any improvement? 
(1) Yes (2) No + 
np1b To what degree do you think municipal officials pay attention to what people ask for in town 
hall meeting or other meeting convened by the mayor?  
(1) Very much ~ (3) Not at all + 
np1 Have you attended a town hall meeting or other meeting convened by the mayor in the past 
12 months? 
(1) Yes (2) No + 
muni11 How much influence do you think you have on what the municipality does?  (1) A lot ~ (4) None + 
Education ed What was the last year of education you passed? total number of years   
Household 
income 
q10 Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this household 
fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working adults and 
children?  
(00) No Income ~ (13) Above 
$2000 
 
Area (urban-
rural) 
ur  1. Urban 2. Rural   
Governmental 
AC 
n9 To what extent would you say the current Government combats government corruption?  (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot  
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APPENDIX 4 
Variables, Indicators, Categories and Codes Regarding LCT		
Deviant 
determinant 
Code Indicator's survey question Categories Relation to 
LCT 
Bad for society 
  
  
it1 Now, speaking of the people from here, would you say that people in this 
neighborhood are generally… 
(1) Very trustworthy ~ (4) Untrustworthy + 
cp5c Have you been attending community meetings about some problem or some 
improvement?  
(1) Yes (2) No + 
b6 To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Peru? (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
Economically 
convenient 
  
lgl3 Would you be willing to pay more taxes to the municipality so that it could provide 
better services or do you believe that it would not be worth it to do so? 
(1) Willing (2) Not worth it + 
cp5a Have you donated money or material to help address a problem in your community or 
in your neighborhood? 
(1) Yes (2) No + 
Legally harmful 
  
aoj12 If you were a victim of a robbery or assault, how much faith do you have that the 
judicial system would punish the guilty party? 
(1) A lot ~ (4) None + 
b1 To what extent do you think the courts of justice in Peru guarantee a fair trial?  (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
Unethical 
  
  
  
b3 To what extent do you think that citizens’ basic rights are well protected by the 
political system of Peru? 
(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
b32 To what extent do you trust the Mayor’s office of your municipality?  (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
muni15 How interested do you think the Mayor is in the people’s participation in the work of 
the munipality? 
(0) Not at all ~ (3) Very - 
pn4 In general, with the way in which democracy functions in Peru, would you say that 
you are…? 
(1) Very satisfied ~ (4) Very dissatisfied + 
Most people 
attempt 
exc7 Taking into account our own experience or what you have heard, corruption among 
public officials is… 
(1) Very Common ~ (4) Very 
Uncommon 
- 
High-level 
corruption 
  
muni6 How much confidence do you have that the Mayor's office manages funds well?   (0) None ~ (3) A lot - 
n9 To what extent would you say the current Government combats government 
corruption?  
(1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
Officials are 
corruptible 
exc7 Taking into account your own experience or what you have heard, corruption among 
public officials is… 
(1) Very Common ~ (4) Very 
Uncommon 
- 
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No economical 
alternative 
  
  
idio1 How would you describe your economic situation overall?  (1) Very Good ~ (5) Very Bad + 
q10 Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this 
household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working 
adults and children?  
(00) No Income ~ (10) Above $1000 - 
q10d The salary that you receive and the total family income… (1) Is enough, you can save ~ (4) Is not 
enough, you can not cover your basic 
needs 
+ 
Is dangerous to 
refuse 
  
  
b18 To what extent do you trust the National Police?  (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
b10a To what extent do you trust the system of justice?  (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
aoj1 If you were the victim of a crime, did you report the incident to any institution? (1) Yes (2) No + 
Compliant 
determinant 
Code Indicator's survey question Categories Relation to 
LCT 
Helps underpaid 
officials 
  
st1 Regarding the official dealings that you or someone from your family has had with the 
national police at some time, do you feel…? 
(1) Very satisfied ~ (4) Very dissatisfied - 
st2 Regarding the official dealings that you or someone from your family has had with the 
courts or justice tribunals at some time, do you feel…? 
(1) Very satisfied ~ (4) Very dissatisfied - 
Makes me feel 
impotent 
  
  
  
prot2 During last year, did you participate in a public demonstration or protest? (1) Sometimes ~ (3) Never + 
cp8 Did you attend the meetings of a committee or council for community improvements? 
You attend them… 
(1) Once a week ~ (4) Never + 
cp5d Have you tried to help organize a new group to resolve a neighborhood problem or to 
bring about any improvement? 
(1) Yes (2) No + 
np1 Have you attended a town hall meeting or other meeting convened by the mayor in the 
past 12 months? 
(1) Yes (2) No + 
Most people 
surrender 
exc7 Taking into account our own experience or what you have heard, corruption among 
public officials is… 
(1) Very Common ~ (4) Very 
Uncommon 
- 
Ineffective/dange
rous compliant  
  
  
muni10 If you carried out any official dealings or requested any document at the municipality 
in the past year, did they address your problem or request? 
(0) No (1) Yes - 
b10a To what extent do you trust the system of justice?  (1) Not at all ~ (7) A lot - 
aoj1 If you were the victim of a crime, did you report the incident to any institution? (1) Yes (2) No + 
Can't afford to 
lose service 
idio1 How would you describe your economic situation overall?  (1) Very Good ~ (5) Very Bad + 
q10d The salary that you receive and the total family income… (1) Is enough, you can save ~ (4) Is not + 
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enough, you can not cover your basic 
needs 
q10 Into which of the following income ranges does the total monthly income of this 
household fit, including remittances from abroad and the income of all the working 
adults and children?  
(00) No Income ~ (13) Above $2000 - 
Attitude 
  
exc18 Do you think that the way things are, sometimes giving a bribe is justified? (0) No (1) Yes  
exc19 Do you think that in our society giving bribes is justified because of the poor public 
services, or do you think it is not justified? 
(0) No (1) Yes  
Behavior exc11 During the last year, to process any kind of document (like a license, for example), 
have you had to pay any money above that required by law? 
(0) No (1) Yes  
exc14 Have you had to give a bribe to the courts during the last year? (0) No (1) Yes  
exc15 In order to be attended to in a hospital or a clinic during the last year, have you had to 
give a bribe? 
(0) No (1) Yes  
Officials' 
treatment 
sgl2 How have they treated you or your neighbors when you have had dealings with the 
municipality? 
(1) Very well ~ (5) Very badly  
Ask for a bribe exc6 During the last year, has any public official asked you for a bribe? (0) No (1) Yes  	
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APPENDIX 5 
Additional Logistic Regression Analyses 
Concerning Attitudinal and Behavioral Indicators of LCT 
 
 
TABLE A5-1 
PAYMENT OF A BRIBE BY OWN INITIATIVE OR VICTIMIZATION (ALL SUBJECTS) 
 
 VICTIMIZATION  
BRIBE NO YES TOTAL 
NO 823 
92.06% 
76 
59.38% 
899 
87.96% 
YES 71 
7.94% 
52 
40.62% 
123 
12.04% 
TOTAL 894 
100% 
128 
100% 
1,022 
100% 
 
 
TABLE A5-2 
IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPT DEVIANCE (ALL SUBJECTS) 
 
 
BRIBE COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
ATTITUDES 
(GREED) 
-0.471 0.368 -1.28 
 
N = 878 
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.005 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
 
 
 
TABLE A5-3 
IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE (ALL SUBJECTS) 
 
 
BRIBE COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
ATTITUDES -0.222 0.391 -0.57 
 
N = 127 
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.003 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
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TABLE A5-4 
PAYMENT OF A BRIBE BY OWN INITIATIVE OR VICTIMIZATION (ONE CASE) 
 
 VICTIMIZATION  
BRIBE NO YES TOTAL 
NO 506 
94.76% 
34 
66.67% 
540 
92.31% 
YES 28 
5.24% 
17 
33.33% 
45 
7.69% 
TOTAL 534 
100% 
51 
100% 
585 
100% 
 
 
TABLE A5-5 
IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPT DEVIANCE (ONE CASE) 
 
 
BRIBE COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
ATTITUDES 
(GREED) 
-1.944 1.024 -1.90 
 
N = 524 
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.037 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
 
 
TABLE A5-6 
IMPACT OF ATTITUDES OVER BEHAVIOR – CORRUPTION COMPLIANCE (ONE CASE) 
 
 
BRIBE COEFFICIENT STD. 
ERROR 
Z 
ATTITUDES 3.36e-17 0.700 0.00 
 
N = 51 
CRAGG-UHLER (NAGELKERKE) R2 = 0.000 
* P<0.05; ** P<0.01; *** P<0.001 
 
 	
 
 
 
 
 	
 
 
 
